Here are the materials in Smith v. United States (D. Ariz.):
Major Crimes Act
Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Conviction over Dissent on Right to Counsel in Tribal Court (Rosebud Sioux)
Here are the materials in United States v. Long:
An excerpt from the dissent:
A misdemeanant like Michael Long is forbidden to possess a firearm only if he was “represented by counsel in the case” in which he sustained the misdemeanor conviction, or if he “waived the right to counsel in the case.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(I). It is undisputed that Long did not waive the right to counsel and that he was not represented by a lawyer in the case. The court concludes, however, that because Long was represented in the case by a nonlawyer, dubbed a “lay counsel” by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, he was “represented by counsel in the case.” I believe that this conclusion is inconsistent with the meaning of the word “counsel” in the statute, so I would reverse Long’s conviction for possession of a firearm as a prohibited person.
Ninth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Manslaughter Conviction
Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. Bearcomesout.
Tenth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Murder Conviction
Here is the opinion in United States v. Magnan.
Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act DV/Sexual Assault Conviction
Here is the opinion in United States v. Johnson.
Federal Court Holds State Highway on Sandia Pueblo is Indian Country
Here are the materials in United States v. Antonio (D.N.M.):
An excerpt:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, filed April 10, 2017 (Doc. 62)(“Motion”). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on April 11, 2017, and a hearing on April 12, 2017. The primary issue is whether the Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the Indian Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573 (Dec. 20, 2005), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, because the automobile collision giving rise to Plaintiff United States of America’s criminal prosecution against Defendant Jeffrey Antonio, which occurred on private land, nonetheless occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant to the Sandia Pueblo, which Congress confirmed in the Act of December 22, 1858, 11 Stat. 374, 374 (1859). The Court concludes: (i) the automobile collision giving rise to this criminal cause of action occurred within the exterior boundaries of the 1748 Spanish land grant; and, consequently, (ii) under 25 U.S.C. § 331 Note, the Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the Court denies Antonio’s Motion.
Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Child Abuse Conviction
Here is the opinion in United States v. White Plume.
Justice Dept. Cements Position on Concurrent Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in “Optional” P.L. 280 States
Here:
oaag-80488-v1-optional_pl_280_memo_to_u_s__attorneys
An excerpt:
For decades, conflicting judicial decisions and Department of Justice statements have led to uncertainty about whether the United States has concurrent jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 over Indian-country crimes that fall within an “optional P.L. 280” State’s jurisdiction under Section 7 of Public Law No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). The Acting Solicitor General, after reviewing prior positions of the Department and the underlying legal materials, has now concluded that the litigating position of the United States is that the United States does have this concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Your Offices therefore can bring prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153, in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2), notwithstanding any contrary view about optional P.L. 280 jurisdiction that the United States or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) may have previously expressed.
Eighth Circuit Affirms Major Crimes Act Conviction; Judge Bright Dissents on Race Discrepancy in Sentencing Issue
Here is the opinion in United States v. Lasley.
Briefs:
An excerpt from Judge Bright’s dissent:
I write to protest the sentencing disparity in this case and the heavy disparity in sentences for other similarly-situated individuals based purely on their race and residence. Appellant-defendant Gordon Lasley (Lasley), an Indian and twenty-six-years old at the time of sentencing, will spend the rest of his life in prison for a conviction of two counts of second-degree murder, but a sentence imposed as though the conviction was for two counts of first-degree murder. This result comes about because our precedent: (1) purports to allow the imposition of the federal sentencing regime to cases under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 without consideration of sentences imposed and actual time served for similar state-law crimes; and (2) authorizes federal district courts to find a defendant committed a greater offense for the purpose of sentencing when a jury expressly convicts a defendant of the lesser-included offense. The consequence of both precedents is a high probability Lasley will serve a longer sentence than a white citizen because Lasley is an Indian who committed a crime in Indian Country. This disparity resting on Lasley’s status as an Indian is unjust, unfair, and improper for the reasons set forth herein. Thus, Lasley’s sentence should be reversed and remanded.
Ninth Circuit Reverses Major Crimes Act Conviction on Indian Status Grounds
Here is the opinion in United States v. Alvirez.
The court’s syllabus:
The panel reversed a conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6), and remanded.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that a Certificate of Indian Blood offered into evidence by the government in order to establish Indian status, an essential element of § 1153, was a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 902(1). The panel held that this error was not harmless.
The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude references to polygraph evidence, where the defendant, who elected not to present his multiple-interrogation defense as a legal strategy, was not denied the opportunity to present his defense.
The panel held that the district court cannot show plain error in the district court’s application of enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 for infliction of permanent or life-threatening injury.
The panel held that double jeopardy does not bar retrial after reversal in this case because the erroneously-admitted Certificate of Indian Blood was nevertheless sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
Briefs here.
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