Here:
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin (W.D. Wis.):
This case is on remand from the CA7, materials here.
News coverage here.
Here is the brief in opposition in Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation:
Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Opposition Brief
Cert petition here.
Here:
Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation Cert Petition
Question presented:
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) defines authorized Indian gaming as Class I, Class II, or Class III. 25 U.S.C. § 2703. Unlike Class III gaming, Class II is not subject to tribal-state gaming compacts. 25 U.S.C. § 2710. Class II gaming includes card games that “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II). Wisconsin’s Constitution prohibits the state legislature from authorizing any form of gambling, including poker. See Wis. Const., art. IV, § 24(1).
Prior to Congress enacting IGRA, the Court held that a state cannot enforce its gambling laws on Indian land when its policy toward gambling is civil and regulatory, rather than criminal and prohibitory. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987). Here, the Seventh Circuit applied Cabazon to interpret IGRA. It concluded that the electronic poker offered by the Ho-Chunk Nation is Class II, not Class III, when Wisconsin’s policy toward gambling and poker is regulatory, rather than prohibitory. Under this approach, the Nation can offer e-poker in Madison, Wisconsin despite the parties’ compact, which does not authorize Class III gaming in Madison.The question presented is:
Whether Cabazon’s “regulatory/prohibitory” test that pre-dates IGRA applies to determine whether a game is Class II or Class III gaming under IGRA?
Lower court materials here.
Here is the opinion in State of Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation:
An excerpt:
The State of Wisconsin sued the HoChunk Nation of Wisconsin to stop the tribe from offering electronic poker at its Madison gaming facility. The state maintained that the tribe was violating its agreement with the state to refrain from conducting Class III gaming at that location. The tribe responded that its poker is a Class II game that is permitted by law. The state prevailed in the district court, and the Ho-Chunk Nation now appeals. We reverse.
Briefs are here.
Lower court materials here.
Here is the opinion in Schlemm v. Wall.
And a release from Huy.
The petition is here.
Here:
Western Sky v Jackson Cert Petition
Questions presented:
I. Whether the validity of an arbitration clause is determined exclusively by the statutory requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), as held by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits – or by a common-law “reasonableness” test, as held by the Seventh Circuit below?
II. Whether a court may apply a state law defense in a manner that disfavors arbitration by voiding an entire arbitration clause merely because the contractually-designated arbitrator is unavailable, notwithstanding the FAA’s express directive to appoint a substitute arbitrator?
III. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously – and in conflict with the Second and Eighth Circuits – required a non-tribal-member’s physical entry onto the relevant Indian reservation in connection with a transaction with a tribal member before ordering tribal court exhaustion of judicial claims arising from the transaction?
Lower court materials here.
Here is the petition in Wisconsin v. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians:
Wisconsin Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Question presented:
A moving party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) must show a significant change in factual conditions or law that renders continued enforcement of a judgment detrimental to the public interest. The proceeding is not a relitigation of the underlying judgment. Here, the Seventh Circuit shifted the burden to the non-moving party (Wisconsin) to justify an underlying judgment that night hunting of deer was fundamentally unsafe. Does Rule 60(b)(5) permit shifting the burden to the non-moving party to justify the original judgment?
Seventh Circuit materials here.
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