Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Indian Law Legacy

My most enduring memory of Justice Kennedy is no doubt watching him lean over the bench, red faced and angry, screaming/yelling/lecturing at Neal Katyal during the Dollar General oral argument. I concluded then, if I hadn’t already before that moment from his writings, that Justice Kennedy was so disturbed by tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-Indian businesses that he angrily wanted to protect a non-Indian sexual predator from the horror of being subject to a tort claim in tribal court.

Justice Kennedy was confirmed for SCOTUS in 1988. His first vote in an Indian law case was in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham. His last vote in an Indian law case was in the Upper Skagit matter (he recused in the culverts case). During his tenure, tribal interests cleanly won 15 cases and cleanly lost 40 cases. There were two cases in which there were two or more issues in which tribal interests won and lost. There were three cases decided by 4-4 tie votes (including one which Kennedy was recused), and in which tribal interests had prevailed below. There were two non-criminal cases in which the interests of individual Indians were at play, making it difficult to declare it a clean win or loss for tribal interests. There was one case the Court remanded (not talking about Upper Skagit) without a clear winner. In short, it was/is a bad time for tribal interests — just under a 30 percent win rate for tribes, adding in the tie cases.

Justice Kennedy’s voting record was overwhelmingly oppositional to tribal interests. Kennedy voted cleanly in favor of tribal interests 11 times (and that includes Lara, in which he wrote a scathing opinion blasting tribal powers, and nearly half of those votes were in the past few years), and voted cleanly against tribal interests 45 times. There was one case where voted to split issues. We can and should presume he was an anti-tribal vote in both of the 4-4 tie cases (and would have been a deciding vote against the tribes and the US in the culverts case had he not recused). I count just under a 20 percent pro-tribal vote rate for Justice Kennedy.

Justice Kennedy wrote relatively few Indian law opinions, as few as Justice Scalia. It should be clear to observers that during this period, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and junior justices carry the conservative side’s laboring oar in Indian law, not right wing stalwarts who write the federalism and anti-civil rights opinions.

The most important majority opinion Justice Kennedy wrote was Duro v. Reina, though Rice v. Cayetano comes in a close second. Duro really shouldn’t be considered an important opinion because it was so clearly wrong on so many levels Congress enacted a temporary Duro fix within weeks of its announcement, making the fix permanent within a year or so. Perhaps because the principles Justice Kennedy advanced in Duro were principles he had been working with in his own mind since at least the 1970s when he dissented as a Ninth Circuit judge in Oliphant [544_f.2d_1007] — this is America where Americans must consent to government and non-Indians cannot choose to be subject to tribal jurisdiction because they cannot be tribal citizens — he seemed to ache to have an opportunity to strike down the Duro fix. His concurring opinion in United States v. Lara lays out how his consent theory would be enough to kill the Duro fix and all but asks the Court to seek a vehicle out for review, a vehicle that never came (sorry Russell Means, you shouldn’t have hired a lawyer). Maybe the biggest problem for Kennedy’s consent theory is that it’s completely farcical and simply not grounded in the Constitution or reality (try driving from Michigan to New Mexico just to vote, not that I would have voted for Gavin even if I could vote — go Deb Haaland!).

For all my criticism, I have a favorite Kennedy opinion, his lower court opinion in United States v. Finch [548_f.2d_822], a precursor to the Montana v. United States case in which SCOTUS held that the Crow Nation did not possess the Big Horn River. Kennedy wrote strongly in favor of the tribe’s ownership, guaranteed by treaty, an opinion that shows how completely misguided Justice Rehnquist’s Montana decision actually was. If he had been that judge during his tenure as a Supreme Court judge he’d be celebrated, even worshipped, by Indian country. Instead a collective “meh” upon his retirement, Indian country would be mourning the retirement of a great justice.

Rose Villazor on Blood Quantum Laws and Equal Protection

Rose Cuison Villazor (SMU) has published “Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma” in the California Law Review. This is a great paper. Here is the abstract:

Modern equal protection doctrine treats laws that make distinctions on the basis of indigeneity defined on blood quantum terms along a racial versus political paradigm. This dichotomy may be traced to Morton v. Mancari and, more recently, to Rice v. Cayetano. In Mancari, the Supreme Court held that laws that privilege members of American Indian tribes do not constitute racial discrimination because the preferences have a political purpose – to further the right of self-government of federally recognized American Indian tribes. Rice crystallized the juxtaposition of the racial from the political nature of indigeneity by invalidating a law that privileged Native Hawaiians. That law, according to the Court, used an ancestral blood requirement to construct a racial category and a racial purpose as opposed to the legally permissible political purpose of promoting the right of self-government of American Indian tribes.

