Mille Lacs Ojibwe Seeks Judge

Here (District Court Judge).

The District Court Judge presides over the District Court of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians and exercises judicial authority over cases in law and equity for the specific purposes of promoting the general welfare, preserving and maintaining justice, and protecting the rights of all persons under the jurisdiction of the Non-removable Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe. This is a six-year term.

Tribal Court Materials in Competing State/Tribal Court Actions in North Dakota Oil Transport Contract Controversies

Here are the materials in the Fort Berthold Tribal Court action, TJMD LLP v. Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC:

DOCS-#390943-v1-defendants__motion_to_dismiss

DOCS-#390944-v1-defendants__brief_-_motion_to_dismiss

DOCS-#390945-v1-defendants__appendix_-_motion_to_dismiss

Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Non-Trail Member Jur

Affidavit of Virgil White Owl

DOCS-#407079-v1-PDF_2013_02_06_2nd_Aff_Claypool

DOCS-#407080-v1-PDF_2013_02_06_Def_Reply_Brief_Support_Motion_Dismiss

DOCS-#440826-v1-PDF_interim_order_on_jurisdiction

Prior post here.

Materials in Competing State/Tribal Court Actions in North Dakota Oil Transport Contract Controversies

In the most recent Bench & Bar (Minnesota State Bar Journal) article “Boomtown: Risks and Rewards in the Peace Garden State,” Kristin Rowell writes about her experiences in litigating contract claims in both Fort Berthold Tribal Court and North Dakota’s Montrail County District Court where the courts reach opposition conclusions on the same legal question. An excerpt:

In October 2012, I commenced litigation on behalf of my client against four defendants companies.  Two of the companies were organized under the laws of the state of Minnesota, one of the companies was organized under the laws of Nevada, and the other company was organized under the laws of Florida.  All of these out-of-state residents were conducting business with my client on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in New Town, North Dakota, as a part of the booming oil industry.  (Another fascinating aspect of North Dakota’s judicial landscape is that there are several independent tribal courts separate from the state and federal court systems.  An in-depth look at North Dakota tribal courts will have to be saved for another article.)  My client is a member of the federally recognized Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Native American Nations, also known collectively as the “MHA Nation” or the “Three Affiliated Tribes.”  For a variety of reasons, my client chose to commence its case in Fort Berthold District (Tribal) Court.

In response to the complaint, the four defendants moved to dismiss my client’s case for “lack of nonmember tribal court jurisdiction.”  We opposed the motion and explained to the tribal court judge that it could and should retain jurisdiction under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Supreme Court case that gave tribal courts the authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers on reservation land owned in fee by non-Indians.  Under Montana, tribal courts can regulate the activities of nonmembers (and in turn, assert jurisdiction over nonmembers in tribal court) where: (1) the nonmembers “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” or (2) the nonmembers’ “conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”15  If the circumstances of a case fit either exception, then the tribal court has jurisdiction over the dispute.16

We argued that the court had jurisdiction over the key non-Indian defendant because we met both Montana exceptions with respect to that defendant.  The focus of our analysis was that the defendant contracted with my client so the first Montana exception was easily met.  Defendants argued that because my client is a company and not a human, it could not be a “member” of the tribe for jurisdictional purposes.  We argued that my client, a limited liability partnership, was owned by an Indian, which meant that it was a “member” of the tribe for jurisdictional purposes.

The Fort Berthold Tribal Court agreed with us.  The court’s decision turned on the novel and narrow legal issue of whether a limited liability partnership was more akin to a limited liability company or a corporation for jurisdictional purposes.  We argued that the United States Supreme Court has held that the citizenship of a limited partnership for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is determined according to the citizenship of its limited and general partners, citing Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990).  Several courts have held that this holds true for limited liability partnerships too.17  Defendants argued that the limited liability partnership was more analogous to a corporation, should be treated as a separate legal “person,” and cited cases in which the courts held that a corporate person could not be a “member” of an Indian tribe.

We have been proceeding in the tribal court ever since and we will eventually have a trial.  But there is a conundrum.  While the other side’s motion to dismiss was under advisement in tribal court, the contracting party defendant in the tribal court action started an action against my client in North Dakota state court related to alleged oil spills at the exact property they are fighting about in tribal court.  My client moved to dismiss or transfer the state court case, and the same issues were argued to the state court judge that had just been decided in tribal court.  The short story is that the state court judge disagreed with the tribal court judge and retained jurisdiction over the second case.  In other words, we now have two cases pending in two courts involving the same two parties and the same contract.  Suffice it to say that we are working hard to resolve both.

The materials in the Montrail County matter (Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC v. TJMD LLP are here:

DOCS-#424808-v1-PDF_notice_of_motion_&_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer

DOCS-#424809-v1-PDF_Mem_Supp_Motion_Transfer_Venue_and_Dismiss

DOCS-#424810-v1-pdf_KBR_Affidavit_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer

DOCS-#424811-v1-PDF_proposed_order_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer

DOCS-#430259-v1-pdf_Dak_Pet_response_brief_to_motion_to_dismiss

DOCS-#430260-v1-PDF_exs_to_Dak_Pet_response_brief

DOCS-#430276-v1-PDF_authorities_cited_DP_response_motion_to_dismiss

DOCS-#431865-v1-PDF_Reply_Mem_Supp_Motion_to_Dismiss_or_Transfer

DOCS-#431866-v1-PDF_Supp_Aff_KBR_motion_to_dismiss_or_transfer

DOCS-#449184-v1-Order_denying_motion_to_dismiss_transfer_(mountrail)

Materials in the parallel tribal court litigation TJMD LLP v. Dakota Petroleum Transport Solutions LLC are included as exhibits to these pleadings. We will post those materials in a separate post.

