Tom Gede on the Problems with an Oliphant Fix

Tom Gede has published “Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?” in ENGAGE: The Journal of the Federalist Society Practice Groups.

Here is a sampling:

As a policy matter, Congress must consider whether the “relaxing” of restrictions on inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is warranted, given that it would subject non-Indian citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they had not previously been subject, and where the customary guarantees of federal constitutional protections may be questioned. Unlike the Duro-fix, which related to non-member Indians, a full or partial Oliphant-fix that relies on reaffirming inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction will bring significant constitutional and prudential questions that will likely have to be tested at the highest levels. An Oliphant-fix that grants federal delegated authority to tribal governments and includes federal appellate review likely will be more palatable to non-Indians and to a Supreme Court that looks to constitutional structure guarantees, among others, but does nothing to respect tribal sovereignty. The real question ought to be what instrument most effectively and expeditiously permits the local prosecution and punishment of domestic violence and sexual assault and other crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country.

On Localist Judging and Tribal Courts

There’s new and interesting scholarship on something called “Localist Statutory Interpretation” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper argues for more attention to citizens’ point of contact with our legal system within local courts – and makes an effort to conceptualize local judges as parts of local governments. Once the paper highlights the role of local courts within the constellation of local government, it offers an argument for why certain forms of “localist judging” are appropriate postures for local judges to take when confronted with hard cases of statutory interpretation. The paper explores the virtues of a type of “intrastate judicial federalism.”

I’m interested in the application of these ideas to tribal courts. I don’t think the paper’s author intends to comprehensively theorize how local judges can engage in “localist judging,” and therefore the paper has limited or no utility for tribal judges, but it does raise several important points.

First, the Tribal Law and Order Act amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to include this requirement for tribes who want to exercise enhanced sentencing authority:

In a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe, in exercising powers of self-government, imposes a total term of imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian tribe shall … require that the judge presiding over the criminal proceeding–(A) has sufficient legal training to preside over criminal proceedings; and (B) is licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States….

The bold language is what’s confusing to the tribes thinking about using the enhanced sentencing provisions (that apparently there is a verb tense agreement problem will only bother Bryan Garner). I have been asked about this provision a couple times in the last week. I am glad to report someone smarter than I shares my view on this question (quoting from footnote 19 in the paper linked above):

I am here avoiding the debate about whether it is sound (or constitutional) to have lay people adjudicating cases in the legal system. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72 (Cal. 1974) (holding that it is a violation of the federal Constitution to allow non-attorney judges to sit in judgment over criminal defendants for offenses punishable by incarceration); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (suggesting that it is not unconstitutional, so long as de novo review is available in a court with a legally-trained judge); City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1998) (rejecting the logic of North and finding non-lawyer adjudications imposing jail time to violate Tennessee’s Constitution). New York has many village and town courts without lawyer adjudicators – and given the New York Times reporting several years ago, supra note 2, it is hard to think it is anything but a scandal.

There’s my answer in there, again in bold, to the question whether tribes can utilize enhanced sentencing provisions through judges who are not lawyers licensed by a state bar.

Second, I am concerned about the sometimes extreme disadvantage Indian tribes and individual Indians have in “local” (read: non-Indian) courts. Perhaps the days of local judges disregarding treaty rights are largely over, but local judges routinely, openly, and notoriously disregard and denigrate the Indian Child Welfare Act. Recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court refused to intervene in what appears to be exactly the kind of open hostility of ICWA. Plus, there was that weird Iowa magistrate judge who just pointedly refused to acknowledge blackletter federal Indian law as some sort of manifesto against the Iowa Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to same-sex marriage.

Third, I’m not at all down on this paper. Tribal courts are the epitome of localist judging. The material within the paper on the role of local judges changing depending on whether or how they are elected or nominated would be interesting reading for tribal judges who are serious about understanding their role in tribal communities. It’s a pretty short paper, and I urge tribal judges and tribal court practitioners to take a look.

Eastern Band Cherokee Ordinances Implement TLOA Higher Sentencing Authority

Here:

Ordinance 210

Ordinance 182 (2012)

They appear to have preceded Hopi by a few days.

ICRA Habeas Challenge to Makah Banishment Order Dismissed

Here are the materials in Wilbur v. Makah Tribal Court (W.D. Wash.):

DCT Order Dismissing Wilbur Claims

Makah Motion to Dismiss

Wilbur Response

Makah Reply

Navajo Nation SCT Issues Immunity Decision

Here is the decision in Navajo Housing Authority v. Johns.

From the court’s syllabus:

In this appeal of the Crownpoint District Court’s denial of NHA’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity, the Court vacates the denial.  Noting that the issue of NHA’s immunity has returned time and again to the Court, first on the basis of NHA’s codified plan of operations, subsequently on amendments to both NHA’s plan of operations and the Sovereign Immunity Act, the Court finds that NHA had immunity at all times relevant to this action. In reaching its decision, the Court overrules a quartet of cases concerning NHA’s immunity and reestablishes its 1987 opinion in NHA v. Dana as the controlling case.

Opening Seventh Circuit Brief in Challenge to Martin Webb Payday Lending Company’s Forum Selection Clause

Here is the opening brief in Jackson v. Payday Financial LLC:

Jackson Opening Brief

Lower court materials here.

Opening Eighth Circuit Brief in Montana 1 Case out of Turtle Mountain Tribal Court (UPDATED with Answer and Reply Briefs)

Here is the brief in DISH Network Service LLC v. Laducer:

DISH Network Opening Brief

And the answer brief:

Tribal Court Brief

And the reply brief:

DISH Network Reply Brief

Lower court materials here and here.

Federal Court Grants Habeas Petition in Consecutive Sentences Case

Interesting case involving whether the Tribal Law and Order Act can be retroactively applied to a Gila River Indian Community conviction. Here are the materials in Johnson v. Tracy (D. Ariz.):

Johnson Habeas Petition

GRIC Response to Petition

R&R Recommending Denial of Writ

Federal Defenders Amicus Brief

GRIC Response to Amicus Brief

DCT Order Rejecting R&R

Navajo SCT Rules that Criminal Sentences Presumed to be Concurrent

Here is the court’s opinion in Baker v. Greyeyes.

From the court’s syllabus:

The Court grants a writ of habeas corpus filed after 6 months incarceration by an inmate serving time on multiple sentences in which it had not been specified how the sentences would run, holding that, when not stated in a judgment, multiple sentences are presumed to run concurrently.

Contour Spa v. Seminole Tribe Cert Petition

Here:

Contour Spa Cert Petition

Questions Presented:

1. Does Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2003), provide a basis for finding a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity where an Indian Tribe has expressly waived sovereign immunity, is sued in state court, removes to federal court, and then asserts sovereign immunity based on the Tribe’s concealment of the fact that the Tribe did not comply with the Secretary of the Interior’s lease approval requests?
2. Does Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). support the concept of tribal sovereign immunity or should that accidental doctrine, questioned in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998), be revisited and discarded.
3. Does the Indian Civil Rights Act, Title 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(5) and (a)(8) create an implicit cause of action permitting the Tribe to be sued for the taking of property without due process of law?
Lower court materials here.