Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Indian Law Legacy

My most enduring memory of Justice Kennedy is no doubt watching him lean over the bench, red faced and angry, screaming/yelling/lecturing at Neal Katyal during the Dollar General oral argument. I concluded then, if I hadn’t already before that moment from his writings, that Justice Kennedy was so disturbed by tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-Indian businesses that he angrily wanted to protect a non-Indian sexual predator from the horror of being subject to a tort claim in tribal court.

Justice Kennedy was confirmed for SCOTUS in 1988. His first vote in an Indian law case was in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham. His last vote in an Indian law case was in the Upper Skagit matter (he recused in the culverts case). During his tenure, tribal interests cleanly won 15 cases and cleanly lost 40 cases. There were two cases in which there were two or more issues in which tribal interests won and lost. There were three cases decided by 4-4 tie votes (including one which Kennedy was recused), and in which tribal interests had prevailed below. There were two non-criminal cases in which the interests of individual Indians were at play, making it difficult to declare it a clean win or loss for tribal interests. There was one case the Court remanded (not talking about Upper Skagit) without a clear winner. In short, it was/is a bad time for tribal interests — just under a 30 percent win rate for tribes, adding in the tie cases.

Justice Kennedy’s voting record was overwhelmingly oppositional to tribal interests. Kennedy voted cleanly in favor of tribal interests 11 times (and that includes Lara, in which he wrote a scathing opinion blasting tribal powers, and nearly half of those votes were in the past few years), and voted cleanly against tribal interests 45 times. There was one case where voted to split issues. We can and should presume he was an anti-tribal vote in both of the 4-4 tie cases (and would have been a deciding vote against the tribes and the US in the culverts case had he not recused). I count just under a 20 percent pro-tribal vote rate for Justice Kennedy.

Justice Kennedy wrote relatively few Indian law opinions, as few as Justice Scalia. It should be clear to observers that during this period, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and junior justices carry the conservative side’s laboring oar in Indian law, not right wing stalwarts who write the federalism and anti-civil rights opinions.

The most important majority opinion Justice Kennedy wrote was Duro v. Reina, though Rice v. Cayetano comes in a close second. Duro really shouldn’t be considered an important opinion because it was so clearly wrong on so many levels Congress enacted a temporary Duro fix within weeks of its announcement, making the fix permanent within a year or so. Perhaps because the principles Justice Kennedy advanced in Duro were principles he had been working with in his own mind since at least the 1970s when he dissented as a Ninth Circuit judge in Oliphant [544_f.2d_1007] — this is America where Americans must consent to government and non-Indians cannot choose to be subject to tribal jurisdiction because they cannot be tribal citizens — he seemed to ache to have an opportunity to strike down the Duro fix. His concurring opinion in United States v. Lara lays out how his consent theory would be enough to kill the Duro fix and all but asks the Court to seek a vehicle out for review, a vehicle that never came (sorry Russell Means, you shouldn’t have hired a lawyer). Maybe the biggest problem for Kennedy’s consent theory is that it’s completely farcical and simply not grounded in the Constitution or reality (try driving from Michigan to New Mexico just to vote, not that I would have voted for Gavin even if I could vote — go Deb Haaland!).

For all my criticism, I have a favorite Kennedy opinion, his lower court opinion in United States v. Finch [548_f.2d_822], a precursor to the Montana v. United States case in which SCOTUS held that the Crow Nation did not possess the Big Horn River. Kennedy wrote strongly in favor of the tribe’s ownership, guaranteed by treaty, an opinion that shows how completely misguided Justice Rehnquist’s Montana decision actually was. If he had been that judge during his tenure as a Supreme Court judge he’d be celebrated, even worshipped, by Indian country. Instead a collective “meh” upon his retirement, Indian country would be mourning the retirement of a great justice.

