Tribal Immunity, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, and Separation of Powers

There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).

It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.

Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.

Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.

Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.

Lodging Issues before Supreme Court in U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache

The United States is objecting to some documents the Jicarilla Apache Nation [correction] amici Navajo Nation and Pueblo of Laguna are attempting to lodge with the Supreme Court. Here are the materials:

2011-03-16 DRB lodging request ltr

1978-01-24 Doc 14 – Fredericksmemo to Deputy ASIA re pooling

1983-07-21 Vollmann memo to ASIA re Mitchell II

1990-03-21 LaVell memo to AISA ontribal trust fund contractab

2011-03-30 SG ltr opposing lodging

2011-03-31 DRB lodging reply ltr

Documents lodged with the Court can be very important. In Carcieri v. Salazar, the OSG lodged documents with the Court, one of which was incredibly damaging to the government’s own position and became a partial basis for Justice Thomas opinion rejecting the Dept. of Interior proposed trust acquisition for the Narragansett Tribe:

Furthermore, the Secretary’s current interpretation is at odds with the Executive Branch’s construction of this provision at the time of enactment. In correspondence with those who would assist him in implementing the IRA, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, explained that:

“Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. L., 988), provides, in effect, that the term ‘Indian’ as used therein shall include—(1) all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe that was under Federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act … .” Letter from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar. 7, 1936), Lodging of Respondents (emphasis added).

NCAI and FBA Amicus Brief in U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation

Here: 10-382bsacNationalCongressOfAmericanIndians

Navajo & Laguna Pueblo Amicus Brief in U.S. v. Jicarilla

Here: NN-POL amicus brief

Supreme Court Oral Argument, Judicial “Tipping”, and Pre-Decision Dismissal

Earlier this year, the Oneida Indian Nation successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to GVR a case that most observers would agree the Nation would have a difficult time winning — by informing the Court of changed circumstances, initiated by the Nation, that effectively mooted the case. This is all detailed in Kaighn Smith’s new article in this month’s edition of the Federal Lawyer.

Right now it is rare for the Supreme Court to grant a case and then change its mind. Occasionally, the parties force the Court to dismiss a granted petition by agreeing to settle the matter or if one of the parties walks on (in cases like criminal cases).

Tribal advocates in recent years have openly feared the Supreme Court, which appears very hostile to their clients’ interests (and the stats are in strong agreement). The Oneida effort to moot the case in light of a likely bad outcome raises a few other questions about strategic behavior before the Court.

Given how many members of the Supreme Court appear to strongly articulate (“tip”?) their views and positions during oral argument (witness yesterday’s argument in the massive WalMart class action employment discrimination case, which the plaintiffs now must realize will crash and burn given the overt hostility of the Court), could a tribal party wait and see how oral argument goes — where they very possibly will learn whether or not they have a real chance of prevailing — and then seek a way to dismiss the action? The recent oral argument in Tohono O’odham Nation offered little in the way of clear tipping, but another argument (in Jicarilla Apache Nation) will afford the tribal interests an opportunity to analyze their chances (and count votes).

Of course, once this is done (and already has been done) a few times, the Court will catch on. Then the Court will perhaps begin to react with its own form of strategic behavior.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s (Justice Thomas excepted, of course) tipping of its likely decision during oral argument in some, but not all cases, encourages such behavior.

Oklahoma’s Cert Opposition Brief in Native Wholesale Supply Case

Here: Oklahoma Cert Opp.

The cert petition and related materials are here.

Winnemucca Reply Brief in Winnemucca Colony Council v. Wasson

Here: Winnemucca Reply

Earlier cert stage briefs in this case are here and here.

Jicarilla Nation Merits Brief in U.S. v. Jicarilla

Here: Jicarilla Respondent’s Brief.

Here is the government’s merits brief.

Cert Opposition Brief in Winnemucca v. Wasson Case

Here: Wasson Cert Opp.

The petition is here.

Neither party seems to realize that this petition has absolutely no chance of being granted. Frankly, it’s a waste of resources.

Edited to Add:  As anticipated, this petition was denied in the April 18th order.

Supreme Court 2010 Mid-Term Update

Much has happened and much is in limbo in this Term so far. Our two previous previews are here and here. Our previous mid-Term update is here.

Granted Cases

1. United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation (09-846).

The opinion in this matter will likely be available at any time, as many cases submitted to the Court around the same time have been decided already. If the Court does not issue an opinion next week, it may mean that there is a significant dissent or concurrence being generated. Oral argument recaps are here and here (from Millett and Meggesto). The oral argument transcript is here.

2. Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation (10-72). GVR.

This is the big surprise of the Term, with the Supreme Court granting cert on the question whether tribes are immune from foreclosures by counties for failure to pay property taxes, and then the Oneida Indian Nation enacting an ordinance purporting to waive its immunity from such suits. Over the petitioners’ objections, the Court remanded the case back to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Oneida’s waiver.

3. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation (10-382).

Other than Madison County, this is so far the biggest grant of the Term, with the United States seemingly seeking to limit its trust obligations to Indian nations dramatically. The case involves the government’s attorney-client privilege against the trust beneficiary in relation to trust-related documents. Oral argument is set for April 20.

Pending Petitions (CVSGs)

A very interesting development in the Supreme Court’s recent handling of the Indian law cases is the dramatic upswing in invitations to the Office of Solicitor General to opine on various cert petitions. Beginning last Term with Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, the Court has issued a CVSG in five Indian law cases, far more than it ever has (though it makes perfect sense for the Court to ask the United States for advice on such petitions).

4. Brown v. Rincon Band (10-330).

The Court issued a CVSG in December 2010 in this case involving the IGRA good faith negotiation requirement after the Ninth Circuit held that California’s demand for revenue sharing violated the requirement. The invitation brief could come at any time.

5. Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co. (10-717).

The Court CVSG’d this petition in January 2011. It’s a case involving federal jurisdiction over an effort by the Tribe to enforce a tribal court judgment against the construction company. Interesting in part because usually the Court pays little or no attention to tribal petitions for cert, so perhaps there is a change in the air. Expert commentary from Harold Monteau follows (Bethany Berger, I believe, made a similar argument in a comment, but I can’t find the posting):

One wonders why the Tribe did not seek registration/enforcement of its judgment in a State Court where KA has assets. The answer can only be that the Tribe’s legal counsel researched the possibility and came to the conclusion that a State Court would, under principles of comity, inquire into “due process” issues and would find that the denial of an appeal by a Tribal Council sitting as a court of appeals, knowing full well that it has a stake in the outcome, does not comport with thtat State Courts standards for due process and would not enforce the judgment. I don’t think the Supreme Court will grant cert. We are fast learning that Federal District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and jurisdiction can’t be premised pemised on an agreement. The Federal Court either has jurisdiction or it does not. Here, it does not. However, given the “activism” of the Court in recent years with regard to Indian cases, they could take it, uphold the Court of Appeals, but expound on issues of due process in tribal courts that don’t fit the “normal” American Jurisprudence scheme. I hope they just deny cert.

6. Osage Nation v. Irby (10-537).

Yet another CVSG, and the second CVSG of a tribal petition in the same Term (!). This case involves the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the Osage reservation has been disestablished by Congress, though it appears that the lower court applied the wrong standard in reaching the conclusion. Here is Patricia Millett’s commentary on the CVSG.

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