Federal Court Orders Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in Suit Brought against Pharmaceutical Company in Blackfeet Tribal Court

Here are the materials in Takeda Pharmaceuticals America v. Connelly (D. Mont.):

11 Motion to Dismiss

20 Opposition

31 Reply

59 DCT Order

An excerpt:

The Court at this juncture simply must determine whether Blackfeet Tribal Court “plainly” lacks jurisdiction. The IHS facility sits on leased Indian land. This fact, by itself, amounts to a colorable claim of jurisdiction. The Blackfeet Tribal Court maintains a colorable claim of jurisdiction based on the alleged conduct on tribal trust land. This determination precludes analysis at this point as to whether either Montana exception provides a colorable basis for Blackfeet Tribal Court jurisdiction. Admiral Ins. Co. v. Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Ct., 2012 WL 1144331 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

CSKT Allotment Owner’s Trust Breach Claims Dismissed

Here are the materials in Liberty v. Jewell (D. Mont.):

19 US Motion to Dismiss

24 Response

25 Reply

26 DCT Order

Ninth Circuit Reverses Judgment Favoring Crow Nation against HUD

Here is the opinion in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD.

From the court’s syllabus:

The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding the case to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for a hearing, reversed the judgment, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of HUD in a case brought by the Crow Tribal Housing Authority, arising from a dispute involving Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996.

The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that HUD violated Crow Housing’s right to Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996’s notice and reporting requirements under 25 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4165.

Specifically, the panel concluded that HUD did not act under § 4161, and accordingly, could not have violated a hearing requirement under that section. The panel further concluded that HUD’s actions triggered the opportunity for a hearing under § 4165 when it conducted an on-site review of Crow Housing in August 2004. Finally, the panel held that because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under § 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing under the facts of the case.

Briefs and materials are here.

 

FTCA/Civil Rights Suit against BIA Officers Enforcing N. Cheyenne Tribal Bench Warrant against Non-Indian Dismissed

Here are the materials in the case captioned In re Roberts Litigation (D. Mont.):

33 Federal Motion for Summary J

44 Opposition

45 Federal Reply

54 DCT Order Granting Federal Motion for Summary J

An excerpt:

In order for Roberts’ claim under Bivens to survive, the law must have been sufficiently clear to place a reasonable officer on notice that the Tribal Court acted in complete absence of jurisdiction in issuing the warrants, and that in carrying out the Tribal Court mandate to serve the warrants, reasonable officers would have known they were [8]  engaging in an unlawful act, Existing law permits no such conclusions, notwithstanding Roberts’ contention that the law was clearly established that the Tribal Court lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under the authority of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978) and that the officers had personal knowledge that Roberts was a non-Indian.

Roberts’ argument fails to take into account the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court’s claim of capacity to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians by consent. It is not necessary, however, for this Court to decide the question of whether a tribal court may exercise such jurisdiction. Rather, the issue is whether the law was so clearly established at the time of Roberts’ arrests that a reasonable officer would have known that the tribal court was wholly without jurisdiction and that he was engaging in a null and void act. Existing law is not sufficiently clear to warrant that conclusion. The jurisdictional issue remains.

The officers were presented with facially valid warrants, they were charged with the responsibility to execute the warrants, and they had a reasonable basis to believe in the validity of the warrants and in the lawfulness of their actions in executing the warrants. They are entitled to qualified immunity for the personal capacity claims brought against them under the Bivens doctrine.

Suit for Injunctive Relief against Blackfeet Elected Officials over Utility MOA Dispute May Proceed

Here are the materials in Town of Browning v. Sharp (D. Mont.):

71 12b1 Motion to Dismiss

73 12b6 Motion to Dismiss

75 12b7 Motion to Dismiss

95 Response to 12b1 Motion

96 response to 12b6 Motion

97 Response to 12b7 Motion

115 Reply in Support of 12b7 Motion

123 DCT Order

140 Magistrate Report

144 Objection to Magistrate Report

148 DCT Order

An excerpt:

Defendants and Plaintiff have not objected to Judge Johnston’s Findings and Recommendations on any other grounds. The Court finds no clear error in Judge Johnston’s Findings and Recommendations, and adopts them in full. A plaitiff may seek only prospective, injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.2007). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, exemplary damages, treble damages, and costs and attorney fees for counts 2–5. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Dismissal of counts 2–5 is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff seeks prospective, injunctive relief in count 1. Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted in count 1.

Utility Company Sues to Be Excused from Exhausting Tribal Remedies at Blackfeet

Here is the complaint in Glacier Electric Coop. Inc. v. Gervais (D. Mont.):

1 Complaint

1-2 Tribal Court Complaint

From the complaint:

The Tribal Court plainly lacks jurisdiction over the Lawsuit because the Tribal Court, and Blackfeet Tribe, lack subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs.

From the tribal court complaint:

A public utility may not use its privileged position, in conjunction with the demand, which it has created, as a weapon to control rates by threatening to discontinue that part of its service, if it does not receive the rate demanded.

Ninth Circuit Materials in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD

Here are the briefs:

HUD Opening Brief

Crow Answer Brief

HUD Reply

Oral argument audio and video.

Lower court materials here.

Chippewa Cree Tribe Suit to Recover Arbitration Award from Tribally-Owned Payday Lending Management Company

Here is the complaint in Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy Reservation of Montana v. Encore Services LLC (D. Mont.):

1 Complaint + Exhibits

News coverage, “Tribal members funneled cash from lending company,” here. H/T pechanga.

Materials in Effort to Partition Indian Allotment

Here are the materials so far in Haeker v. United States Government (D. Mont.):

21 US Motion to Dismiss

22 Response

23 US Reply

24 MJ R&R

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Kurt Haeker (“Haeker”) seeks to partition his undivided fee interest in land within Indian Allotment 3316 on the Crow Indian Reservation. See Second Amend. Cmplt (ECF 19). The United States holds the legal title to the remaining undivided legal interest in trust for the benefit of several individual Indian allottees.
Pending is the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF 20. Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court makes the following findings and recommends that the motion be granted.

Federal Courts Dismiss Federal Habitual Domestic Violence Offender Indictments Due to Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions

Here are the materials in United States v. Kirkaldie (D. Mont.):

21 Motion to Dismiss

24 US Response

39 DCT Order

And in United States v. Stewart (D. Mont.):

20 Stewart Motion to Dismiss + Tribal Court Docs

21 US Response

28 DCT Order