Here are the materials in Sault Ste. Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Hamilton (W.D. Mich.):
Sault Tribe Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims
tribal sovereign immunity
Oklahoma Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations Federal Complaint re: State Court Jurisdiction over Casino Cases
Here is the complaint in Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma (W.D. Okla.): Choctaw Nation & Chicasaw Nation v Oklahoma Complaint.
At issue are the Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions holding that state courts are “courts of competent jurisdiction” in tort claims against tribal casinos under the Oklahoma model gaming compact (opinions here and here.).
Here is an August 2009 arbitration award affirming that state courts do not have such jurisdiction — Choctaw Chickasaw Oklahoma Arbitration Decision. And the joint referral to arbitration — Joint Referral to Binding Arbitration.
Federal Civil Rights Complaint against Puyallup Tribal Police Dismissed
Here are the materials in Boyd v. Puyallup Tribal Police (W.D. Wash.):
Removal of Casino Slip and Fall to Federal Court Fails
Here are the materials in Keim v. Harrah’s Operating Co. (S.D. Cal.):
Federal Court Dismisses Effort by Wells Fargo to Take Over LDF’s Lake of the Torches EDC
Pretty incredible case. Wells Fargo, alleging financial improprieties by the EDC relating to an indentured trust, sought an order from the court appointing a receiver for the EDC. The EDC defended on grounds of sovereign immunity and that the trust had not been approved by the NIGC, apparently prevailing on the latter theory.
Here are the materials (the court has promised a written opinion “in due course”):
Wells Fargo Motion to Appoint Receiver
LDF Opposition to Motion to Appoint Receiver
Wells Fargo Reply re Motion to Appoint Receiver
Wells Fargo Supplemental Brief re Motion to Appoint Receiver
Rosenberg v. Hualapai Indian Nation Cert Petition
Here is the cert petition in Rosenberg v. Hualapai Indian Nation (No. 09-742): Rosenberg Cert Petition.
No chance for a grant here. No circuit split. Nothing important for the SCT to decide, especially since they denied cert in the dram shop cases earlier this year. And the petition merely asks the Court to reverse itself, without really stating why. Oh, and the plaintiff had recourse to tribal court, so there isn’t a “no forum” problem.
Lower court materials are here.
The questions presented:
1. Does the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe extend to off-Indian County (extra-territorial), tortuous conduct?
a. Does Congress, and Congress alone, have the authority to establish the boundaries of tribal sovereign immunity, a judicially-created doctrine, or may this Court define its outer boundaries, as this Court has suggested in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998)?
b. Is tribal sovereign immunity broader than the immunity provided to foreign sovereign nations?
2. Does a tribe waive its sovereign immunity by engaging in conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she might have recourse in a court of competent jurisdiction for the negligence acts of the tribe?
Federal Court Holds that Tribal Sovereign Immunity Survives Removal to Federal Court
But suggests that the law is unsettled. Here is the opinion in Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo and Casino (E.D. Cal.): Ingrassia v Chicken Ranch Bingo and Casino DCT Order
An excerpt:
At this point, the case law is not absolutely clear whether tribal sovereign immunity is more like the immunity enjoyed by the states or by foreign sovereigns in the circumstance of removal. There are a number of cases in which courts have applied tribal sovereign immunity after removal without addressing the issue. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (E.D.N.Y.2003);Maynard v. Narrangansett Indian Tribe, 798 F.Supp. 94 (D.R.I.1992); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21776 (W.D.Mo. Nov. 19, 1997). In other cases where tribes removed, courts have pierced immunity but not based on waiver from removal. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.1980). These cases, in conjunction withSonoma Falls, leads to the conclusion that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity. However, the issue is not settled and appeal may be fruitful for Plaintiffs.
Colorado v. Cash Advance Briefing Complete
The first round of briefs (state, anti-payday loan amici, etc.) is here. The responses (mostly tribal) are here. And the final brief (state’s reply brief — State Reply Brief).
Dicara v. Cahuilla Band — Immunity Waiver in Gaming Contract Dispute
Here is the opinion from the California Court of Appeals (4th Dist., Div. 2).
An excerpt:
The trial court issued a postjudgment assignment order (Code of Civ. Proc., § 708.510) against the Cahuilla Band of Indians (Cahuilla), in favor of Mary DiCara dba Scott Leasing (Scott). Cahuilla contends the assignment order should be reversed because (1) the superior court did not have jurisdiction to issue the order; (2) the lease agreement, upon which the underlying damage award was based, was void since inception; and (3) federal law and Cahuilla’s revenue allocation plan preempt the superior court’s order. Scott contends that it should be awarded attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the judgment and award attorney’s fees to Scott.
The trial court issued a postjudgment assignment order (Code of Civ. Proc.,§ 708.510)1, 2 against the Cahuilla Band of Indians (Cahuilla), in favor of Mary DiCaradba Scott Leasing (Scott). Cahuilla contends the assignment order should be reversedbecause (1) the superior court did not have jurisdiction to issue the order; (2) the leaseagreement, upon which the underlying damage award was based, was void sinceinception; and (3) federal law and Cahuilla’s revenue allocation plan preempt thesuperior court’s order. Scott contends that it should be awarded attorney’s fees onappeal. We affirm the judgment and award attorney’s fees to Scott.
Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Counterclaims against Kalispel Tribe
Here is the opinion in Kalispel Tribe v. Spokane Raceway Park (unpublished opinion).
An excerpt:
We need not decide whether the Tribe waived its immunity to Orville Moe’s counterclaim for contract damages as a third-party beneficiary, because Moe failed to present a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Neither the Joint Venture Agreement nor any other document specified the amount of compensation board members were to receive or how that amount was to be determined. Given the lack of details in the agreement, Moe had to produce evidence of what compensation was due and that the Tribe was responsible for that compensation. He failed to do so.
We need not decide whether the Tribe waived its immunity to Orville Moe’scounterclaim for contract damages as a third-party beneficiary, because Moe failedto present a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324(1986). Neither the Joint Venture Agreement nor any other document specified theamount of compensation board members were to receive or how that amount wasto be determined. Given the lack of details in the agreement, Moe had to produceevidence of what compensation was due and that the Tribe was responsible for thatcompensation. He failed to do so.
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