Federal Court Rejects Double Jeopardy-Related Habeas Petition from Prisoner Previously Convicted in Tribal Court

Here are the materials in Jacobs v. United States (D. S.D.):

2255 Motion

Government’s Response

Jacobs’ Response

DCT Order Denying Habeas Relief

Materials from Mr. Jacobs’ direct appeal of his conviction based on the 1868 Fort Laramie treaty is here.

Harold Monteau Critique of Congressional Research Service Report on VAWA Reauthorization

Here.

The CRS report at issue is here.

The law professor letter (spearheaded by Sarah Deer) is here.

Justice Thomas’ Indian Law Vision

Much is being made of Justice Thomas as a rising leader in the Roberts Court, which quietly says a great deal about the incredible conservatism of the Court right now. Justice Thomas views on gun control, which former Chief Justice Burger would have labeled “fraudulent,” are now the law. Jefffrey Toobin’s New Yorker piece, profiled at SBM blog, notes that Thomas’s dissenting and concurring opinions long have espoused well-nigh radical notions of constitutional law, and are now being vindicated one after the other.

Justice Thomas’s radical vision of the law also has touched Indian law. In particular, Thomas has suggested two major changes to Indian law jurisprudence.

First, in White Mountain Apache, he wrote that the trust relationship was more properly viewed as a “guardian-ward relationship,” a view adopted to some extent by the Jicarilla Court just a few months ago:

The Court of Claims has observed that the relationship between the United States and Indians is not governed by ordinary trust principles: “The general relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes is not comparable to a private trust relationship. When the source of substantive law intended and recognized only the general, or bare, trust relationship, fiduciary obligations applicable to private trustees are not imposed on the United States. Rather, the general relationship between Indian tribes and [the United States] traditionally has been understood to be in the nature of a guardian-ward relationship. A guardianship is not a trust. The duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of some other fiduciaries.” Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 565, 573 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

One can only wonder what Justice Thomas would have done if Cobell had fallen into the Court’s lap. Today’s posting on the lower court’s sarcastic rejection of the government’s position on the merits of the Jicarilla trust claim suggests the DOJ and DOI are more than willing to offer up an argument to return the trust relationship to the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock era.

Second, Justice Thomas has stated an interest in extending his onslaught on the commerce clause to the Indian Commerce Clause context. In United States v. Lara, he linked Lopez and Morrison to the Indian Commerce Clause: Continue reading

Minnesota Supreme Court Affirms State Jurisdiction over Tribal Traffic Offenses

…over a dissent from Justice Alan Page. The case is State v. Davis. An excerpt:

State court has subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant‟s traffic violations because Congress has not preempted Minnesota from enforcing its traffic laws against appellant in state court.

And from the dissent:

The MCT is the governing unit federally recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the individual bands such as the Leech Lake Band and the Mille Lacs Band are merely “component reservations” of the MCT. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,553, 18,555 (Apr. 4, 2008). Yet the court concludes with little explanation that the MCT has no tribal interest in self-governance. Nor does the court cite any authority for the distinction it makes between Indian tribes and Indian bands. I would also note that there is no indication in this record that the MCT has no interest in self-governance or has chosen to relinquish its interest in self-governance. Absent a showing that the MCT has chosen to relinquish its interest in self-governance, it is presumptuous for us to impose such a choice on the MCT. Because we held in Stone that no exceptional circumstances exist requiring a preemption analysis for tribal members who are alleged to have been speeding on tribal territory and because Davis is an MCT member whose alleged speeding offense occurred within the MCT‟s territory, I conclude that the state has no jurisdiction over Davis.

Eighth Circuit Upholds Major Crimes Act Conviction

In United States v. Antelope, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal of a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, who had pled guilty below. He argued on appeal that since he had also been prosecuted in tribal court, the government had violated the double jeopardy clause.

Here is the opinion.

