Order list here.
Question Presented: Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment.
Previous coverage here.
Here:
Question presented:
It is well established that “Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,_ U.S._, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). “Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess – subject, again, to congressional action – is the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers …. That immunity, we have explained, is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and selfgovernance.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986).
In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., supra, this Court explained that the “baseline position … is tribal immunity; and [t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must unequivocally express that purpose …. That rule of construction reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian selfgovernment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 134 S.Ct. at 2031-32.
Lower court materials here.
Download Petition for Writ of Certiorari (PDF)
Link to briefs previously posted here.
Question Presented: Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment.
Here are the briefs in Sun v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise:
Reply TK
Lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Lewis v. Clarke (Conn.):
Here are the materials in Matt v. United States (D. Mont.):
37 Fort Belknap Motion to Quash
40-1 Opposition to Motio to Quash
45 DCT Order Granting Motion to Quash
The underlying complaint against the US is here:
Here is the opinion in Pistor v. Garcia:
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an action brought against tribal officers who were sued in their individual capacities for an assertedly unconstitutional detention and seizure of property that took place at a casino owned and operated by a tribe on tribal land. The district court held that even if the tribal defendants were entitled to tribal immunity, it was inappropriate to dismiss the claims against the defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court went on to hold, however, that if the tribal defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss was construed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court would conclude that plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the tribal defendants in their individual capacities. The district court therefore denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the action.
The panel held that sovereign immunity is a quasi-jurisdictional issue that, if invoked at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage, must be addressed and decided. Accordingly, the panel held that the district court erred in concluding that it would be inappropriate to dismiss the claims against the defendants at the 12(b)(1) stage. The panel nevertheless affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the action. The panel held that the tribal defendants were not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual rather than their official capacities, as any recovery will run against the individual tribal defendants, rather than the tribe.
The panel held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether plaintiffs successfully stated a claim against the defendants under § 1983. The panel held that whether the tribal defendants were acting under state or tribal law did not matter for purposes of the tribal sovereign immunity analysis, although it will matter for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs can succeed in their § 1983 claim.
Briefs and lower court materials here.
Here are the materials in Sanders v. Anoatubby (W.D. Okla.):
An excerpt:
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s Complaint, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims alleged in her Complaint. The Court specifically finds that jurisdiction is not vested in this Court based on plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated Title VI by not complying with the NAHASDA since the NAHASDA specifically exempts federally recognized tribes, such as the Chickasaw Nation and the tribally designated housing entities of those tribes such as the Chickasaw Nation Housing Administration, from Title VI. Further, the Court finds jurisdiction is not vested in this Court based on the Ex parte Young doctrine. Plaintiff specifically included defendants’ official titles in the caption of this lawsuit and alleges that defendants violated tribal policies. Other than conclusory statements that defendants were acting outside the scope of their official tribal capacity, plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support her claim that defendants were acting outside the scope of their tribal capacity or violating federal law. Therefore, the Court finds plaintiff’s Complaint against defendants Governor Bill Anoatubby, Wayne Scribner, Renee Sweet, Jackie Williams, and Terry Davis should be dismissed.
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