Fletcher Commentary on Dollar General in the Yale Law Journal Forum

Here is “Contract and (Tribal) Jurisdiction.” (PDF)

Excerpts:

Consider two commercial contracts. The first requires customers to waive their rights to bring class actions against large businesses in favor of private arbitration. The second requires a reservation leaseholder to adjudicate disputes in tribal court. Both contracts require dispute resolution in fora over which the Supreme Court does not exercise supervisory jurisdiction. Both arbitration and tribal courts are favored by acts of Congress.1 Both contracts are hotly contested in the Supreme Court. But the arbitration clause contract has been affirmed in a series of recent decisions.2 The tribal court contract, by contrast, is pending before the Court in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.3 Ironically, while the more conservative Justices signed on to the arbitration clause decisions, these same Justices may be Dollar General’s best bets for escaping tribal jurisdiction. This short Essay details the key arguments in Dollar General and argues that to undo the tribal contract would unnecessarily and unconstitutionally undo the right to contract for Indian nations.

And:

Justice Scalia’s death may mean a 4-4 tie in the Dollar General case. Justice Scalia was in the majority in the most recent tribal civil jurisdiction dispute, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,32 decided by a 5-4 vote, split along the traditional conservative-liberal voting pattern. In Plains Commerce, Justice Scalia asked a nonmember company that had not specified jurisdiction in its commercial agreement with a tribal member-owned business: “[Y]our client could have obtained that certainly [sic] by inserting a choice of law provision providing that any disputes would be resolved somewhere else, couldn’t it?”33 The answer in that case from the nonmember? “I think that in the face of silence in the contract, the general rule [against tribal jurisdiction] controls rather than its exceptions.”34 There is a choice of law provision in Dollar General, negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated business entities, and it points to tribal court jurisdiction.35

 

Cert Stage Briefs in Zepeda v. United States

Here:

Zepeda Cert Petition

US Cert Opp Brief

Zepeda Reply

Lower court opinion here. En banc materials here, here, and here. Panel materials and other materials here, here, and here.

Crow Allottees v. Dept. of Justice Cert Stage Briefs

Here:

Crow Allottees Cert Petition

Cert Opp Brief

Cert Cert Stage Reply

Lower court materials: briefs, Mont SCT Opinion.
Related federal court materials here.

Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York Cert Petition

Here:

Shinnecock Cert Petition

Questions presented:

Petitioner’s case is the last in a long line of Indian land claim cases arising in the State of New York in which Indian tribes have been denied access to the courts by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014). Based on its Cayuga “laches” defense, the court of appeals summarily dismissed all claims of Petitioner for legal and equitable relief for the loss of their lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, also known as the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Recently, however, this Court affirmed the general rule in equity that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of all claims filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014). In Petrella, this Court recognized that only equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the outset of litigation due to delay in commencing suit in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1977. The questions presented are:
1. Whether at the outset of litigation a court may apply “laches” to foreclose an Indian tribe from bringing its federal statutory and common-law claims, *ii including one for money damages, if brought within the statute of limitations established by Congress.
2. Whether a court violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses when it retroactively applies a new, judicially-formulated rule to dismiss an Indian tribe’s viable claims ab initio, thereby extinguishing established property rights.
Lower court materials here.

 

SCOTUS Denies Cert in Alaska v. Organized Village of Kake (Roadless Rule)

Here.

Cert petition here.

Tribal NLRB Background Materials

Here are the materials relevant to Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government v. NLRB.

Supreme Court cert stage briefs

Little River Petition and Appendix COMBINED

USET Amicus Brief

Final CO-UMUT Amicus Cert Petition – Saginaw Chippewa and LRB

National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation

CNIGA Amicus

NCAI Amicus

Michigan Amicus Brief

US Cert Opposition

Little River Reply

Sixth Circuit En Banc Stage Continue reading

CNIGA Amicus Brief in Saginaw Chippewa v. NLRB

Here:

CNIGA Amicus Brief

SCOTUSBlog Profile of Sturgeon v. Frost Decision

Here.

US Cert Opposition Brief in Zepeda

Here:

US Cert Opp Brief

An excerpt:

Petitioner contends (Pet. 11-22) that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of an “Indian” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1153 violates equal protection. Petitioner further asserts (Pet. 22-23) that the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with a decision from the Utah Supreme Court. Those claims lack merit. The court of appeals’ decision – which follows this Court’s precedent – is fully consistent with the Constitution, and no conflict exists on the question presented. Moreover, this case would be a poor vehicle to consider the meaning of “Indian” in Section 1153 because petitioner qualifies under any conceivable definition, including the one he proposes. Further review is not warranted.

Cert petition is here.

SCOTUSBlog Profile of Nebraska v. Parker Decision

Here.