Here.
SCOTUSBlog Preview of United States v. Bryant
Here.
Supreme Court
Cert Stage Briefs in Zepeda v. United States
Lezmond Mitchell v. U.S. Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
Petitioner, a Navajo, is a federal prisoner sentenced to death under the
Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599. Petitioner’s statements to the
FBI constituted the primary evidence at his capital trial. The FBI took these
statements while petitioner spent twenty-five days in tribal custody, with no right
to the assistance of counsel. In a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, petitioner presented evidence that a working arrangement between federal
and tribal authorities resulted in his arrest on a minor tribal charge, and kept him
in prolonged custody not authorized under Navajo Nation law, to deprive him of his
federal procedural rights. Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance at the guilt
and penalty phases of his trial, and the depositions of his three trial attorneys
revealed serious contradictions regarding the investigations undertaken and
defenses pursued.
An evidentiary hearing is required in a Section 2255 case “[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the cases conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). In this case, the district court denied the
Section 2255 motion without a hearing, and a divided court of appeals affirmed.
The questions presented are:1. Whether the court of appeals, in conflict with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’
grants of a hearing on similar records, erroneously concluded that petitioner
could not establish, under any circumstances, that his attorneys had
performed deficiently at the penalty phase of his trial.2. Whether the court of appeals clearly misapprehended Section 2255(b)’s
standards by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government,
weighing the evidence, and silently resolving factual disputes to conclude
that no evidentiary hearing was required.3. Whether the court of appeals erroneously concluded that reasonable jurists
could not debate whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted on
petitioner’s claim of federal-tribal collusion to deprive him of his rights to
prompt presentment and assistance of counsel.
Lower court decision.
Crow Allottees v. Dept. of Justice Cert Stage Briefs
Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
Petitioner’s case is the last in a long line of Indian land claim cases arising in the State of New York in which Indian tribes have been denied access to the courts by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014). Based on its Cayuga “laches” defense, the court of appeals summarily dismissed all claims of Petitioner for legal and equitable relief for the loss of their lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, also known as the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Recently, however, this Court affirmed the general rule in equity that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of all claims filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014). In Petrella, this Court recognized that only equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the outset of litigation due to delay in commencing suit in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1977. The questions presented are:
1. Whether at the outset of litigation a court may apply “laches” to foreclose an Indian tribe from bringing its federal statutory and common-law claims, *ii including one for money damages, if brought within the statute of limitations established by Congress.
2. Whether a court violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses when it retroactively applies a new, judicially-formulated rule to dismiss an Indian tribe’s viable claims ab initio, thereby extinguishing established property rights.
Lower court materials here.
SCOTUS Denies Cert in Alaska v. Organized Village of Kake (Roadless Rule)
Tribal NLRB Background Materials
Here are the materials relevant to Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government v. NLRB.
Supreme Court cert stage briefs
Little River Petition and Appendix COMBINED
Final CO-UMUT Amicus Cert Petition – Saginaw Chippewa and LRB
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
Sixth Circuit En Banc Stage Continue reading
CNIGA Amicus Brief in Saginaw Chippewa v. NLRB
Here:
SCOTUSBlog Profile of Sturgeon v. Frost Decision
Here.
US Cert Opposition Brief in Zepeda
Here:
An excerpt:
Petitioner contends (Pet. 11-22) that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of an “Indian” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1153 violates equal protection. Petitioner further asserts (Pet. 22-23) that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with a decision from the Utah Supreme Court. Those claims lack merit. The court of appeals’ decision – which follows this Court’s precedent – is fully consistent with the Constitution, and no conflict exists on the question presented. Moreover, this case would be a poor vehicle to consider the meaning of “Indian” in Section 1153 because petitioner qualifies under any conceivable definition, including the one he proposes. Further review is not warranted.
Cert petition is here.
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