certiorari

Tales from the Cert Pool: Justice Blackmun’s Papers on Cotton Petroleum

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico is one of the harshest outcomes in the modern era of Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court held that states may tax non-Indian-owned businesses doing business in Indian Country, even where the tribe has imposed its own tax. In short, the states may double-tax non-Indians, effectively preempting tribal taxes on the tribe’s own land.

The recent uploading of Justice Blackmun’s papers on the internet offers a glimpse into the background of the case.

In Cotton Petroleum, two documents are available: The cert pool memo and Justice Blackmun’s docket sheet recording the votes of the Justices.

The Court decided to grant certiorari in this case over the recommendation of the cert pool memo to deny cert. Justices White, Stevens, O’Connor, and Blackmun voted to grant cert (in accordance with the Rule of Four, only four votes are required to grant cert), while Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Scalia, and Kennedy voted to deny.

One interesting (and awful) tidbit from the cert pool memo is that the memowriter noted that the tribal interests weren’t represented in the litigation and that, importantly, Cotton Petroleum hadn’t introduced evidence about the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty:

“As [New Mexico] and [state] amici explain, this Court’s precedents require a showing of actual impact on tribal interests in self-government before pre-emption will be found, and [Cotton Petroleum] failed to introduce evidence of such impact in this case.” Cert Pool Memo at 7.

As noted above, the impact of New Mexico’s tax on tribal sovereignty was devastating, but since Cotton Petroleum was never in a position to make the argument, it was never developed.

Moreover, in a case denied cert that same Term, Rodney, Dickason v. Revenue Division of New Mexico, the cert pool memowriter (Deborah Malamud of NYU) argued that “the Indian preemption framework serves a substitute for the now-repudiated doctrine that state law has no effect on Indian reservations…. As that doctrine was geographical in nature, perhaps it makes sense that those same limits should apply to its modern substitute.” Cert Pool Memo in Rodney, Dickason at 8-9. But, alas, the Court decided not to adopt such a workable bright-line rule.

More tales from the cert pool memos will follow over the next several weeks.

The Exxon Case, Indian Country, and Maritime Law

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Exxon case. The case stems back to one of the worst ecological events in the last few decades, the oil spill resulting from the supertanker Exxon Valdez’s running aground. Exxon is appealing a $2.5 billion punitive damages award. Exxon thought the Court was ripe to reverse large punitive damage awards because of recent cases striking them down in constitutional grounds, but the Court is not going to review the punitive damages on those grounds. Instead, the Court will be looking at Exxon’s maritime law-related claims.

What is interesting in that choice (other than the obvious interest that Alaskan Native and Pacific NW tribes have in the direct impact of the event) is that maritime or admiralty law is a uniquely federal field of law that has very little constitutional grounding. In other words, it is practically an all-federal common law field — just like federal Indian law.

And, as we know from federal Indian law, the Court is not constrained by constitutional and statutory language when applying federal Indian law. My guess is that the Court will strike down the punitive damage award, or else they would have let this award stand.

Chief Justice Roberts & Federal Indian Law

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Long before John G. Roberts, C.J. became life-tenured, he practiced. And he worked on at least three Indian law-related cases: Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, Rice v. Cayetano, and (briefly) Roberts v. United States. Also, as part of President Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel, he vetted several Acts of Congress related to Indian tribes.

Roberts won Venetie, representing the State of Alaska. He lost Rice, representing the State of Hawaii. And the Court denied his petition for cert on behalf of Hollis Roberts (no relation, one presumes) in Roberts v. U.S.

The now semi-notorious brief Roberts filed in Alaska v. Venetie is here: Venetie Petr Brief. It is notorious for the reversal of the “deadliest enemies” language in United States v. Kagama. The Kagama Court wrote that states and state citizens were the deadliest enemies of Indians and Indian tribes, but the Venetie brief (for no real good reason) altered the quote to mean that Indians and Indian tribes were the deadliest enemies of states and state citizens. Here’s my own paper on the archaic notion that states and tribes are “deadliest enemies.”

