Here is the opinion in Alvarez v. Lopez.
An excerpt:
We consider whether an Indian tribe violated a criminal defendant’s rights by failing to inform him that he could receive a jury trial only by requesting one.
The answer was yes. One judge dissented.
The same panel had held in 2014 that the petitioner had failed to exhaust tribal remedies. Those materials here.
The panel issued this opinion on rehearing. Here are the rehearing stage materials:
Here is the opinion in Akina v. State of Hawai’i.
An excerpt:
These appeals concern recent efforts by a group of Native Hawaiians to establish their own government. The plaintiffs are Hawaii residents who challenge that process. They appeal the district court’s order denying their request for a preliminary injunction to stop activities related to the drafting and ratification of self-governance documents. Separately, another group of Hawaii residents appeals the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene in the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal of the preliminary injunction order as moot, and we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to intervene.
Briefs here.
Here are the materials in United States v. Washington (subproceeding 09-01):
Here are the materials in Jamul Action Committee v. Chaudhuri (E.D. Cal.):
127-1 Federal Motion to Dismiss
133-1 JAC Motion for Summary J
This case is on remand from the Ninth Circuit; those materials here.
Here is the opinion in Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act and California law on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity.
Following the Eleventh Circuit, the panel held that a federally recognized Indian tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity from suit by exercising its right to remove to federal court a case filed against it in state court. The panel concluded that the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity.
The panel remanded the case, leaving it to the district court to address on remand any remaining immunity issues.
Briefs here.
Here is the opinion in United States v. Lamott.
Briefs:
An excerpt:
In 2013, Congress added the offense of assault by strangulation to the federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C. § 113. The following year a jury convicted Jordan Lamott under this provision for nonfatally strangling his girlfriend. We must decide whether the jury was properly instructed to disregard Lamott’s voluntary intoxication, which requires us to determine whether § 113(a)(8) is a general or specific intent crime. We also must decide whether the court’s instruction to the jury on assault by strangulation violated Lamott’s due process rights. We hold that assault by strangulation under § 113(a)(8) is a general intent crime, and Lamott’s intoxication was therefore irrelevant. We find no plain error in the court’s instruction on the elements of the offense. Accordingly, we affirm Lamott’s conviction.
A lengthier excerpt:
Violence against Native American women in Indian Country has reached alarming rates in the past few decades. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016). Recent studies suggest that Native American women experience certain violent crimes at two and a half times the national average. Id. (citing Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence, Ending Violence So Children Can Thrive 38 (Nov. 2014)). Particularly pervasive among violent crime is nonfatal strangulation by domestic partners. See Nancy Glass et al., Non-Fatal Strangulation Is an Important Risk Factor for Homicide of Women, 35 J. Emergency Med. 329, 333 (2008).
Nearly half of domestic violence victims report being choked. Id. at 330, 333. Recent studies show that although nonfatal strangulation often leaves few visible signs of injury, it can cause severe physical, neurological, and psychological complications and often forebodes future domestic homicide. See Donald J. Smith, Jr. et al., Frequency and Relationship of Reported Symptomology in Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: The Effect of Multiple Strangulation Attacks, 21 J. Emergency Med. 323, 327–28 (2001); see also Glass, supra, at 329–33 (concluding that women who have been nonfatally strangled are over seven times more likely to become a victim of homicide with the same partner). The recent increased focus on the dangers of nonfatal strangulation confirms what “[s]urvivors of non-fatal strangulation have known for years”: “Many domestic violence offenders and rapists do not strangle their partners to kill them; they strangle them to let them know they can kill them—any time they wish.” Casey Gwinn, Strangulation and the Law, in The Investigation and Prosecution of Strangulation Cases 5, 5 (2013).
These concerns helped motivate the reauthorization in 2013 of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 159 Cong. Rec. S480-02, S488 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Udall). In relevant part, the Act amended the federal assault statute to add a provision directed toward victims of nonfatal strangulation by a domestic partner. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. The newly added section (a)(8) criminalizes “[a]ssault of a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner by strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate.” 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8).
Here is the opinion in United States v. Benally.
An excerpt:
Joe Arviso Benally appeals a jury conviction for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 and 1153 and for using a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In a separate unpublished memorandum disposition, we address Benally’s challenge to the trial proceedings and sentence. In this opinion, we address whether involuntary manslaughter can be considered a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). We hold that involuntary manslaughter is not a “crime of violence” and reverse the § 924(c) count of conviction.
Here is the opinion in Russell Road Food & Beverage v. Spencer.
An excerpt:
Once associated with a legendary Native American leader, “Crazy Horse” is now a registered trademark for “entertainment services, namely, exotic dance performances.” We must decide whether Russell Road’s use of the mark “Crazy Horse III” for its Las Vegas strip club infringes defendants Frank Spencer and Crazy Horse Consulting’s rights to the trademark “Crazy Horse.” The district court granted summary judgment to Russell Road, holding that it has the right to use the mark because it is the assignee of a valid trademark co-existence agreement entered into with the former owner of the registered Crazy Horse mark. We agree, and therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Russell Road.
Here is the opinion in Aguayo v. Jewell.
An excerpt:
This appeal analyzes whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded that, according to tribal law, it had no authority to intervene in a tribal membership dispute, in which more than 150 people were disenrolled from the Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band or Band). We conclude that it did not, and affirm the decision of the district court.
Appellate Briefs:
Doc. 13 – Appellant’s Opening Brief
Doc. 23 – Answering Brief of the Federal Defendants
Doc. 21 – Appellant’s Reply Brief
Lower court materials here
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