Here is the opinion in Robbins v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security:
Robbins v Ariz Dept Econ Sec Opinion
We posted a brief from this case back on random brief day in February.
Here is the opinion in Robbins v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security:
Robbins v Ariz Dept Econ Sec Opinion
We posted a brief from this case back on random brief day in February.
Here:
An excerpt:
But a new dialogue may be in the wind. On February 15, Navajo Nation President Ben Shelly spoke fresh words at the opening of an impressive justice center in Tuba City: “We’re ready to have a federal court. We’re ready for a federal judge here.” Federal judges in native America handling federal cases would help. Sure, new statutes would require enactment. Empaneling juries would present challenges. But until Indian nations acquire full criminal jurisdiction for offenses occurring within their boundaries, improved justice for native victims will require expanded federal efforts.
A small part of this case, but important nonetheless. Here are the materials in Kinlichee v. United States (D. Ariz.):
Chinle District Court Order Validating Adoption
DCT Order Denying US Motion to Dismiss
From the opinion:
It is undisputed that Ms. Davis is a Navajo and that Mr. Kinlichee was as well. (Doc. 52–1 at 1–2). It is undisputed that the alleged negligence in this case occurred within the Navajo Nation. (Doc. 1 at 1–2). It is undisputed that Ms. Davis obtained an order in the Family Court of the Navajo Nation validating her Navajo common law adoption by Mr. Kinlichee. (Doc. 52–1 at 1–10). Although the adoption was posthumous as to Mr. Kinlichee and retroactive to 2003, the Navajo court granted the adoption. See (Doc. 52–1 at 1, 10).
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a state must give full faith and credit to adoption decrees issued by the tribal court of a Native American sovereign. Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir.1991). There is no issue known to the Court, or raised here, suggesting that the Navajo Nation lacks the status of a Native American sovereign, and its tribal court granted Ms. Davis an adoption order. If Ms. Davis had been legally adopted by Mr. Kinlichee in another state, and then became a tort plaintiff in the District of Arizona, that adoption likely would not be questioned, or legally analyzed for its merits, before Ms. Davis would be granted standing. Accordingly, this Court must recognize the order of the Navajo court validating Mr. Kinlichee’s adoption of Ms. Davis.Therefore, as to Ms. Davis, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing.
I think. The petition is a bit confusing. Here is the petition in Butler v. Montana:
Butler v Montana Cert Petition
Question presented (which tells us almost nothing):
The question presented is whether the justice of the peace, presiding over a court of no record, exercised jurisdiction over a sovereign nation in contravention of New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338, 103 S. Ct. 2378, 2388-89, 76 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1983), and federal statutes conferring jurisdiction solely on the Navajo Nation by preventing Petitioner from hunting in the Navajo Nation.
Lower court decision, State v. Butler, here:
Apparently, this is an appeal to the Montana court’s order that Butler violated his probation he received for hunting violations in Montana because he went hunting on the Navajo Nation.
Just no.
Here is the opinion in State, ex rel., Children, Youth, and Families Department v. Marsalee P.
An excerpt:
We examine in this appeal of a parental termination order circumstances that require the district court and Petitioner Children, Youth and Families Department (the Department) to fulfill obligations under the Abuse and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 32A-4-1 to -34 (1993, as amended through 2009). We hold that the district court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights without ensuring that the Department had complied with Section 32A-4-22(I) of the Abuse and Neglect Act, which mandates that the Department “shall pursue the enrollment” on behalf of children eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remand to the district court.
Here is the opinion in State v. Steven B.:
An excerpt:
In State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, 127 N.M. 382, 981 P.2d 796, this Court held that the State does not have jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal defendant within Parcel Three of the former Fort Wingate Military Reservation (Parcel Three). A subsequent decision by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, United States v. M.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D.N.M. 2004), decided otherwise. In this appeal, the State asks this Court to agree with the federal court decision and overrule its holding in Dick. Because we continue to believe that Parcel Three is within “Indian country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949) and discussed in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520 (1998), we affirm the ruling of the district court dismissing the State’s prosecution.
The federal court decision referenced in the opinion is here: 311_F.Supp.2d_1281
Here are the materials in Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves (D. Ariz.):
DCT Order Granting Summary J to School District
We posted the complaint here.
Here.
Excerpt:
During a February 22 media conference call with legal experts, Laughlin McDonald, director of the ACLU Voting Rights Project, said he thinks it is the Supreme Court’s duty to reject the challenge of constitutionality of Section 5. “The Section 5 objections enforcement actions…show that the extension of Section 5 in 2006 was more than justified,” McDonald said. In his report, “Voting Rights in Indian Country,” McDonald lays out several discriminatory decisions, such as redistricting in South Dakota, which diluted the Indian vote.
However, Section 5 is not permanent and jurisdictions may terminate or “bail out” from coverage if they have not discriminated for at least 10 years. Nine states are currently covered as a whole: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
According to Patricia Ferguson-Bohnee, law professor at Arizona State University and author of an amicus brief filed by the Navajo Nation, Section 5 has improved American Indian’s voting rights in Arizona. However, she said, voters are still facing challenges, such as distant poll locations, linguistic barriers, and restrictive ID requirements.
James Tucker, a voting rights of counsel with Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker and a primary author of the amicus brief filed by the Alaska Federation of Natives, said Section 5 remains an appropriate measure to prevent the ongoing voting discrimination against Alaska Natives. Section 203 of the Act requires that minorities in certain designated jurisdictions are to be given assistance in voting in their native language.
Not much going on, so how about a few random briefs?
Here’s a brief from the State of Arizona in the Arizona COA defending a decision to deny state unemployment benefits to a former Navajo Nation elected official who is unemployed after losing an election (Robbins v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security):
And here’s a SCT cert petition from a North Carolina company alleging that the state’s ban on a form of gaming advertisements are violative of the First Amendment (Sandhill Amusements Inc. v. North Carolina):
Here.
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