Here are the materials in Quitiquit v. Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians (N.D. Cal.):
DCT Order Dismissing Quitiquit Complaint
ICRA habeas
ICRA Habeas Petition in Robinson Rancheria Disenrollment Cases
Here is the petition in Quitquit v. Robinson Rancheria Citizen Business Council (N.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
Petitioners Luwana Quitiquit, Robert Quitiquit, Karen Ramos, Inez Sands, and Reuben Want (Petitioners) are Native Americans currently residing on the tribal lands of the Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians in Nice (Lake County), California. They reside in homes they contracted to purchase through a federally-funded, low-income Indian housing program when they were enrolled members of the Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians tribe. In late 2008, the officers of the Robinson Rancheria Tribal Business Council (Respondents) passed a Resolution to disenroll Petitioners and extinguish all their rights as tribal members. Subsequently, Respondents established a Tribal Court with jurisdiction to hear only eviction cases brought by Respondents. Respondents retained an attorney to evict Petitioners using the newly-established Tribal Court. These evictions culminated in the issuance of a Judgment by the Tribal Court that, when executed, will effectuate the immediate expulsion of Petitioners from their homes on the reservation and from tribal land under threat of arrest and criminal trespass, effectively banishing them.
Federal Court Dismisses Stalker’s Habeas Petition against Chehalis; Notes that Petition Could Have Merit, However
Here are the materials in Youckton v. Stinson (W.D. Wash.):
DCT Order Dismissing Stouckton Petition
An excerpt:
Youckton makes the following argument to support his double jeopardy claim: (1) Youckton committed domestic violence under Chehalis Tribal Code (“CTC”) § 15.03.02; (2) domestic violence is defined under CTC §15.03.01, which sets out five possible ways to commit domestic violence; (3) the only way Youckton’s case fits into the domestic violence definition is under the fifth way, stalking; (4) stalking is defined by CTC § 15.04.01, which envisions “repeated” contact; (5) Youckton’s multiple texts/phone calls should be considered “repeated” contact for purposes of sentencing, which would require sentencing him for this conduct as one unit of offense; therefore (6) sentencing him for 205 separate violations rather than as one unit of crime may constitute double jeopardy.
Anderson v. GTB: ICRA Habeas Suit Tossed for Failure to Exhaustion Tribal Remedies
Federal Court Grants ICRA Habeas Petition of Kewa Pueblo Prisoner
Here are the materials in Pacheco v. Massengill (D. N.M.):
Supplemental Pleading in LVD Case
Sounds like the federal habeas case is dead for now, as the LVD council is out of jail.
Opening Brief in Second Ninth Circuit Tribal Court Consecutive Sentencing Case
The case is Bustamante v. Valenzuela. And the brief: Appellant’s Opening Brief 9th Cir.100910
Lower court materials are here.
LVD Council Habeas Petition — UPDATED with Exhibits
Here: LVD Council Habeas Petition.
Update (9/10/10): LVD Habeas Exhibits.
Update (9/11/10): LVD Habeas Exhibits Part 2
Amazing materials. Has this ever happened before? Wonder if one of these (a habeas petition on behalf of an entire tribal council) has ever been filed.
Court Orders Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies in Speedy Trial Case at Oglala
Here are the available materials in Chipps v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court (D. S.D.):
Ninth Circuit Affirms Tribal Court Conviction
The case is Eagle v. Yerington Paiute Tribe, and involves an interesting question: whether tribal prosecutors have to prove Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt. The answer appears to be no.
[Appellant opening brief unavailable.]
Turtle Talk 
You must be logged in to post a comment.