Here:
15-1215acFederalIndianLawProfessors
Petition here.
Supreme Court
Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse Cert Petition
Here.
Question presented:
The “disparagement clause” in § 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars the registration of a trademark that “may disparage … persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The questions presented are:
1. Whether § 2(a)’s disparagement clause violates the First Amendment.
2. Whether § 2(a)’s disparagement clause is impermissibly vague, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.
3. Whether the government’s decades-long delay between registering a trademark and cancelling the registration under § 2(a)’s disparagement clause violates due process.
The Fourth Circuit matter is still pending. This is an effort to jump ahead of the process to join another petition currently pending captioned Lee v. Tam. We posted about that Federal Circuit decision here.
SCOTUS Denies Cert in Zepeda and Crow Allottees Matters
Pauma Band Cross-Petition in Gaming Compact Dispute with California
Here is the cert petition in Pauma Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. State of California:
Question presented:
One of the statutory elements for establishing a prima facie case of bad faith negotiation against a state under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., is that “a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(I). In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this language according to the status quo ante, holding that an Indian tribe who sought and obtained a declaration rescinding a compact could not pursue a claim for latent bad faith negotiation against a state that induced the compact through material misrepresentations in order to increase its tax receipts (i.e., “revenue sharing”) by 2,460%. With this holding seeming to violate deep-rooted principles of retroactivity and interpretive norms for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act set forth within this Court’s precedent, the question presented is:Whether an Indian tribe can pursue a bad faith negotiation claim against a state under Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act after rescinding a compact induced by misrepresentation or other latent bad faith conduct, and thus bringing its circumstances into compliance with the statutory requirement that “a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into.”
California’s petition is here.
Oral Argument Transcript in United States v. Bryant (and Commentary)
Here.
Background materials here.
Quick commentary:
This was a dramatically less intense argument (reading from a cold transcript) than in Dollar General. Again, as in DG, much of the commentary about tribal courts depended on how much work Congress did in enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act. So long as the rights contained in that statute satisfy the Supreme Court, tribal court convictions may be used as prior convictions under 18 U.S.C.§ 117.
If that is the case, Justices on the Court concerned about the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions must wrestle with precedents (mainly Scott and Argersinger) that affirmed there is not an absolute right to counsel in misdemeanor convictions where imprisonment is possible but not imposed.
Again, reading from a cold transcript, I was shocked that Bryant’s counsel noted that Bryant was not indigent. (p. 36, line 10) Moreover, Bryant apparently waived his right to counsel, which happens much of the time in state and federal court where incarceration is not on the table. Bryant also apparently waived a claim that the tribal court convictions were invalid, putting him a somewhat similar position to Billy Jo Lara. Bryant’s counsel was left arguing that ICRA does not confer any “rights” at all as a mere federal statute, and so there is no right to counsel at all in tribal court. So then the only way I see Bryant prevailing is if the Court holds that ICRA is a dead letter, and that there really is no federally guaranteed right to counsel in tribal courts (which I guess would mean tribes can deny counsel if they so choose). That seems like a particularly difficult holding to garner four votes (which would be enough to affirm by 4-4 split). Moreover, it’s simply not the case — I am aware of no tribal court that refuses to allow counsel to appear for criminal defendants.
The Chief Justice mentioned the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers brief that strongly criticized tribal court convictions (p. 12, lines 1-4), but that gave the government’s attorney a chance to note that the federal habeas right is a meaningful remedy (much as GRIC did in its controversial letter).
Gila River Indian Community Letter to NACDL re: Bryant Amicus Brief
Here:
An excerpt:
I am writing to you to express the Gila River Indian Community’s concerns regarding the Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Experienced Tribal Court Litigators in Support of Respondent (“Brief’) recently filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Bryant (No. 15-420). The Brief makes numerous attacks on the Community’s criminal justice system, hasty generalizations regarding tribal justice systems, and omits relevant facts and conclusions regarding the Community.
The stated purpose of the Brief is “to draw upon amici’s knowledge and experience with tribal-court criminal litigation to give this Court an informed perspective from which to assess these claims.” Brief at 4 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Brief does not do so. Instead, it reads as a narrative and anecdotal attack on tribal justice systems, prominently including the Community. These attacks on the Community’s criminal justice system have often come in a third-party form, such as letters from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and National Association of Federal Defenders to members of Congress regarding proposed legislation. Despite prominent mention of the Community, these letters- and the Brief-were not provided to the Community when sent or filed. We suspect it may have to do with the favorable outcomes to the Community in the cases discussed in the Brief.
Briefs and other materials in this case are here.
Cert Stage Briefs in Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie County v. Chaudhuri
Here:
Lower court materials here.
SCOTUSBlog Preview of United States v. Bryant
Here.
Cert Stage Briefs in Zepeda v. United States
Lezmond Mitchell v. U.S. Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
Petitioner, a Navajo, is a federal prisoner sentenced to death under the
Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599. Petitioner’s statements to the
FBI constituted the primary evidence at his capital trial. The FBI took these
statements while petitioner spent twenty-five days in tribal custody, with no right
to the assistance of counsel. In a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, petitioner presented evidence that a working arrangement between federal
and tribal authorities resulted in his arrest on a minor tribal charge, and kept him
in prolonged custody not authorized under Navajo Nation law, to deprive him of his
federal procedural rights. Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance at the guilt
and penalty phases of his trial, and the depositions of his three trial attorneys
revealed serious contradictions regarding the investigations undertaken and
defenses pursued.
An evidentiary hearing is required in a Section 2255 case “[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the cases conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). In this case, the district court denied the
Section 2255 motion without a hearing, and a divided court of appeals affirmed.
The questions presented are:1. Whether the court of appeals, in conflict with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’
grants of a hearing on similar records, erroneously concluded that petitioner
could not establish, under any circumstances, that his attorneys had
performed deficiently at the penalty phase of his trial.2. Whether the court of appeals clearly misapprehended Section 2255(b)’s
standards by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government,
weighing the evidence, and silently resolving factual disputes to conclude
that no evidentiary hearing was required.3. Whether the court of appeals erroneously concluded that reasonable jurists
could not debate whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted on
petitioner’s claim of federal-tribal collusion to deprive him of his rights to
prompt presentment and assistance of counsel.
Lower court decision.
Turtle Talk 
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