Close analysis of the dichotomy between the constitutive notion of indigenous blood as either racial or political has largely escaped scholarship. An analysis deconstructing their juxtaposition is sorely needed. As recent  [*802] challenges to blood quantum laws show, there remain unanswered questions about the extent to which the racialized (and thus invalid) Native Hawaiian-only voting law impact other blood quantum laws. Among the laws implicated by the dichotomy between the racial and political meaning of indigeneity are land ownership laws that privilege indigenous peoples who are not federally recognized tribes. Specifically, in some jurisdictions in the United States, including Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. territories, only indigenous peoples may purchase or possess property. Perhaps more problematically, these property laws define indigeneity on the basis of blood quantum. Under the contemporary race versus political meaning of blood quantum, these laws arguably violate equal protection principles because they do not fit the current framing of what constitutes political indigeneity.

Using these laws – what I collectively refer to as blood quantum land laws – as frames of reference, this Essay interrogates and criticizes the juxtaposition of the racial and political meaning of indigeneity. Specifically, the Essay examines the legal construction of political indigeneity and demonstrates how its narrowed construction would undermine these blood quantum land laws that were enacted to reverse the effects of colonialism. Consequently, this Essay calls for the liberalization of the binary racial and political paradigm by expanding equal protection law’s interpretation of the meaning of political indigeneity. Toward this end, this Essay provides an initial analysis of how to broaden the political notion of indigeneity, focusing in particular on the relationships among property, indigeneity, and the right to self-determination.

Rose Villazor on Indian Blood Quantum and Equal Protection

Rose Cuison Villazr (SMU) has posted her wonderful paper, “Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Dilemma,” forthcoming in the California Law Review, on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Modern equal protection doctrine treats laws that make distinctions on the basis of indigeneity defined on blood quantum terms along a racial versus political paradigm. This dichotomy may be traced to Morton v. Mancari and, more recently, to Rice v. Cayetano. In Mancari, the Supreme Court held that laws that privilege members of American Indian tribes do not constitute racial discrimination because the preferences have a political purpose – to further the right of self-government of federally recognized American Indian tribes. Rice crystallized the juxtaposition of the racial from the political nature of indigeneity by invalidating a law that privileged Native Hawaiians. That law, according to the Court, used an ancestral blood requirement to construct a racial category and a racial purpose as opposed to the legally permissible political purpose of promoting the right of self-government of American Indian tribes.

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Chief Justice Roberts & Federal Indian Law

Long before John G. Roberts, C.J. became life-tenured, he practiced. And he worked on at least three Indian law-related cases: Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, Rice v. Cayetano, and (briefly) Roberts v. United States. Also, as part of President Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel, he vetted several Acts of Congress related to Indian tribes.

Roberts won Venetie, representing the State of Alaska. He lost Rice, representing the State of Hawaii. And the Court denied his petition for cert on behalf of Hollis Roberts (no relation, one presumes) in Roberts v. U.S.

The now semi-notorious brief Roberts filed in Alaska v. Venetie is here: Venetie Petr Brief. It is notorious for the reversal of the “deadliest enemies” language in United States v. Kagama. The Kagama Court wrote that states and state citizens were the deadliest enemies of Indians and Indian tribes, but the Venetie brief (for no real good reason) altered the quote to mean that Indians and Indian tribes were the deadliest enemies of states and state citizens. Here’s my own paper on the archaic notion that states and tribes are “deadliest enemies.”

Hawaii’s brief in Rice v. Cayetano is here: Rice Resp Brief

Roberts’ cert petition in Roberts v. US is here: Roberts v. United States Cert Petn. This one is especially important since Roberts (and Roberts) brought a challenge to Section 465, the fee to trust statute. There is ongoing litigation involving Section 465 that may soon be appealed to the Supreme Court. To some extent, the legal challenge to Section 465 has morphed since the 1999 cert petition, but it is significant that Roberts, C.J. is aware of this kind of case.

Finally, we include the documents Roberts wrote as a member of the OLC. These came out during his Senate confirmation process.

Kickapoo OLC Memo

Reagan Indian Policy OLC Memo

Tribal Tax Status Act OLC Memo

Utah Paiute Act OLC Memo

Zuni OLC Memo

Shoalwater Bay OLC Memo

Las Vegas Paiute OLC Memo

I guess what these memos demonstrate is that young Roberts was a serious conservative and a funny guy (unless you were the subject of the humor).