Federal Court Finds Jurisdiction in Tribal Dispute with Massachusetts over Regulation of Gaming on Martha Vineyard

Here are the materials so far in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (D. Mass.):

1 Notice of Removal

18 Massachusetts Motion to Remand

21 Opposition to Motion to Remand

25-1 Massachusetts Reply

31 DCT Order

An excerpt:

This lawsuit involves a dispute between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a federally recognized Indian tribe as to who has regulatory jurisdiction over civil gaming on Indian lands on Martha’s Vineyard. The Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe and related entities have taken steps to commence commercial gaming operations on tribal lands without a license from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts contends that by doing so, the Tribe violated a 1983 settlement agreement that subject the lands in question to state civil and criminal jurisdiction. Count 1 of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and Count 2 seeks a declaratory judgment.

The Commonwealth filed suit in state court on December 2, 2013. On December 30, 2013, defendants removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal-question and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. The Commonwealth has moved to remand the matter to state court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

Bay Mills Opinion First Impressions — Dodging the Biggest Bullet Since Worcester

The Bay Mills Indian Community and the rest of Indian country dodged a very large bullet aimed by the State of Michigan at a core principle of inherent tribal sovereignty and tribal governance with today’s opinion by Justice Kagan. The stakes were incredibly high for tribal interests, and may remain so for the foreseeable future as more sovereign immunity cases work their way through the pipeline. In fact, Justice Kagan pointed out that several possible fact patterns that might justify serious reconsideration (“special justification”) are not before the Court:

We need not consider whether the situation would be different if no alternative remedies were available. We have never, for example, specifically addressed (nor, so far as we are aware, has Congress)whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct. The argument that such cases would present a “special justification” for abandoning precedent is not before us. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984).

Slip op. at 16 n. 8.

Turning away from the statutory and common law immunity analyses for a moment, it remains to be seen what Bay Mills has won here. Justice Kagan’s opening paragraph concludes with this phrase:

Michigan must therefore resort to other mechanisms, including legal actions against the responsible individuals, to resolve this dispute.

Slip op. at 1.

Later, she elaborates on the mechanisms Michigan might employ to defeat the underlying issue here — whether Bay Mills can open an off-reservation casino on lands acquired under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act. Michigan has many advantages, it would appear, stemming from the tribe’s movement off the reservation:

And the resulting world, when considered functionally,is not nearly so “enigma[tic]” as  Michigan suggests. Reply Brief 1. True enough, a State lacks the ability to sue a tribe for illegal gaming when that activity occurs off the reservation. But a State, on its own lands, has many other powers over tribal gaming that it does not possess (absent consent) in Indian territory. Unless federal law provides differently, “Indians going beyond reservation boundaries” are subject to any generally applicable state law. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U. S. 95, 113 (2005) (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973)). So, for example, Michigan could, in the first instance, deny a license to Bay Mills for an off-reservation casino. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§432.206–432.206a (West 2001). And if Bay Mills went ahead anyway, Michigan could bring suit against tribal officials or employees (rather than the Tribe itself) seeking an injunction for, say, gambling without a license. See §432.220; see also §600.3801(1)(a) (West 2013) (designating illegal gambling facilities as public nuisances). As this Court has stated before, analogizing to Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), tribal immunity does not bar such a suit for injunctive relief against individuals, including tribal officers, responsible for unlawful conduct. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 59. And to the extent civil remedies proved inadequate, Michigan could resort to its criminal law, prosecuting anyone who maintains—or even frequents—an unlawful gambling establishment.See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§432.218 (West 2001),750.303, 750.309 (West 2004). In short (and contrary to the dissent’s unsupported assertion, see post, at 11), the panoply of tools Michigan can use to enforce its law on its own lands—no less than the suit it could bring on Indian lands under §2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)—can shutter, quickly and permanently, an illegal casino.

Slip op. at 12-13.

I count several state law mechanisms; however, all are untested. Michigan has teed up a suit against tribal officials for injunctive relief. I guess we move there next, unless BMIC pays up and settles for a large percentage of off-reservation gaming revenues.

Also, the majority highlights two mechanisms expressly endorsed by counsel for the tribe at oral argument that I imagine most tribal leaders, perhaps even Bay Mills’, are not happy about: suing tribal officials for injunctive relief and utilizing state criminal laws. In this respect, the opinion (from the perspective of tribal interests) is tainted.

