Here, from SSRN:
Judith Royster has posted “Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers on Trust Lands,” published in the Arizona Law Review. PDF SSRN
Here is the abstract:
In a series of cases beginning with its 1981 decision in Montana v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has diminished the civil authority of Indian tribal governments over nonmembers within the tribes’ territories. Initially, the Court confined itself to hobbling tribes’ inherent sovereign authority over non-tribal members only on non-Indian (“fee”) lands within reservations. In 2001, however, the Court ruled for the first time that a tribe did not possess inherent jurisdiction over a lawsuit against state officers that arose on Indian (“trust”) lands. What that decision, Nevada v. Hicks, means for general tribal authority over nonmembers on Indian lands is not clear, however, and lower federal courts are struggling to interpret it. The primary issue is whether Hicksintended the Montana approach to extend to all nonmembers on trust lands or whether the decision in Hicks is confined to its particular set of facts. That uncertainty could lead to further inroads on the inherent sovereign authority of tribes.
The Court in Montana, however, recognized a second approach to tribal authority over nonmembers on trust land: the tribal treaty right of use and occupation. Although the Court held that those treaty rights are extinguished on fee lands, it agreed that the rights survive on trust lands. This Article argues that the treaty rights argument—that Indian tribes have rights to govern nonmembers on trust lands recognized by treaty and treaty-equivalent—must be resurrected. If inherent tribal authority over nonmembers on trust lands is under increasing judicial attack, tribes may assert their treaty right to govern as a path to ensure their sovereignty on Indian lands.
Arizona Law Review announces its publication of Galanda and Dreveskracht’s piece entitled Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, which has been described as “a must read for all of Indian country” by Indian law scholar Robert A. Williams, Jr. Please see the press release for additional information.
Elizabeth Kronk Warner has posted “Tribal Renewable Energy Development Under the Hearth Act: An Independently Rational, But Collectively Deficient Option,” forthcoming in the Arizona Law Review, on SSRN.
Increased domestic energy production is of enhanced importance to the United States. Given the growing focus on domestic energy development, many, including tribal governments, have increasingly looked to Indian country for potential energy development opportunities. Such attention is warranted, as abundant alternative and renewable energy sources exist within Indian country. Many tribes are increasingly exploring possible opportunities related to alternative and renewable energy development. Despite this interest, large alternative and renewable energy projects are virtually absent from Indian country. This article explores why, despite the great potential for alternative and renewable energy development in Indian country and strong tribal interest in such development, such little development is occurring.
Congress enacted the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act (HEARTH Act) in July 2012 to address one of the obstacles to alternative and renewable energy development in Indian country — federal approval for leases of tribal lands. In brief, the HEARTH Act allows tribes with tribal leasing provisions pre-approved by the Secretary of the Interior to lease tribal land without Secretarial approval required for each individual lease.
To fully understand the potential implications of the HEARTH Act, this Article explores obstacles to effective energy development in Indian country, what the HEARTH Act is and how it supposedly addresses those obstacles, and some significant problems associated with enactment of the HEARTH Act — specifically, the mandatory environmental review provisions and waiver of federal liability, and the impact of the liability waiver on the federal government’s trust responsibility to federally recognized tribes. The article ends with some concluding thoughts on how the HEARTH Act and potential future reforms to the existing federal regulatory scheme applicable to energy development in Indian country might better address tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility to Indian country.
Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes
Matthew L.M. Fletcher
The Supreme Court’s certiorari process does more than help the Court parse through thousands of “uncertworthy” claims—the Court’s process creates an affirmative barrier to justice for parties like Indian tribes and individual Indians. The Court has long maintained that the certiorari process is a neutral and objective means of eliminating patently frivolous petitions from consideration. But this empirical study of 163 preliminary memoranda, recently made available when Justice Blackmun’s papers were opened, demonstrates that the Court’s certiorari process is neither objective nor neutral. The research, reflecting certiorari petitions filed during October Term 1986 through 1993, demonstrates that statistically, there is a near zero chance the Supreme Court will grant a certiorari petition filed by tribal interests. At the same time, the Court grants certiorari to far more petitions filed by opponents of tribal sovereignty.
Barbara Atwood has just posted, “The Voice of the Indian Child: Enhancing the Indian Child Welfare Act through Children’s Participation” on SSRN.
From the abstract:
This essay explores the promise and challenge of giving more prominence to the child’s voice in ICWA proceedings in state courts. I identify legal sources of the child’s right of participation in statutory provisions, constitutional law, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and tribal law. The Essay also explores the considerable challenges facing representatives for children who are the subect of ICWA proceedings. Using selected cases for illustration, I argue that incorporating children’s views in the ICWA calculus would move ICWA litigation toward a culture of respect for the dignity of each child and would enrich the decision-making of state court judges.