New Mexico Notice and Time Frame Case from Court of Appeals [ICWA]

Children, Youth & Families Department v. Tanisha G. and Isaac G.

This is an interesting and remarkable case, and a way to deal with continued notice violations and delay by an agency. Here are the highlights of this disturbing case of agency overreach:

CYFD took Child, then age four, into custody on January 26, 2018, after the 12 Bernalillo County Sheriffs Office executed a warrant for Father’s arrest, leaving no caregiver in the home to care for Child.

***

Parents were served with the petition on February 6, 2018. By that time, Father  had been released from custody and the charges against him dropped; his arrest was apparently the product of mistaken identity.

Meanwhile,

In the ensuing seventy-seven days, the parties appeared for three hearings: a status conference on February 27, 2018, and two adjudicatory hearings that had been set for April 2, 2018, and April 24, 2018, respectively. The district court declined to 14 commence the adjudication on either April 2 or April 24, however, because although CYFD had mailed ICWA notices to several tribal entities on February 8, 2018, and the tribal entities had received those notices shortly thereafter, CYFD had not filed proof of service to establish receipt in the record.

On April 25, 2018, Parents filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that 19 CYFD had failed to commence the adjudication within sixty days as required by the Abuse and Neglect Act.

THEN,

The district court heard the motions to dismiss on the morning of May 24, 6 2018, at which time CYFD orally moved for an extension of time to commence the adjudicatory hearing. The district court denied CYFD’s request, noting that the court and parties had attempted multiple times to commence the adjudication, that CYFD’s failure to comply with ICWA’s notice requirements had precluded the court from timely adjudicating the matter, that the court had reminded CYFD that the time limits were running, and that CYFD had failed to file a motion to extend the time limits when the parties were last in court.  The district court granted the Parents’ motions to dismiss the petition with prejudice.

Hours later, Father filed an emergency motion for contempt of court, stating that arrangements had been made for Child to be reunited with Parents at 11: 15 a.m., but CYFD refused to return Child. The district court conducted an emergency hearing at 3:00 p.m., during which CYFD stated that it intended to file a motion to reconsider or, alternatively, to stay the judgment. The district court admonished CYFD for keeping Child without jurisdiction and ordered reunification before 5:00 p.m. that day, which occurred. CYFD appeals the district court’s dismissal order.

The Court of Appeals upholds the lower courts dismissal and ADDS THIS:

Finally, we briefly address CYFD’s assertion that the district court “was … inexplicably dismissive of [CYFD]’s concerns for Child’s welfare, which is not only an abuse of discretion, but demonstrates a conscious disregard by the [district] court of its statutory duty to ensure that ‘a child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.'” Contrary to CYFD’s characterization, however, we note that the district court heard from Father’s attorney that the conditions in the home had been remedied. The guardian ad litem (GAL) reiterated that Parents’ attorneys had suggested that the home was now clean and safe for Child. The GAL stated that Child and Parents share a strong bond and that Child was suffering from anxiety due to his separation from Parents. The GAL believed it was safe to return Child to  Parents. Moreover, the criminal allegations against Father, which had brought Child into CYFD’s custody in the first place, were a product of mistaken identity and had been dismissed months earlier. Based upon this testimony, we disagree with CYFD’s characterization that the district court disregarded Child’s health and safety.

Qualified Expert Witness Case out of Alaska Supreme Court [ICWA]

Here

I have been trying to figure out how to comment on this particular opinion, though I may just default to Alaska’s QEW holdings have always been outliers . . .

So as a reminder for us all, this is how the Minnesota Supreme Court described the purpose of the QEW:

The third clause—“including testimony of qualified expert witnesses”—further identifies what must be included as part of the court’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” determination. Id.; see also Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2010) (“[A] limiting phrase . . . ordinarily modifies only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”). The clause provides that testimony from a QEW must support the court’s serious-damage determination. But this testimony need not stand alone. The statute provides that the court’s serious-damage determination must be supported by evidence “including testimony of qualified expert witnesses.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (emphasis added). “Include” means “[t]o contain as a part of something.” Include, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). So long as the QEW testimony supports the district court’s serious-damage determination, section 1912(f) has been satisfied. In other words, the court may pair the required QEW testimony with other supporting evidence to make its serious-damage determination.

