ICWA

Montana ICWA Case: Notice, Active Efforts and a Look at Adoptive Couple Citations

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

A footnote in the case,

The record does not clarify whether G.S. ever had custody of M.S. The record is silent regarding G.S.’s relationship with M.S. prior to his incarceration. We recognize that 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) does not apply where the “breakup of the Indian family” has long since occurred. In re J.S., 2014 MT 79, P29, 374 Mont. 329, 321 P.3d 103 (citing Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013)). Although the District Court asked during the April 22, 2013 hearing, before Baby Girl was decided, how the ICWA standard for termination applies in a situation where the child was never in the parent’s custody, the parties did not dispute that ICWA’s active efforts were required. Because this potential issue was not raised, we will not address it in this appeal.

got me looking for other cases that have cited Adoptive Couple. According to Westlaw, that would be 19 cases, including this one. Striking four of them as not child welfare cases, all 15 remaining were involuntary proceedings. Five from California, two from Montana, and one in Alaska, Nebraska, Oklahoma, North Carolina, North Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, and Virginia.  Three cases “distinguished” Adoptive Couple, though that included the Alexandria P. case, so distinguishing Adoptive Couple doesn’t necessarily mean the court followed ICWA. Seven of the cases only cited the case (including this one).

Those that used the Adoptive Couple reasoning (instead of citing the case for fairly standard ICWA language)  include:

Native Villiage of Tununak v. State (holding that the adoption preferences of ICWA didn’t apply if the preferred placement didn’t “formally” move to adopt the child);

In re J.S. (applying the “continued custody” reasoning to a guardianship); and

In re Elise W. (discussing whether the case would change notice requirements when a parent never had custody)(unpublished case out of California’s First District).

In re T.S. (discussing when active efforts must start, in light of 1922 and 1912(d))

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik Briefing Complete

Matthew L.M. Fletcher4 Comments

Here:

Brief in Support of First Motion (July 2014)

Statement of Undisputed Facts (First Motion)

Due Process Motion (Second PSJ)

Due Process Undisputed Facts

Exhibit 1 (Hearing Transcripts) 502 pp

Exhibit 2 (Custody Orders) 113 pp.

Exhibit 7 (ICWA Affidavits) 145 pages

Exhibit 8 (Petitions for Temp Custody) 7 pages

DOJ Amicus Brief

128 Defendants Response to 1922 Motion

129 Defendants Response to Due Process Motion

OST46(ReplyBrief1922)

OST48(ReplyBriefDueProcess)

NICWA Annual Conference Call for Presentations

Kate Fort

Here.

Deadline is Nov. 7th.

 

 

Afternoon Nuts and Bolts Panel at MIFPA Training

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Annette Nickel, Judge Butts, Maribeth Preston, Judge Maldonado

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Judge Thorne Presenting At the Grand Rapids MIFPA Training

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Spoiler alert–the answer is “gold standard.”

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Susan Harness Kicks Off Overflow MIFPA Training in Grand Rapids

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Amazing turn out.

Unpublished ICWA Burden of Proof Case out of Michigan

Kate Fort1 Comment

Here.

The record demonstrates that although the trial court found that DP and AP were Indian children under the ICWA, the trial court did not apply the heightened “beyond a reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard of proof at the termination hearing as required under ICWA. Id.; 25 USC 1912(f). The record further demonstrates that although a representative of DP and AP’s Indian tribe testified at the termination hearing, the witness was never qualified as an expert and, importantly, the witness did not testify that respondents’ “continued custody of” DP and AP was “likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the” Indian children. 25 USC 1912(f); In re Morris, 491 Mich at 100 n 9. In both Docket No. 318105 and 318163, petitioner concedes that the trial court “committed reversible error” by applying the incorrect evidentiary standard of proof, and petitioner requests that we reverse the trial court’s termination of respondents’ respective parental rights to the Indian children and remand for further proceedings consistent with applicable ICWA provision. On the record before us, we agree that the trial court committed plain error affecting respondents’ substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8- 9; see In re Morris, 491 Mich at 100 n 9. In both Docket No. 318105 and 318163, we reverse the termination of respondents’ respective parental rights to the two Indian children, DP and AP, and remand for proceedings in compliance with ICWA, 25 USC 1912(f).

Published Definition of Indian Child Case out of California

Kate Fort

Here.

State Judges Respond to Oglala Sioux Tribe Motions for Summary Judgment

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the new materials in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik (D.S.D.):

128 Defendants Response to 1922 Motion

129 Defendants Response to Due Process Motion

The motions for summary judgment are here.

The evidentiary exhibits are here.

The DOJ amicus brief is here.

Alaska SCT Applies Adoptive Couple to Affirm Non-Native Adoption

Matthew L.M. Fletcher5 Comments

Here is the opinion in Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (Alaska).

An excerpt:

We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing and oral argument on the effect of the Supreme Court’s Baby Girl decision on the adoption appeal currently before us.26 We now hold that because the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on issues of federal law bind state courts’ consideration of federal law issues — including the Indian Child Welfare Act — the decision in Baby Girl applies directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court’s holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not “formally [seek] to adopt” Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, “there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]” and therefore ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s [placement] preferences are inapplicable.”27 We affirm the superior court’s order granting the Smiths’ petition to adopt Dawn and vacate our remand order in Tununak I requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. We do not otherwise disturb our decision in Tununak I.

We posted briefs here.