Federal Court Dismisses D.V. Offender’s Challenge to Revocation of Probation for Violation of Tribal Court Exclusion Order…With Concerns

Here are the materials in United States v. Nichols (D. S.D.):

44 Nichols Motion to Dismiss

45 US Response

49 DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

An excerpt:

Steven Nichols, a non-Indian, was excluded from the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation. While his exclusion was in effect, he was seen driving on a public road within the reservation. Tribal officers stopped and detained him until an FBI agent arrived. The agent then arrested him for criminal trespass. Nichols claims that the tribe did not have the authority to ban him from using the road and that his federal trespass charge — built upon a tribal writ and order of exclusion — should be dismissed. Because (1) there exists latent factual issues that require an evidentiary foundation, (2)there has been no exhaustion of tribal remedies or any showing that some exception to the exhaustion prescription applies, and (3) there is no ambiguity in the language of the revocation petition as amended, Nichols’s dismissal motion must be denied, but without prejudice.

Cert Opposition Brief in Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw Tribal Court Jurisdiction Matter

Here:

Mississippi Choctaw Cert Opposition

Cert petition here.

California Legislature Enacts Tribal Court Civil Money Judgment Act

Here:

SB-104 CA Tribal Court Civil Money Judgement Act 08-22-2014

From the digest:

The existing Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act provides that foreign judgments that grant or deny recovery of a sum of money and that are final and conclusive are enforceable in California, with specified exceptions. The act includes within the definition of “foreign-country judgment” a judgment by any Indian tribe recognized by the government of the United States.

This bill would, until January 1, 2018, exempt Indian tribal judgments from the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, and would instead enact the Tribal Court Civil Money Judgment Act. The new act would likewise provide for the enforceability of tribal court money judgments in California, except as specified. The act would prescribe the procedure for applying for recognition and entry of a judgment based on a tribal court money judgment, the procedure and grounds for objecting to the entry of judgment, and the bases upon which the court may refuse to enter the judgment or grant a stay of enforcement. The bill would require the Judicial Council to prescribe a form for the notice of filing the application for recognition of the tribal court money judgment, as specified. The bill would require that this application be executed under penalty of perjury, which would expand the scope of the crime of perjury and thus impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would require the California Law Revision Commission to conduct a study of the standards for recognition of a tribal court or a foreign court judgment under the Tribal Court Civil Money Judgment Act and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, and submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Legislature and the Governor no later than January 1, 2017.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for
a specified reason.

Seventh Circuit Rules against Western Sky in Jackson v. Payday Financial LLC — A Warning to Indian Country

Here is the opinion:

CA7 Opinion

Based on these findings, we now conclude that the Plaintiffs’ action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. We also cannot accept the Loan Entities’ alternative argument for upholding the district court’s dismissal: that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation. As the Supreme Court has explained, most recently in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. The Loan Entities have not established a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, and, therefore, exhaustion in tribal courts is not required. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the district court’s dismissal on this alternative basis.

Primary briefs here. Supplemental briefs here.

As should be expected by this time, payday lending in Indian country is creating bad law for tribal interests. This case involved a privately owned payday lending operation. Tribally-owned operations will be scrambling to distinguish themselves from this case. Particularly troublesome is the holding and (hopefully) dicta from the opinion that suggests tribal courts have no jurisdiction involving off-reservation lending operations, even though the operation is based in Indian country and even though the lending instrument includes a forum selection clause naming a tribal forum.

My initial recommendations to tribal leaders and counsel — shut down on-reservation-based payday lending operations operated privately immediately. My second recommendation is to ensure that tribal regulations of tribally owned payday lending operations are independent and robust. In other words, tribes must be able to withstand the kind of searching inquiry into their regulatory scheme that the federal court did in this case. Can tribal sovereign lenders say that?

Hopi Seeks Pro Tem Judge

Here. And here.

Navajo SCT Rules that Navajo Courts Retain Jurisdiction over Navajo Children Residing Off-Reservation

Here is the opinion in Nouri v. Crownpoint Family Court. The court’s syllabus:

The Supreme Court issues its Opinion and Order Denying Writ of Prohibition regarding competing child custody actions filed by parents in Navajo and state courts. Jurisdiction of the Navajo court over the child was challenged because the child who formerly resided in Fort Defiance now resides with her mother in Albuquerque. The Court affirms that the Nation has jurisdiction over Navajo children wherever they may reside, which arises from inherent sovereignty as acknowledged at 7 N.N.C. 253(B). The Court further affirms that the Álchíní Bi Beehaz’áannii Act is not the basis for jurisdiction over privately filed family actions in which parents are legally capable of making decisions for their children.

News Update in KBIC Judicial Crisis — Utilities Shut Off

Here is the news article, “KBIC moves tribal court.”