Here.
Via Pechanga.
ICWA
National Indian Child Welfare Association Resources on Baby Veronica Case
Here.
Useful site, especially the Media Fact Check Matrix.
Split Alaska SCT Decides ICWA Active Efforts/Parental Rights Termination Case
Here is the opinion in Thea G. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services.
The affected tribe is Native Village of Kotzebue.
Supreme Court Grants Cert in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
SCOTUSBlog: Two Indian Law Petitions to Watch for this Week’s Conference
Here:
Issue: (1) Whether a non-custodial parent can invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law; and (2) whether ICWA defines “parent” in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.
Issue: (1) Whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin activity that violates the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., but takes place outside of Indian lands; and (2) whether tribal sovereign immunity bars a state from suing in federal court to enjoin a tribe from violating IGRA outside of Indian lands.
Texas COA Issues Distubing ICWA Notice Opinion
Here is the opinion in In re C.T. & K.:
From pages 32-33:
Paul and Alice argue that the trial court “ha[d] reason to know that an Indian child” was involved in the case—and the notice and verification requirements of subsection 1912(a) were therefore applicable—because of Myra’s testimony that C.T. is “half-Indian.” The Department, for its part, agrees that the case should be abated and remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether ICWA applies.
We disagree that the case should be remanded or abated, however, because we do not believe that the trial court “kn[e]w or ha[d] reason to know that an Indian child” was involved in the case. See id. The only evidence adduced regarding C.T.’s heritage was Myra’s statement that Myra is “half Black Foot” and that Alice is “half Cheyenne.” She did not state that either Alice, Paul, C.T., K.T., or herself were “members” of an Indian tribe, and she did not state that either child would be “eligible for membership” in an Indian tribe. See id. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian child” as a person under eighteen who either: (a) is a member of an Indian [55] tribe; or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe); see also In re Trever I., 973 A.2d 752, 758 (Me. 2009) (noting that “the party asserting the applicability of the ICWA has the burden to provide sufficient information to at least put the court or Department on notice that the child may be an ‘Indian child,’ within the meaning of the ICWA, and that further inquiry is necessary”); In re Arianna R.G., 657 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Wis. 2003) (holding that ICWA notice provisions did not apply because “the information available to the court was too vague for the court to have reason to know” that children were Indian where only evidence was father’s statement that his children have “Indian heritage” and that their “ancestry stems from the Ojibwa Tribe in Marinette, Wisconsin”).
“Rough Justice in Indian Child Welfare” in South Dakota
And here is some of the information on which the story is based — it’s a portion of the interrogation video, now a court document, of four Native children in South Dakota who were accusing their nonNative foster parents of sexual and physical abuse. The portion of the video chosen did not include the children in order to protect their privacy; the agents are off-camera, discussing their interrogation strategy, and don’t realize they’re being picked up on the mic.
NYTs (Liptak) on SCT Cert Petition involving Cherokee ICWA Case
Here.
Michigan COA Issues Conditional Reversal in ICWA Notice Case
Here is the unpublished opinion:
An excerpt:
Given the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, the Supreme Court found “the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one,” and held that sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement. Morris, 491 Mich at 88-89. The transcript of the November 29, 2004, hearing was not provided on appeal for review of the evidence indicating Indian heritage, but the trial court deemed the evidence “weakly strong” and felt it warranted provision of ICWA notice. On appeal, the parties agree that the lower court record does not show notice was provided in 2004. Given the fact that the notice requirement was triggered in 2004, it is unnecessary to decide whether respondent mother’s comments during the 2012 termination hearing were also sufficient to require notice. If her comments were not sufficient, or even if she denied SKV’s Indian heritage, the trigger occurred in 2004, and a parent cannot waive the child’s status. Morris, 491 Mich at 111.
Nebraska SCT Overrules Precedent Designed to Avoid Application of ICWA
Here is the opinion in In re Zylena R.
From the court’s syllabus:
To the extent that In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105 (1992), permits a state court to consider the best interests of an Indian child in deciding whether there is good cause to deny a motion to transfer a proceeding to tribal court, it is overruled.
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