Here:
KG Urban Reply Brief in First Circuit Appeal
Here:
Here:
An excerpt from Justice Cavanagh’s unanimous opinion:
While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one. Therefore, we hold first that sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement. We hold also that a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child’s tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record including, at minimum, (1) the original or a copy of each actual notice personally served or sent via registered mail pursuant to 25 USC 1912(a) and (2) the original or a legible copy of the return receipt or other proof of service showing delivery of the notice.1 Finally, we hold that the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.
Here:
Here.
Additional coverage:
Indian Country Today
Washington Post
NY Times
Statement of Sen. Akaka
Press Release from NCAI
A personal favorite–Fem 2.0
“After all my reading I’m still loss as to why Republicans do not trust tribal courts.”
Here:
NACDL and NAFD VAWA Letter 4 23 12
I find it odd that there’s such a heavy reliance on the testimony from the 1960s in the years leading to the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act in this letter. Barbara Creel’s work is much more formidable and persuasive, probably because it’s not such a direct assault on all tribal courts using such broad (and now largely inaccurate) generalizations. Later this week, I’ll be presenting a paper about the 1977-79 NAICJA study on tribal courts where David Getches pointed out the direct analogy between tribal and rural justices systems — that analogy is still present, with all its plusses and minuses. I am persuaded that that’s a much more direct analysis (see also here). Most tribal courts aren’t going to be like federal courts; neither are magistrates and JOPs in rural New York or Iowa or Arizona.
Tova Indritz’s efforts to criticize the Tribal Law and Order Act a few years back are in this hearing:
Here.
An excerpt:
No one suggested during a Supreme Court hearing that Congress had done a dumb thing in the way it has treated Indian tribes as partners (the most critical comment was that Congress had acted in a “schizophrenic” way), but sheer irrationality was what seemed to be troubling the Justices. On the one hand, Congress told the government it had to accept every contract offered by an Indian tribe to provide government services. But, on the other hand, it said every year that the government could not pay for everything it got in return. On Wednesday, the Court was trying to figure out what to do about that — other than simply handing the problem back to Congress (an option that did get discussed). The argument came in the case of Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, et al. (docket 11-551)
Here is the Congressional report that accompanies the bill —
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