Indian Law Profs Comments on EPA’s Proposed Water Quality Standards for Washington State

Here:

Law Professors Comments on EPA’s Proposed WQS for WA

UCLA Law Review Symposium in Honor of Carole Goldberg

The Next Frontier in Federal Indian Law: Building on the Foundational Work of Carole E. Goldberg

Here is the agenda:

Goldberg Symposium Schedule Revised

Tenth Circuit Affirms Rejection of Civil Rights Suit for Killing of Ute Tribal Member Allegedly by Police

Here is the opinion in Jones v. Norton

Eleventh Circuit Decides Miccosukee Tribe v. Cypress

Here is the opinion

Materials in the million dollar sanction award are here

Materials in Miccosukee’s failed effort to disqualify the judge are here.

Materials on the underlying merits of the claim are here and here.

Dahlia Lithwick on Dollar General

Here

Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Sand Creek Massacre Trust Claims

Here is the opinion in Flute v. United States.

An excerpt:

This case arises out of an ignominious event in the history of this Nation. In 1864, the United States Army conducted an unprovoked attack on a group of unarmed Indians, who had relocated to an area next to the Sand Creek River in the Territory of Colorado at the direction and under the protection of the Territorial Governor. When what has become known as the Sand Creek Massacre was over, most of the Indians were dead, including many women and children. After an investigation, the United States publicly acknowledged its role in the tragedy and agreed to pay reparations to certain survivors of the massacre. But those reparations were never paid.

Plaintiffs are descendants of the victims of the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre and bring this action for an accounting of the amounts they allege the U.S. government holds in trust for payment of reparations to their ancestors. Because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of such for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Briefs here.

Federal Court Affirms Navajo Nation May Sue Urban Outfitters under American Indian Arts and Crafts Act

Here are the materials in Navajo Nation v. Urban Outfitters (D. N.M.):

258 Navajo Response

287 Reply

606 DCT order

Previous posts here, here, and here.

Federal Circuit Sitting En Banc Declares Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Unconstitutional

Here is the opinion in In re Tam:

In re Tam

An excerpt:

Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) from registering scandalous, immoral, or disparaging marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The government enacted this law—and defends it today— because it disapproves of the messages conveyed by disparaging marks. It is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment that the government may not penalize private speech merely because it disapproves of the message it conveys. That principle governs even when the government’s message-discriminatory penalty is less than a prohibition.

Courts have been slow to appreciate the expressive power of trademarks. Words—even a single word—can be powerful. Mr. Simon Shiao Tam named his band THE SLANTS to make a statement about racial and cultural issues in this country. With his band name, Mr. Tam conveys more about our society than many volumes of undisputedly protected speech. Another rejected mark, STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA, proclaims that Islamisation is undesirable and should be stopped. Many of the marks rejected as disparaging convey hurtful speech that harms members of oft-stigmatized communities. But the First Amendment protects even hurtful speech.

The government cannot refuse to register disparaging marks because it disapproves of the expressive messages conveyed by the marks. It cannot refuse to register marks because it concludes that such marks will be disparaging to others. The government regulation at issue amounts to viewpoint discrimination, and under the strict scrutiny review appropriate for government regulation of message or viewpoint, we conclude that the disparagement proscription of § 2(a) is unconstitutional. Because the government has offered no legitimate interests justifying § 2(a), we conclude that it would also be unconstitutional under the intermediate scrutiny traditionally applied to regulation of the commercial aspects of speech. 

 

California COA Published Opinion in ICWA Notice Case (Chumash)

Here is the opinion in In re Natalie A.:

B261303A