The child’s attorney opposed the transfer, and the appellate court supported the decision of the Family Court to transfer to the tribe.
ICWA
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
1. Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of this Court and three other courts of appeals, that the possibility of filing a separate mandamus action was in and of itself “sufficient” to provide an “adequate opportunity” requiring Younger abstention, where plaintiffs had no opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the preliminary hearing procedure in the course of the state’s abuse and neglect proceedings?
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in conflict with three courts of appeals, that the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to Younger abstention applies only to flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statutes, but not to flagrantly and patently unconstitutional policies, and in concluding that separating children from their parents for sixty days with no notice or opportunity to be heard inflicted no irreparable harm?
Lower court materials here.
Qualified Expert Witness Case from Alaska [ICWA]
This is a case worth reading in its entirety for the discussion of the qualifications of the QEW but also the discussion of the testimony supporting the casual connection between the parents’ behavior and the removal of the children.
This QEW had been a Guardian ad Litem in the Yukon Kuskokwim Delta region for a number of years, however:
She agreed that she had no formal education in psychology, mental health, chemical dependency, substance abuse, social work, or therapy, and she did not recall having read any scholarly literature in these areas. She acknowledged that she was unable to “diagnose mental health issues,” though she testified she could recognize them based on her experience as an attorney and a GAL. But she further admitted that she did not use “any documents or models, like professional references, in order to make those conclusions”; she relied solely on her experience as an attorney and a GAL.
Then, she
did not address causation, as framed in the regulation, by testifying about how Keith and Eva’s conduct was likely to cause “serious emotional or physical damage to” the two boys. She drew no connections between specific conduct
and the likelihood of specific harm. We have held in the past that expert testimony need not directly address every aspect of this element of a termination decision; trial courts are allowed to consider “reasonable inferences from the expert testimony, coupled with lay witness testimony and documentary evidence from the record.” But when expert testimony is required in order to support termination in ICWA cases, trial courts may rely on reasonable inferences only from the testimony of witnesses who are qualified to testify on the subject.
ICWA Op-Ed in the WaPo and Editorial in the Austin American Statesman
Brackeen Oral Argument Audio
Alaska Supreme Court on Active Efforts [ICWA]
Here.
I very nearly made an inadvertent broken record pun here, but seriously, I do talk about making a clean record a lot. OCS didn’t even manage to document state law requirements in this case. And in the continuing theme of this afternoon’s ICWA cases–the requirements of ICWA stand regardless of whether the agency finds the parents cooperative or not.
Like the superior court, we are underwhelmed by the quality of OCS’s testimony. We agree with the court’s observation that OCS “made a rather lackadaisical effort” and “put on a skeletal case about [its] required active efforts.” The superior court was rightly concerned to doubt OCS’s demonstration of active efforts. We acknowledge that the superior court concluded that OCS met its burden due in large part to “the consideration the Court is to give to the parents’ demonstration of an unwillingness to change or participate in rehabilitative efforts.” While this principle remains valid, the parents’ lack of effort does not excuse OCS’s failure to make and demonstrate its efforts. Even considering the parents’ lack of participation, there is simply insufficient evidence in the record to show that OCS made active efforts. It was legal error for the superior court to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family.
***
A related but distinct problem is OCS’s failure to document its active efforts in detail in the record. While documentation is related to OCS’s duty to make active efforts, documenting those efforts is a separate responsibility. The act of documentation is not itself an “active effort”; rather, it is a mechanism for OCS and the court to ensure that active efforts have been made. Documentation is required by ICWA and is critical to compliance with ICWA’s purpose and key protections. The CINA statute also requires OCS to document its provision of family reunification support services. But such documentation is woefully missing here.
Montana Supreme Court on Reason to Know [ICWA]
And a long excerpt:
Contrary to the Department’s assertion and the apparent corresponding view of the District Court, the “reason to know” standard does not necessarily require an evidentiary showing, and certainly not by the parents, that a child or parent may be eligible for tribal membership. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107-08. Nor does ICWA require that an assertion of potential tribal eligibility be certain. Gerardo, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 802; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 511. See also 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.107(a), (c), -108(a). Any more stringent construction as suggested by the State would defeat ICWA’s manifest purpose and command. Certainly, a “reason to know” is a low standard, but not an unlimited one. In re Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 207-08 (Cal. App. 2009); In re Z.H., 740 N.W.2d 648, 653-54 (Iowa App. 2007). A “reason to know” requires something more than a bare, vague, or equivocal assertion of possible Indian ancestry without reference to any identified Indian ancestors with a reasonably suspected tribal connection. See Jeremiah G., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 207-08; Z.H., 740 N.W.2d at 653-54. Pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c)(1), Mother’s asserted belief that she may be eligible for enrollment in the Crow Tribe was minimally sufficient to constitute a reason to know that the children were Indian children under the circumstances of this case.
¶22 We are further troubled by the Department’s apparent view that it has no affirmative duty to make further inquiry or provide tribal notice and inquiry when parents are not cooperative. Lack of parental cooperation is immaterial, is not a basis for equitable waiver or estoppel, and does not otherwise relieve state agencies and courts of the duty to comply with ICWA requirements. Kahlen 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. ICWA vests Indian children and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian and related Indian tribes with a federal right, independent of but on par with the right of Indian parents, to specified tribal notice and eligibility determinations regardless of the conduct or disregard of the parents. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 49-53, 109 S. Ct. at 1609-11; Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The practical difficulty or inability of a state agency to identify the correct tribe or substantiate an assertion of requisite Indian ancestry does not relieve the agency of its duty to comply with ICWA requirements. See Kahlen, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
Briefing Completed in Brackeen v. Bernhardt (frmly Zinke) in the Fifth Circuit [ICWA Case]
Oral arguments are March 13.
Principal Briefs on the Tribal Defendant/Intervenor and Federal Side (Pro-ICWA)
Navajo Nation Motion to Intervene and Proposed Brief
Amicus Briefs, Pro-ICWA
Constitutional Law Profs Brief
Casey Family Programs and Thirty Child Welfare Organizations Amicus Brief
21 State Attorneys General Amicus Brief
Indian Law Scholars Amicus Brief
325 Tribal Governments and 57 Tribal Organizations Amicus Brief
Native American Women’s Amicus Brief
Principal Briefs on the State and Individual Plaintiff side (Anti-ICWA)
Amicus Briefs (Anti-ICWA)
ProjectonFairRepresentationAmicus
Reply Briefs by Tribal Intervenors and Federal Government
Intervenor Navajo Nation Reply Brief
Comments Needed for Kansas ICWA Pro Hac Vice Rule Exception
The Kansas Supreme Court is seeking comments on an amendment for to the pro hac vice rule to exempt out of state ICWA attorneys from fees and associating with local counsel. Deadline for comments is March 15, 2019. Rule is here.
| Kansas Supreme Court accepting public comment on Rule 116 |
| TOPEKA—The Kansas Supreme Court is accepting public comment on amendments to Rule 116 regarding admission of out-of-state attorneys to make it easier for a tribe to exercise its rights to participate in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings.
The Supreme Court will accept comment until 5 p.m. Monday, March 18, 2019. Comments are to be sent to rulenotice@kscourts.org with “Rule 116” in the subject line. Amendments to Rule 116 are requested by the Kansas Judicial Council, on the recommendation of its Tribal-State Judicial Forum. Among the amendments requested is new language that exempts an out-of-state attorney appearing in an Indian Child Welfare Act proceeding from paying a fee and from a duty to associate with local counsel. The out-of-state attorney would still need to file a motion for admission pro hac vice, accompanied by the attorney’s verified application. |
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