Hawaii’s brief in Rice v. Cayetano is here: Rice Resp Brief

Roberts’ cert petition in Roberts v. US is here: Roberts v. United States Cert Petn. This one is especially important since Roberts (and Roberts) brought a challenge to Section 465, the fee to trust statute. There is ongoing litigation involving Section 465 that may soon be appealed to the Supreme Court. To some extent, the legal challenge to Section 465 has morphed since the 1999 cert petition, but it is significant that Roberts, C.J. is aware of this kind of case.

Finally, we include the documents Roberts wrote as a member of the OLC. These came out during his Senate confirmation process.

Kickapoo OLC Memo

Reagan Indian Policy OLC Memo

Tribal Tax Status Act OLC Memo

Utah Paiute Act OLC Memo

Zuni OLC Memo

Shoalwater Bay OLC Memo

Las Vegas Paiute OLC Memo

I guess what these memos demonstrate is that young Roberts was a serious conservative and a funny guy (unless you were the subject of the humor).

Cert Petition in Carcieri v. Kempthorne

Matthew L.M. Fletcher1 Comment

From Indianz.com:

Rhode Island appeals land-into-trust ruling
Friday, October 19, 2007

The state of Rhode Island is asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a land-into-trust case that is being watched by tribes nationwide.

In July, the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Bureau of Indian Affairs can place 31 acres in trust for the Narragansett Tribe. The tribe is like any other tribe and can follow the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized the land-into-trust process, the court said.

As I will argue in my forthcoming article, “Factbound and Splitless: An Empirical Study of the Impact of the Certiorari Process on Federal Indian Law,” the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant cert. in this case for two important reasons. First, there is no circuit split (“splitless”). What that means is that the federal courts of appeal that have addressed the question of the constitutionality of the fee to trust process (25 U.S.C. § 465) — the 8th Circuit in South Dakota v. Kempthorne, the 10th Circuit in Utah v. Shivwits, and the 11th Circuit in Roberts v. U.S., are examples — have held (just as the 1st Circuit did here) that the statute is constitutional.

Second, this case involves the muddying aspects of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act and how it affects the application of § 465, rendering this case a bit messy as a factual matter (“factbound”). If this was a straight-up interpretation of § 465 without the Settlement Act’s application, the Court would be more likely to grant cert (although, without a split, not so much). In short, this case implicates a relatively small number of tribes (those Rhode Island tribes).

Land-into-Trust Decision:
Carcieri v. Kempthorne (July 20, 2007)

Earlier 1st Circuit Decision:
Carcieri v. Norton (February 9, 2005)

Relevant Documents:
Carcieri v. Norton Briefs, Opinions (NARF-NCAI Tribal Supreme Court Project

Relevant Laws:
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (US Code)

Relevant Links:
Narragansett Tribe – http://www.narragansett-tribe.org
Tribal Supreme Court Project – http://www.narf.org/sct/index.html

Supreme Court & Indian Law

Matthew L.M. Fletcher

The Supreme Court issued its first order of the October 2007 Term last week — containing no Indian law grants, as I blogged elsewhere.

Today, the Court issued an order listing cert. denials, including Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina (No. 07-69), Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States (06-1672), and Yakama v. Colville (No. 06-1588).

So what does this mean? By itself, I suppose it means nothing. But the Catawba and Gros Ventre cases were cases in which the tribal interests were petitioning (and the other case was an intertribal conflict) against a state and the federal government, respectively. A Court hostile to tribal interests would leave those cases alone.

With this round of cert. denials, keep in mind that the last time the S. Ct. granted cert. in an Indian law case was Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation — and two “Westerners,” Rehnquist, C.J. and O’Connor, J., were still Members of the Court. Since then, the Court has denied cert. in something like 60 straight Indian law cases.

For background on my theory about how it matters that “Westerners” used to sit on the Supreme Court in the context of cert. petitions, see my editorial in Indian Country Today.

Of course, the editorial has an incorrect statement (my own fault) — for a few years in the early 1990s, there were four Westerners on the Court — Rehnquist, O’Connor, White, Kennedy.