Ann Tweedy on the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and U.S. v. Lara

Ann Tweedy has posted “Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty” on SSRN. This paper is forthcoming in one my favorite journals, the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Here is the abstract:

This law review article examines: (1) the underpinnings of tribal sovereignty within the American system; (2) the need for restoration based on the Court’s drastic incursions on tribal sovereignty over the past four decades and the grave circumstances, particularly tribal governments’ inability to protect tribal interests on the reservation and unchecked violence in Indian Country, that result from the divestment of tribal sovereignty; (3) the concept of restoration as illuminated by United States v. Lara, and finally (4) some possible approaches to partial restoration.

The article first evaluates the constitutional provisions relating to Indians and the earliest federal Indian law decisions written by Chief Justice Marshall on the premise that these two sources shed light on the upper limits of a potential legislative restoration of tribal sovereignty. Next, the article examines the judicial trend of divestment of tribal sovereignty, focusing particularly on the latest decisions that evidence this trend. The article further examines the negative effects of this divestment in Indian Country, from impeding tribes’ ability to provide governmental services and to protect their unique institutions, to problems of widespread on-reservation violence, particularly against Indian women. The article concludes that the judicial trend of divesting tribal sovereignty combined with these dire effects clearly demonstrate a need for restoration. Finally, the article examines the Lara holding and its implications for the types of restoration that will be upheld by Court, concluding with an examination of options for potential legislative restorations.

This looks like a very interesting paper, and may be the first paper that digests the recent scholarship on the scope of the Indian Commerce Clause from Pommersheim, Natelson, and others.

Jacob Levy on Constitutions without Social Contracts

Jacob Levy has posted “Not so Novus an Ordo: Constitutions without Social Contracts,” forthcoming in Political Theory, on SSRN (H/t Legal Theory Blog). It has an interesting discussion of U.S. v. Lara. Here is the abstract:

Social contract theory imagines political societies as resting on a fundamental agreement, adopted at a discrete moment in hypothetical time, that both bound individual persons together into a single polity and set fundamental rules regarding that polity‘s structure and powers. Written constitutions, adopted at real moments in historical time, dictating governmental structures, bounding governmental powers, and entrenching individual rights, look temptingly like social contracts reified.

I argue in this article, however, that something essential is lost in the casual slippage between social contract theory and the practice of constitutionalism. Enacted constitutions do not come into being against the background of a state of nature of isolated individuals; and by this I do not mean to invoke the too-familiar critique of the supposedly decontextualized liberal person, but rather to critique the aspiration to decontextualize the legal and political order. Constitutions are enacted in ongoing societies (whether newly politically sovereign or otherwise) with pre-existing laws and legal systems, political organizations, cultural and linguistic and religious divisions, and norms and mores. Moreover, the practice of constitutionalism is usually, at least in part, a practice of reconciling those legacies to a new political order, of making use of those legacies to build loyalties to or counterbalances against the state (or both). Most constitutions cannot be well-understood by retrospectively characterizing them as the kind of complete and radical break with the past envisioned by social contract theory.

Continue reading

“Preconstitutional Federal Power” Article

My paper on “Preconstitutional Federal Power” has been published by the Tulane Law Review. You can download it here.

Here’s the abstract:

 In two fields of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the federal government may possess preconstitutional power, or national authority derived not from the Constitution but from the very fact of sovereignty. This Article analyzes the two areas of law – the Foreign Affairs Power and the Indian Affairs Power – and assesses their viability in future cases. The case recognizing a preconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power resting with the Executive branch, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., suffers from poor historical reasoning and has little precedential weight in modern foreign affairs cases, but has never been overruled. The Indian Affairs Power case, United States v. Lara, decided in 2004, included no historical reasoning and only offered the theory as dicta. However, the Court raised the theory, perhaps, as a means of placating the textualists on the Court who do not view the Indian Commerce Clause as a viable source of Congressional power in Indian Affairs. This Article offers a best defense for the proposition that Congressional plenary power in Indian Affairs might derive from a preconstitutional source, a defense that includes the original understanding of the Indian Affairs Power and that, unlike the Foreign Affairs Power, did survive the ratification of the Constitution.