In the end, perhaps the biggest winner will be the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, which is making similar arguments as Bay Mills in favor of a Lansing MI casino, but has a somewhat stronger argument under the terms of the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act. Expect to see a denial of Michigan’s cert petition in the fall.

Finally, an most importantly, this is a lesson to Indian country on what kinds of cases are winnable, if not all the time (see Adoptive Couple) — statutory interpretation cases. Cases with common law aspects that can be argued as statutory interpretation cases like Bay Mills should be argued that way if at all possible.

 

 

Friday News Dump: Mechoopda Gaming Decision

Here.

Federal Court Dismisses Cherokee County Challenge to Quapaw Casino

Here are the materials in Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County Kansas v. Jewell (D. D.C.):

DCT Order Dismissing Cherokee County Suit

Interior Motion to Dismiss

Cherokee County Opposition

Cherokee County Motion for Summary J

Interior Opposition

News coverage here.

Second Circuit, over a Dissent, Denies En Banc Review of Shinnecock Casino Construction/Aboriginal Title Suit

Here is the dissent from the order denying en banc review:

CA2 Dissent from Denial of En Banc Petition — Shinnecock

The panel opinion and briefs are here.

Lower court materials are here and here.

Briefs in Shinnecock Second Circuit Gaming Case Now Available

We posted the opinion and lower court materials here.

And now the briefs:

Westwoods – Appellants

Westwoods – Appellees

Westwoods – Reply

Second Circuit Vacates Federal Court Injunction against Shinnecock Casino Construction in Southampton (Updated with Briefs)

Here is the opinion:

08-1194_complete_opn

It’s the Second Circuit, so there are no briefs (unless someone sends them along). Here are the briefs:

Shinnecock Brief

State and Town Brief

An excerpt:

The Shinnecock Indian Nation and its tribal officials (collectively, the “Shinnecock” or the “Tribe”) appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Joseph F. Bianco, Judge). After a bench trial, the district court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Tribe from developing a casino on a plot of land known as Westwoods without complying with the laws of New York State and the Town of Southampton. The Shinnecock object to a number of the district court’s factual and legal conclusions, including its findings: (1) that tribal sovereign immunity from suit does not bar this action; (2) that the Shinnecock’s aboriginal title to the land at Westwoods was extinguished in the seventeenth century; (3) that even if aboriginal title had not been extinguished, equitable principles would prevent the Shinnecock’s development of a casino in violation of state and local law; and (4) that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) supplanted any federal common law right the Tribe may have had to operate the casino. They also argue that the Bureau of Indian Affairs’s recent recognition of the Shinnecock Indian Nation moots the injunction.

We conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and thus do not reach the merits of this appeal.

Lower court materials are here and here.

Broken Arrow Casino Project Enjoined

Here and here.

Fletcher on Cabazon Band in the Federal Lawyer

I’ve posted my short paper, “California v. Cabazon Band: A Quarter-Century of Complex, Litigious Self-Determination,” in this month’s Federal Lawyer on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

The Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), may be the most momentous decision in federal Indian law in the last 50 years. The decision provided a federal common law basis for Indian tribes to engage in high stakes bingo and other gaming activities without state regulation, even in so-called Public Law 280 states like California that have criminal jurisdiction inside of Indian country. Cabazon Band provoked Congress to finally codify a regulatory scheme for Indian gaming, including an enactment that authorized under specific conditions Vegas-style casino gaming, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. Indian gaming, as a direct result of Cabazon Band, now has a market greater than $26 billion a year nationally.

Proposed Casino Would Be South Carolina’s First

An excerpt from The Island Packet:

The gambling resort would be within Hilton Head Lakes, a residential development on U.S. 278 — 18 miles from Hilton Head Island and three miles from Exit 8 on I-95. The United Keetoowa Band of the Cherokee Indians in Tahlequah, Okla., would own it.

Jasper County and city of Hardeeville councils passed resolutions endorsing the project Thursday and asked the state and federal government for support. The local leaders hailed it as a boon to Lowcountry tourism that could help cure chronic unemployment.

and

Under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, before a tribe can request that “off-reservation” land be taken into trust by the U.S. government for gaming purposes, the bureau must determine that doing so is in the tribe’s best interest and not detrimental to the surrounding community. The state’s governor must also agree.

“The governor has no intention of signing any memorandum of understanding that would enable casino gambling,” said Rob Godfrey, a spokesman for the first-term Republican.