The Alaska Supreme Court is now interpreting the regulations to mean

. . . the primary consideration in determining whether an expert is qualified under ICWA is the expert’s ability to speak to the likelihood of harm to the child if returned to the parent’s custody; knowledge of tribal customs and standards is preferred, but such knowledge alone is insufficient. The experts in Oliver’s and Lisa’s cases, despite their extensive knowledge of tribal cultural standards, do not meet this requirement.

Therefore,

As a tribal elder and leader of his community, Encelewski is clearly qualified to testify to tribal cultural standards and childrearing norms. But nothing in the record shows he has sufficient knowledge, either through his experience on the ICWA committee or from formal training, to discuss specifically how Oliver’s conduct or the conditions in his home were likely to result in serious physical or emotional harm to the child if returned to his care. There is no evidence that the source of Encelewski’s conclusion that Oliver’s behavior would likely harm the child is based on anything other than Encelewski’s extensive life experience as a community leader and grandfather. This is insufficient to qualify him to testify about the likelihood of harm if the child is returned to Oliver. To meet the ICWA standards, Encelewski — as the sole expert testifying in support of terminating Oliver’s parental rights — must have been qualified to testify about that causal relationship; nothing in his testimony supports such a qualification.

Among other things, I believe this means that most QEW trainings for Alaska are going to need to fundamentally change to address this holding, especially for tribes using leaders or child welfare committee members as their QEWs.

Association on American Indian Affairs Fifth Annual Repatriation Conference

November 12-14, 2019

We-Ko-Pa Resort & Conference Center

at the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation in Fountain Hills, AZ

Register for “Healing the Divide” here.

Michigan SCT Rules Former Tribal Official who Committed Crime in Office Eligible to Run for State Office

Here is the opinion in Paquin v. City of St. Ignace:

michigan-sct-opinion.pdf

And the lone brief I was able to unearth:

ag-brief.pdf

Lower court decision here.

Mr. Paquin’s indictment here.

Summary Judgment Motions in Stand Up v. Interior [Wilton Rancheria]

Here are the materials in Stand Up for California! v. Dept. of Interior (D.D.C.):

57 Motion to Supplement Record

59 Tribe Opposition

60 DOI Opposition

61 Reply

62 DCT Order Denying Motion to Supplement Record

70 Second Motion to Compel

71 Tribe Opposition

72 DOI Opposition

75 Reply

76-1 Tribe Surreply

77-1 DOI Surreply

80 DCT Order Denying Second Motion

91 Stand Up Motion for Summary Judgmen

96 Tribe Cross-Motion

98-1 DOI Cross-Motion

100 Stand Up Reply

103 Tribe Reply

104 DOi Reply

Prior post here.

32nd Annual University of Washington Indian Law Conference (Sept. 5-6, 2019)

Here are the details, including a link for registration.

Investigation into Marshall Islands Black Market Adoptions

This issue has been the subject of repeated investigative journalism articles from Civil Beat in Hawaii. Here is the latest regarding an adoption attorney in Texas:

Here

Here

Original Report (with a number of additional articles and links)

Federal Court Dismisses Employment Action against Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium

Here are the materials in Wilson v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (D. Alaska):

32 Motion to Disqualify Counsel

49 Second Amended Complaint

51 Motion to Dismiss

56 US Statement re 32

57 Plaintiffs’ Response to 32 and 51

67-1 Reply in Support of 32

69 Plaintiffs’ Surreply re 32

73 Plaintiffs’ Response to 51 + Motion for Discovery

78 Opposition to Motion for Discovery

79 Reply in Support of 51

81 Reply in Support of Motion for Disco

87 DCT Order

Split Eighth Circuit Reinstates MCA Manslaughter Indictment of Mother of Newborn Killed by Drug Toxicity

Apparently the first time the federal government has prosecuted a drug addicted mother for the death of a newborn.

Here is the opinion in United States v. Flute.

Briefs:

Appellant Brief

Appellee Brief

Reply

District Court materials (D.S.D.):

2 Redacted Indictment

25 Motion to Dismiss

26 Response

27 Reply

37 DCT Order