Here is “Tribal court hears argument to dismiss reopened disenrollment cases.”
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe
Sixth Circuit Affirms Conviction of Second Saginaw Chippewa Member for DV
Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. Pego.This one is Samuel John Pego. We posted on the earlier appeal by Waylon Pego here.
Michigan Files Cert Petition against Sault Tribe in Lansing Casino Controversy
Here are the petition materials in Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians:
Lower court materials here.
Sixth Circuit Affirms D.V. Convictions of Saginaw Chippewa Member
Here is the unpublished opinion in United States v. Pego.
We posted the indictment and a procedural matter on the blog.
Sixth Circuit Denies Sault Tribe Motion to Reconsider Stay
Here:
CA6 Order Denying Reconsideration
Prior posts on the stay are here and here. Panel materials here.
En Banc Petition Materials in Michigan v. Sault Tribe
Here:
2014-01-16 Petition for Panel Rehearing with a Suggestion for Rehearing …
2014-01-22 NHBPI Motion for leave to file amicus brief -rehearing
2014-01-23 NHBPI Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of St of MI Pet
2014-01-23 Order Granting Motion for Leave to file Amicus Brief NHBPI
Panel materials are here.
Fletcher, Fort, and Reo on “Tribal Disruption” Theory in the Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort, and Dr. Nicholas J. Reo have published “Tribal Disruption and Indian Claims” in Michigan Law Review’s First Impressions. PDF. Here is a taste:
Legal claims are inherently disruptive. Plaintiffs’ suits invariably seek to unsettle the status quo. On occasion, the remedies to legal claims can be so disruptive-that is, impossible to enforce or implement in a fair and equitable manner-that courts simply will not issue them. In the area of federal Indian law, American Indian tribal claims not only disrupt the status quo but may even disrupt so-called settled expectations of those affected by the claims.[1] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has dismissed a round of Indian land claims at the pleading stage, including Onondaga Nation v. New York,[2] because it considered the claims so disruptive.
We agree that Indian legal claims are inherently disruptive and may implicate the centuries-old settled expectations of state and local governments and non-Indians. It is empirically and categorically false, however, that the remedies tribal interests seek are impossible to enforce or implement in a fair or equitable manner. Every year in cases against state governments and their political subdivisions, Indian tribes settle long-standing claims that at their outset, often appear intractable, if not downright impossible, to remedy. The recent settlements of claims by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York,[3] the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe,[4] and five Michigan Anishinaabe tribes[5] demonstrate the falsehood of the idea that Indian claims are too disruptive to be remedied. These negotiated settlements powerfully illustrate that the disruption produced by Indian claims has an important function: forcing federal, state, and tribal governments to creatively seek solutions to difficult governance issues in Indian country.
Part I of this Essay describes recent common law, which dismisses Indian claims on the grounds that they are too disruptive. Part II briefly surveys the history of the relationship between Indians and the United States. Part III describes recent settlements between tribal and local governments. Part IV presents our theory of tribal disruption based on notions of ecological disturbance, studied in ecology and related fields. We argue that ecological disturbance in linked social-ecological systems offers a useful analog to the disruptive nature of Indian claims. These claims can be compared to disturbances in rivers, forests, or other ecosystems. Floods, forest fires, and windstorms break down existing structures, allowing space for reorganization, diversification, and new growth. Tribal claims similarly clear out a legal space for creative and improved governance institutions.
Sixth Circuit Reverses in Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
Here is the opinion:
An excerpt:
Because the State is not suing to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the casino property will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe for adjudication because it depends on contingent future events that may never occur. The injunction was therefore not properly entered.
Briefs are here.
Lower court materials here.
Op/Ed on Bay Mills Case by Nottawaseppi Huron Potawatomi & Saginaw Chippewa Chairmen
Update in Carnel Chamberlain Murder Prosecution — Motion to Change Venue to Detroit Denied
Here are the materials in United States v. Bennett (E.D. Mich.):
11 Bennett First Superceding Indictment
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