Here is the District of Wyoming’s 40-page decision in Yellowbear v. Wyoming Attorney General — Yellowbear DCT Order
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s opinion to which the federal court gives deference is here.
The briefs:
Here is the District of Wyoming’s 40-page decision in Yellowbear v. Wyoming Attorney General — Yellowbear DCT Order
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s opinion to which the federal court gives deference is here.
The briefs:
Here is the opinion in Lyons v. Menominee Tribal Jail (E.D. Wis.) — DCT Order Dismissing Lyons Complaint
The petitioner claimed to have been jailed for four months without seeing a judge — Lyons Pro Se Complaint. One hopes that isn’t true.
An excerpt from the order (technically, an order refusing the petitioner to waive filing fees):
Moreover, the complaint does not appear to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Section 1983, the civil rights statute, imposes liability on individuals who act under color of state law, but it does not apply to those acting under color of tribal law. Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir.2006) (“A § 1983 action is unavailable ‘for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.’ ”) (quoting R.J. Williams Co. v. Ft. Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir.1983)). Accordingly, it will be dismissed for that additional reason. “Because plaintiff does not allege that defendant acted under color of state law, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment to defendant on that basis.” Pounds v. Killion, 35 Fed. Appx. 819, 821, 2002 WL 1038774, *1 (10th Cir.2002).
The court also noted that no jurisdiction existed under the Indian Civil Rights Act:
Similarly, the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) does not provide a remedy. The only remedy provided in ICRA is that of habeas-style relief (i.e., release from custody)-it does not authorize damages actions after release. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.2005) (“We acknowledge that in the civil context, habeas corpus relief generally is the sole federal remedy for a violation of ICRA.”); Stevens v. Skenandore, 2000 WL 1069404, * 1 (7th Cir.2000) (“Stevens cannot sue the individual Oneida defendants under the ICRA because the only remedy authorized by the statute is a habeas corpus proceeding brought against the tribe pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1303.”)
Here is the opinion in United States v. Fox. Fox is Navajo.
An excerpt:
Dionysius Fox, a member of the Navajo Nation, was arrested on the Navajo Reservation on an unrelated charge and found in possession of a shotgun and a rifle. Mr. Fox is a convicted felon, subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of firearms by those previously adjudged guilty of felonies. Although he acknowledges that he is prohibited from possessing firearms beyond Navajo Reservation land, Mr. Fox asserts that he is entitled to possess guns for the limited purpose of hunting on the Navajo Reservation, pursuant to an 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Navajo Nation. We conclude, however, that Mr. Fox has relinquished any treaty right to use firearms for hunting purposes, and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
This case is interesting in part because another Tenth Circuit judge (see concurring opinion in U.S. v. McCane) raised a question about whether the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment decision D.C. v. Heller actually may make the federal statute in question in Fox unconstitutional.
Here are the briefs:
Here is the indictment in United States v. Jeff Livingston (E.D. Cal.). And an excerpt from the California AG’s office press release about the case:
The joint investigation revealed that Livingston made unauthorized purchases with the casino’s corporate credit card, including:
– A $20,000 down payment on a new Ford Mustang Shelby;
– A $5,000 down payment on a new Ford Fusion for the casino’s former Vice President of Marketing; and
– A $7,000 Mercedes Benz PGA National Golf Championship package in Maui, Hawaii.
Livingston attempted to conceal the down payments by making it appear as if they were part of a ten car purchase he made for a casino giveaway.
Here is the opinion in U.S. v. Doe. An excerpt:
Defendants’ appeals center on the definition of “person” in 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)’s phrase: “Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses ….“ (emphasis added). First, defendants argue that context and statutory construction dictate that “person” is restricted to only living individuals. Second, and alternatively, defendants contend that at its broadest, “person” can only include living individuals or corporations, public and private. Under this definition, defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the arson victim was a corporation. Third, defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to reopen its cases to present evidence related to the corporate status of the arson victim. Fourth, defendants argue that the charging information was insufficient because it failed to provide sufficient identification of the arson victim and its status.
The court actually split on what definition to use to define “person” — the Major Crimes Act or the Dictionary Act. either way, the entire panel reached the same result.
Here is the opinion in the long-running case Reber v. Steele. An excerpt:
Petitioner Colton Reber, a descendant of the Uintah Band Indians, was convicted in Utah state juvenile court of felony wanton destruction of wildlife, in violation of Utah Code § 23-20-4. Having exhausted his remedies through the state courts, Mr. Reber filed the present 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Mr. Reber’s § 2254 petition contends that because he is an Indian, and because the offense occurred on Indian land, the Indian tribe-not the State of Utah-is the victim of the offense. Thus, neither the Eighth District Juvenile Court, nor the State of Utah, possessed jurisdiction over the offense. The federal district court dismissed Mr. Reber’s habeas petition because “it plainly appear [ed] from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner [wa]s not entitled to relief.” Aplt’s App. at 60.
We granted Mr. Reber a certificate of appealability on August 18, 2008, concluding that he had made the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Upon further review, however, we find that the premature filing of Mr. Reber’s § 2254petition deprived the district court of jurisdiction, and thus precludes our review. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s ruling on the merits of the petition, and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice.
Though one judge did strongly criticize the sentence, for a separate reason. Here is the opinion in U.S. v. Lamere (unpublished), and a separate concurrence.
From Indianz:
Clifford Gould Jr., a member of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan, was sentenced to life in prison for assaulting three children.
Gould, 47, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual abuse and one count of abusive sexual conduct. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan said he attacked three girls at his home on the reservation.
Gould will serve out his entire life sentence because there is no parole in the federal system, the U.S. Attorney’s Office said in a press release
Get the Story:
Grand Traverse tribe member gets life for child assaults (The Detroit Free Press 6/29)
Here is the flyer for this training, scheduled for August 10-14, 2009 in Tulsa.
The Washington Supreme Court may soon decide whether tribal police (in this case, of the Lummi Tribe) have authority to detain non-Indians off the reservation, where the tribal police have engaged in hot pursuit of the non-Indian suspect (in this case, a drunk driver). The relevant precedent is State v. Schmuck. Here are the briefs in Washington v. Eriksen:
The case is on direct appeal from the trial court.
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