Here are the early materials in Steiger v. Little River Casino Resort, a sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
Not sure how the plaintiff’s lawyer thinks the federal court has jurisdiction over this. The complaint just cites Title VII, without any argument as to why it could possibly apply to a tribe or its business. Other doing the same have been subject to Rule 11 sanctions (see our paper here).
Here is the opinion in MM&A Productions v. Yavapai-Apache Nation (opinion). An excerpt:
Appellant MM & A Productions appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of its action against the Yavapai-Apache Nation’s Cliff Castle Casino (“the Tribe”). MM & A maintains the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity and the court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. It also maintains the court wrongly “accelerate[d] the date by which [it] needed to appeal,” and erred in denying its motion for relief under Rule 60(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Because none of the orders from which MM & A appeals is appealable, we conclude we lack jurisdiction of this matter and dismiss the appeal.
Here is the next round of briefs (first round was here, an additional round is expected after the holidays):
Here is the opinion in Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Hunt Construction Group, reversing a trial court order that accepted jurisdiction over four counterclaims against the Nation — Oneida Indian Nation v. Hunt Constr Group
An excerpt:
Plaintiff, the owner of the Turning Stone Casino & Resort, commenced this action seeking damages resulting from the alleged breach by defendant of its construction contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the second through fifth counterclaims on the ground that it had waived sovereign immunity only with respect to counterclaims seeking to enforce the terms of the contract and thus that Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the second through fifth counterclaims. We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in denying those parts of the motion seeking to dismiss the second counterclaim to the extent it alleges the breach of implied warranties; the fourth counterclaim, for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment; and the fifth counterclaim, for an account stated. We therefore modify the order accordingly.
The case is Rovinsky v. Choctaw Manufacturing and Development Corp. (D. N.J.). Here are the materials:
Rovinsky v Choctaw Mfg and Dev Corp DCT Order
The tribal motion to dismiss was denied but without prejudice, so it may be refiled at a later date.
Here is the opinion in Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy (E.D. Cal.) — Timbisha Shoshone v Kennedy DCT Order
And the briefs:
Here is the opinion in Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Blalock, from the Louisiana Court of Appeals. And a dissent.
An excerpt:
The Tribe filed its initial possessory action against the Blalocks seeking damages and requesting the filing of any adverse ownership claim by the Blalocks over a larger parcel of property. Notably, River View is absent both from this petition and from the subsequent stipulated judgment in which the Blalocks asserted an ownership interest in the portion of the disputed property now claimed by River View. In addition to asserting its own ownership interest via the petition of intervention, Riverview seeks a judgment establishing a boundary between the larger parcel now in possession by the Tribe and the parcel claimed by the Blalocks and, now, River View. It also seeks a “Judgment ordering the Tunica Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana to surrender possession of the property owned by the Intervenor.”
Here is the opinion in Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc. — Memphis Biofuels v Chickasaw Nation Industries CA6 Opinion
Lower court materials and appellate briefs are here.
The court first concluded that Section 17 corporations do not automatically waive immunity: Continue reading
Here is the opinion in Guzman v. Laguna Development Corp., decided in June. An excerpt:
David and Maria Guzman (the Guzmans) appeal the dismissal of their wrongful death and loss of consortium claims for the death of their son, Anthony M. Guzman. The district court both dismissed (pursuant to Rule 1-012(C) NMRA) and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants Laguna Development Corporation, d/b/a Route 66 Casino, George Russell Kainoa Ayze, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Defendants). We reverse and remand holding that: (1) summary judgment was not proper because Defendants are estopped from taking a position before the district court inconsistent with their successful position before the Workers’ Compensation Administration, and (2) dismissal was not proper because the Guzmans’ complaint sufficiently pleads claims that fall within the Laguna Pueblo’s waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries to visitors at the casino, pursuant to its gaming compact with the State of New Mexico. NMSA 1978, § 11-13-1 (1997) (the Compact).
Here is the opinion in this long-running dispute involving the Unkechauge Poospatuck smoke shop–Gristede Foods v. Unkechauge Poospatuck Smokeshop (E.D. N.Y.). Here, the court holds that the tribe is immune from suit, having demonstrated that it meets the Montoya test for tribal sovereignty — Gristede’s Foods DCT Order
An excerpt:
In light of the foregoing analysis of the evidence, the court finds that defendants have established by a preponderance of the evidence that the three Montoya criteria are satisfied. Consequently, the Unkechauge meets the common law definition of a “tribe” and is entitled to immunity from suit in the present action. “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919). Supreme Court cases “recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty” which is “of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete deference. But until Congress acts, the tribes retained their existing sovereign powers.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978). There is no evidence that the Unkechauge waived or abandoned their tribal immunity or that Congress has abrogated the immunity of the Unkechauge. Because the Unkechauge is a tribe pursuant to federal common law, they enjoy sovereign immunity. Thus, in the absence of a waiver or congressional abrogation of immunity, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine plaintiff’s claims against the Tribe.
However, the smokeshop itself is not immune, the court applying a common law test to determine whether the smokeshop is an arm of tribal government:
The Poospatuck Smoke Shop has not satisfied these criteria. The only evidence that the Smoke Shop submitted in support of its status as an entity of the Unkechauge is Chief Wallace’s testimony that businesses on the Unkechauge tribal grounds must be licensed by the tribal council. (Wallace Tr. at 85, 157; 12/22/08 Oral Arg. Tr. at 41.) This testimony does not satisfy the above factors by a preponderance of the evidence for establishing that the Smoke Shop is an arm of the tribe. Therefore, the Poospatuck Smoke Shop’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Turtle Talk 
You must be logged in to post a comment.