Here is the complaint in Muscogee Creek Indian Freedmen Band, Inc. v. Zinke (D.D.C.).
From the press release:
The Muscogee Creek Nation (“MNC”), with full knowledge and approval of the DOI, continues to deny so-called “Creek Freedmen” and their Descendants their Creek citizenship in violation of the Creek Treaty of 1866, the Constitution of the United States, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The so-called Creek Freedmen continue to be denied basic rights of citizenship including but not limited to their right to vote, right to hold office, and right to be recognized for who they are: Creek Indians by birthright, heritage, history, and culture. The named Defendants are the Creek Nation Principal Chief,James Floyd; the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”); and the Hon. Ryan Zinke, Secretary of DOI.
Here is the complaint in Free v. Dellinger (N.D. Okla.):
UPDATE (5/14/2018):
3 Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Here.
This is the second time recently a well-reasoned QEW case has been unreported, which means it can’t be used as precedent. The first was in Washington. In re K.S., 199 Wash.App. 1034 (2017). This one is out of the Texas Court of Appeals.
First, because I’ve been getting a lot of emails lately about foster parent issues, here are the witnesses who testified:
Only three witnesses testified at the termination hearing: S.P., R.C.P.’s foster parent, and Glendalys Mojica Gonzalez, the caseworker assigned to the case. The Department did not designate or proffer any of the witnesses as an expert, and the trial court did not make any rulings or findings regarding expert witnesses.
The Court then analyses the 2015 Guidelines (which it appears would have been governing this case since it was started in October 2016, i.e. initiated prior to December, 2016. 25 CFR 23.143) and concludes none of those people are QEWs.
The failure of the Department to produce the kind of competent evidence expressly required under the Act to support termination constitutes a failure of proof. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 812 (“[W]hen expert testimony is required, lay evidence . . . is legally insufficient.”); see also Martin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (reversing involuntary-commitment order as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence where State
failed to introduce expert testimony as required by involuntary-commitment statute). Therefore, even viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, because the record does not contain the statutorily required qualified-expert testimony, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to meet the standard of proof under section 1912(f). See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also In re V.L.R., 507 S.W.3d at 796–97 (reversing judgment terminating parental rights because not supported by testimony of qualified expert witness as required under ICWA); Doty-Jabbaar, 19 S.W.3d at 877 (same).
Here:
Question presented:
Whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
Lower court materials here.
UPDATE:
Environmental Federation Of Oklahoma Inc Amicus Brief
Here is the order with the corrected opinion, and an opinion concurring in the denial of en banc review from Judge Tymkovich:
Order Denying En Banc Petition
En banc petition stage materials here.
Panel materials here.
Here are the primary briefs:
2017 09 21 petition for rehearing
2017 10 10 u.s. amicus in support of petition
appellant’s resp to en banc pet
muscogee (creek) nation amicus brief in opposition to en banc pet
Here are additional briefs
amicus mtn ok oil and gas et al
motion by ok independent petroleum assn to file amicus brief
ok municipal league mtn to file amicus
united keetoowah band amicus resp to en banc pet
Panel materials here.
Here are the materials in Kialegee Tribal Town v. Dellinger (N.D. Okla.):
an excerpt:
The Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because plaintiffs have not shown in their complaint that the Court would be required to resolve a substantial and disputed question of federal law. Plaintiffs’ complaint identifies an issue of federal law concerning the enforcement of IGRA by an Indian tribe, but plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts supporting even an inference that the MCN was seeking to enforce IGRA. Dellinger’s letter strongly supports the conclusion that the MCN was seeking to enforce its own laws when it took possession of the Bruner allotment. The law is clearly established that federal courts lack the authority to resolve disputes over tribal law, and such disputes fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of tribal courts. Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 943 (8th Cir. 2010); Wheeler v. United States Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 811 F.2d 549, 551-52 (10th Cir. 1987). The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear matters solely concerning the interpretation of tribal law, and plaintiffs must litigate their case in tribal court to the extent that plaintiffs’ contest the enforcement of tribal gaming laws. As the parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, plaintiffs bear the burden to establish that “federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of California, 463 U.S. at 27-28. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, and this case should be dismissed.
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