Here are the materials in Morris v. Giant Four Corners Inc. (D.N.M.):
38 Giant Motion to Dismiss or Stay Pending Exhaustion
79 DCT Order on Negligent Entrustment
90 Giant Motion for Judgment on Pleadings
Here are the materials in Morris v. Giant Four Corners Inc. (D.N.M.):
38 Giant Motion to Dismiss or Stay Pending Exhaustion
79 DCT Order on Negligent Entrustment
90 Giant Motion for Judgment on Pleadings
Here:
Lower court materials here:
18-motion-to-dismiss
19-motion-to-dismiss
20-reply
22-motion-to-amend-complaint
23-opposition
24-reply
26-dct-order
Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether federal courts are free to ignore congressionally confirmed Indian treaty rights that impliedly reserve tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct within an Indian reservation, thereby effecting an impermissible judicial abrogation of those treaty rights.
2. Whether federal courts may disregard the Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for determining the status of a roadway existing on tribal trust land when deciding if an Indian tribe has inherent sovereign jurisdiction to adjudicate a collision occurring on that roadway between a tribally regulated tour bus and a passenger vehicle carrying tribal members.3. Whether federal courts may decline to apply the consensual relationship exception of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), because nonmember conduct occurred on land deemed to be the equivalent of non-Indian fee land, where (a) the Supreme Court has indicated that Montana’s consensual relationship exception can justify tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct occurring on non-Indian fee land or its equivalent, and (b) there exists a consensual relationship of the qualifying kind between the tribe and the nonmembers.
4. Whether federal courts may deny that an Indian tribe has inherent civil jurisdiction, pursuant to the second Montana exception, over nonmembers’ commercial touring of tribal lands that results in a fatal tour bus/auto collision where (a) the nonmembers’ conduct implicates the tribe’s interests in governing itself, controlling internal relations, and superintending land use, and (b) the impact of the commercial touring activity, unconstrained by tribal regulatory authority, is demonstrably serious and imperils the tribe’s sovereign interests.
Lower court materials here.
Here:
Previously, a member of the Navajo council had drafted a proposal to remove Chief Justice Yazzie:
Proposed removal of Navajo Nation Chief Justice
Politics is a beast. Judicial administration is incredibly difficult.The list of the six allegations against Chief Justice Yazzie demonstrates how these two can interact into an ugly stew. Whether these allegations are rooted in politics I am in no position to opine. But I have a few comments on the independence of the tribal judiciary that I imagine are implicated here:
Here are the six allegations, as summarized by the law and order committee:
On their face, some of these allegations appear to be rooted in maladministration. The first, for example, may be exactly that. But others appear to be likely rooted in political disagreements with the judge’s views on substantive law, most notably, the fifth and sixth allegations. All of them appear to be mixtures of both administration and substantive law.
Elsewhere in the committee release, the committee notes that public commentary was overwhelmingly in opposition to the Chief Justice. The Navajo Nation, I understand, had made a judgment that tribal judges were entitled to life tenure to prevent their removal for making controversial decisions. This information alone seems meaningless and irrelevant, and its inclusion frankly suggests political motivations.
It is very possible that these allegations may be proven to the extent that the Chief Justice is effectively found guilty by an impartial tribunal of “malfeasance, misfeasance, and serious neglect of duty” (to quote the committee’s release). I further realize that a judge may abuse his or her power and improperly interfere in the political process, perhaps justifying removal in extreme circumstances. It can be a fine line for the judge. The next step here looks like simple legislation to me, not due process. I’m not on firm ground here — I know nothing about the Navajo Tribal Council’s process in the context of judicial removals — but there mere fact that it is the tribal council considering this judicial removal process as mere legislation, according to the committee’s release, does not bode well for due process. It looks to me like politics.
These two documents, which are allegations and mere summaries of allegations, plus my own outsider knowledge of several very controversial decisions reached by the Navajo Supreme Court in recent years, compels me to see the makings an unfortunate effort by the political branches of government to remove the Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court. I hope this is not the case, and that the Tribal Council affords proper due process rights to the Chief Justice.
I write this with deep respect for the Navajo Nation, the Navajo Tribal Council, and the Navajo judiciary.
Here is the unpublished memorandum. An excerpt:
Appellants conceded at oral argument that the Navajo Nation has not retained the right to exclude nonmembers on U.S. Highway 160. Consequently, the highway is the equivalent of non-Indian fee land for jurisdictional purposes, and this case is governed by Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). See Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56.
Briefs and oral argument materials here.
Federal district court materials here.
Tribal court materials here.
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