Here:
Anti-Indian Movement in Skagit County – 5-1-12
The earlier version of this report is here.
Here’s a new report from Borderlands Research and Education, based in Silverdale, WA: Anti-Indianism in Skagit County – 4-15-2012 Having practiced in Skagit County, it’s good to see this sort of sentiment, which I found to be fairly prevalent, brought to light. I mentioned the State Republican Party’s resolution requesting termination of tribal sovereignty, which this report addresses in considerable detail, in one of my articles. See 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 737 n.239 (2011).
Here are the materials in Fox Drywall & Plastering Inc. v. Marshall (D. S.D.):
Tribal Court Materials:
Flandreau Trial Court Decision I
Here:
Here:
NACDL and NAFD VAWA Letter 4 23 12
I find it odd that there’s such a heavy reliance on the testimony from the 1960s in the years leading to the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act in this letter. Barbara Creel’s work is much more formidable and persuasive, probably because it’s not such a direct assault on all tribal courts using such broad (and now largely inaccurate) generalizations. Later this week, I’ll be presenting a paper about the 1977-79 NAICJA study on tribal courts where David Getches pointed out the direct analogy between tribal and rural justices systems — that analogy is still present, with all its plusses and minuses. I am persuaded that that’s a much more direct analysis (see also here). Most tribal courts aren’t going to be like federal courts; neither are magistrates and JOPs in rural New York or Iowa or Arizona.
Tova Indritz’s efforts to criticize the Tribal Law and Order Act a few years back are in this hearing:
Here are the materials in Rincon Mushroom Corp. v. Mazzetti:
Rincon Band Motion to Take Judicial Notice
Rincon Mushroom Motion to Take Judicial Notice
Lower court materials here.
An excerpt from the Ninth Circuit opinion:
The Tribe argues that the non-member fee land at issue could potentially contaminate the Tribe’s water supply, or exacerbate a future fire that might damage the Rincon Casino. However, these possibilities do not fall within Montana’s second exception, which requires actual actions that have significantly impacted the tribe. Compare id. at 341 (“The sale of formerly Indian-owned fee land to a third party . . . cannot fairly be called ‘catastrophic’ for tribal self-government. . . .”) (citation omitted); and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1997) (ruling that tribal court jurisdiction over tort suits is not “needed to preserve the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), with Elliott, 566 F.3d at 844, 849-50 (holding that the tribal court had colorable jurisdiction where a non-Indian started a forest fire on reservation land).
To hold that the potential threats of harm presented on this record give rise to tribal jurisdiction under Montana’s second exception would allow the exception to swallow the rule; any property within the Rincon Reservation faces similar potential threats. See Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330. Because the potential threats did not create a plausible basis for tribal court jurisdiction, the district court erred when it dismissed RMCA’s Complaint for failure to exhaust tribal remedies. See Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848.
Compare that language to the lower court’s description of the same allegation:
Defendants have submitted evidence indicating that conduct on Plaintiff’s property “pose direct threats to the Tribe’s groundwater resources.” (Minjares Decl. ¶ 29, Doc. # 52). Defendants also have submitted evidence that “[c]onditions on the Subject Property during the [2007] Poomacha Fire contributed to the spread of wildfire from that property to Tribal lands across the street on which the Casino is located.” (Mazzetti Decl. ¶ 15, Doc. # 17-2). Although Plaintiff disputes this evidence, Defendants have shown that conduct on Plaintiff’s property plausibly could threaten the Tribe’s groundwater resources and could contribute to the spread of wildfires on the reservation. This showing is sufficient to require exhaustion, given the relief requested by the first two counts of the Complaint.
Here are the materials in Wounded Knee v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Council (D. S.D.):
Here are the materials in Encana Oil & Gas v. St. Clair (D. Wyo.):
71 Order Granting Motions to Dismiss
The briefs and other materials are posted here.
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