Federal Circuit Rejects Shinnecock Nation’s Judicial Takings Claims re: Dismissal of Land Claims under Sherrill

Here is the opinion in Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States.

An excerpt:

Accordingly, we affirm the United States Court of Federal Claims’ determination that the Nation’s breach of trust claims are not yet ripe for review, vacate its ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over those claims, and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice.

More:

A similar analysis applies here. The Nation alleges that in applying the doctrine of laches to bar its land claim, the district court improperly “took away the Nation’s legal right to sue for compensation for its stolen land.” The Court of Federal Claims, however, is without authority to adjudicate the Nation’s claim that it suffered a compensable taking at the hands of the district court. See Allustiarte, 256 F.3d at 1352; Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380. The court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions “of district courts and cannot entertain a taking[s] claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal.” Innovair, 632 F.3d at 1344 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the government correctly notes, “[d]eciding whether the district court’s judgment resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the Nation’s property would require the Court of Federal Claims to review the judgment and pass on its correctness.” Just as the plaintiffs’ takings claim in Allustiarte was an improper collateral attack on the judgment of the bankruptcy courts, the Nation’s proposed judicial takings claim is an attempt to mount an improper collateral attack on the judgment of the district court.

Briefs here. Lower court materials here.

Federal Circuit Briefs in Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States

Here:

Shinnecock Opening Brief

US Response Brief

Shinnecock Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Federal Circuit Briefs in Hopi Tribe v. United States

Here:

Hopi Opening Brief

US Answer Brief

Hopi Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Guest Post — Anthony Jones on the Federal Circuit’s Recent Trademark Decision and Its Import for the Washington Football Team’s Nickname

Patently-O commentator Mark Bartholomew points to this Federal Circuit case. The issue is when a trademark may be denied for containing “matter which may disparage” a group of persons. At issue in this case is a proposed mark of STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA which was denied for violation of this disparagement provision. The Federal Circuit approved a two-prong test. Bartholomew further states:

  • “Under the first prong of that test, a court must determine the likely meaning of the mark in question. Under the test’s second prong, the court examines whether the likely meaning refers to an identifiable group and, if so, whether that meaning is disparaging to a substantial composite of that group.”
  • “The stakes are high here because the Federal Circuit is the typical route for appeals of [Trademark Trial and Appeal Board] decisions, and a highly anticipated decision from the TTAB on disparagement involving the WASHINGTON REDSKINS mark is due soon.”

There ought to be little doubt that the term “Redskins” refers to an identifiable group – i.e., American Indians.  As to the issue of disparagement, the Federal Circuit has endorsed a rather permissive evidentiary standard, which allowed for consideration of anonymous blog posts to show public perception and reaction to a proposed mark, and statements from members of the disparaged group stating concern over such disparagement.  One key issue that the Court did not address is what constitutes a “substantial composite” of the referenced group.

Federal Circuit Affirms Council for Tribal Employment Rights v. United States Without Opinion

Here is the order.

Briefs and lower court materials here.

Opening Federal Circuit Brief in Shinnecock Nation v. United States

Here:

Shinnecock Opening Brief

Lower court materials here.

Supreme Court Denies Wolfchild/Zephier Cert Petitions

Here is today’s order list.

The petitions are here.

Federal Circuit Briefs in Council for Tribal Employment Rights v. United States

Here:

CTER Brief

US Brief

CTER Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Two Amicus Briefs Supporting Wolfchild Cert Petition

Here:

Gregory Sisk Amicus

Historic Shingle Springs Miwok Amicus

Cert petitions here.

Zephier v. United States & Wolfchild v. United States Cert Petitions

Here:

Wolfchild v US Cert Petition

Zephier v US Cert Petition

Wolfchild questions presented:

1. Whether the court of appeals interpretations of statutes specific to the Mdewakanton Band — 1863 Acts, 1888-1890 Acts and 1980 Act: (a) contradict Tohono O’Odham Nation because the court of appeals failed to appreciate that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is to provide a judicial forum for most non-tort requests for significant monetary relief against the United States; (b) contradict Nevada v. Hicks, because the court of appeals opinions, including the Eighth Circuit opinion in Smith v. Babbitt, essentially refer the Mdewakanton Band’s federal claims to tribal courts which lack jurisdiction; (c) contradict Mitchell I, Mitchell II, White Mountain Apache, and Navajo Nation because the court of appeals misinterpreted statutory trust and other legal obligations and failed to properly apply the money-mandating duty requirement; (d) conflict with the First Circuit opinion in Passamaquoddy Tribe because the court of appeals failed to apply the “plain and unambiguous” requirement to the 1980 Act for the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band and its statutory property rights; and (e) contradict Carcieri because the court of appeals treated the three non-tribal communities as sovereign historical tribes when they are not.

2. Whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of statutes general to American Indians: (a) contradict Oneida I and Oneida II and their progeny because the court of appeals failed to properly interpret the Indian Nonintercourse Act to require Congressional authorization prior to the purported termination of the Mdewakanton Band’s tribal statutory property rights; (b) contradict Carcieri and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) because the court of appeals deemed the purchased IRA lands to be held exclusively in trust for the three post-1934 non-tribal communities; and (c) misinterpreted the six-year statute of limitations and the Indian Trust Accounting Statute (ITAS) to bar the Mdewakanton Band’s monetary claims.

3. Whether summary judgment should have been granted to petitioners on the pre-1980 and post-1980 statutory fund claims and the statutory land claim.

Zephier questions presented:

I. Whether the Federal Circuit’s 2013 holding that a February 16, 1863 Act of Congress, providing that “the Secretary of Interior is hereby authorized to set apart of the public lands . . . eighty acres in severalty” to loyal Mdewakanton Indian individuals, is “too discretionary to support a viable claim,” thereby conflicts with this Court’s and other precedents holding that power given to public officers in permissive form statutory language, but involving individual property rights calling for its exercise, the language used is “in fact peremptory” and money-mandating?

II. Whether the Panel failed to recognize the trust nature of the February 1863 Act in rejecting Petitioners’ “two basic claims” and thus issued a determination that conflicts with a previous authoritative decision in Wolfchild v. United States, 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which found that the language of the Act of February 16, 1863, Section 9, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652, “created an inheritable beneficial interest in the recipients of any land conveyed under the statute . . . [and] explicitly created a trust relationship” with the Federal Government?

III. Whether the Secretary of Interior’s 1865 actions “invoking the land-allocating authority of the two 1863 Acts” created an equitable estoppel against the Government, conflicting with the 2013 Panel’s conclusion that “those 1865 actions . . . cannot support a timely claim for relief?”

IV. Whether the Panel erred in failing to find an actionable violation of the 1851 and 1858 treaties between the Government and the loyal Mdewakanton by the Government’s failure to fully implement Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863?

Lower court materials here.