tribal court exhaustion doctrine – Page 9

We conclude that the district court erred in excusing the officers from exhaustion of tribal remedies with respect to the Tribe’s trespass claim, which alleges that the officers asserted superior authority over tribal lands and barred a tribal official from accessing the scene of the Murray shooting. Although we do not decide today whether the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over that claim, exhaustion is required unless tribal court jurisdiction is “automatically foreclosed.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985). The officers have not made this showing for the trespass claim because that claim at least arguably implicates the Tribe’s core sovereign rights to exclude and to self-govern. We further conclude that this claim is not barred by Hicks, which excused exhaustion based on a state’s overriding interest in investigating off-reservation offenses. Such an interest is not at play in this case. Murray was not suspected of committing any off-reservation violation, and the officers were not cross-deputized to enforce state law on the Reservation. However, we agree with the district court that the remaining Tribal Court claims are not subject to tribal jurisdiction and thus exhaustion was unnecessary.

Briefs:

Opening Brief

Utah Municipalities Answer Brief

Answer Brief

Reply Brief

Lower court materials in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe (D. Utah):

23 Motion to Dismiss

32 Motion for Preliminary Injunction

33 Utah Municipalities Response to 23

34 State Response to 23

36 Norton Response to 23

37 Reply in Support of 23

38 Opposition to 32

39 Tribal Court Response to 32

40 Reply in Support of 32

57 DCT Order

Federal Court Denies TRO in Matter it Already Dismissed under the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine

March 30, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the new materials in Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria (N.D. Cal.):

53 Motion for TRO

54 DCT Order Denying TRO

Prior posts here.

Federal Court Again Dismisses Challenge to Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court Jurisdiction

February 24, 2017February 27, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria (N.D. Cal.):

An excerpt:

Plaintiff James Acres seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Blue Lake Rancheria Tribe (“Tribe”), the Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”) and its Chief Judge, Lester Marston, alleging that the Tribal Court has conducted itself in bad faith in asserting jurisdiction over him in an underlying contractual fraud case because Judge Marston refused to recuse himself from the case and misrepresented his relationship with the Tribe. Judge Marston has now recused himself from the Tribal Court case and appointed the Hon. James Lambden, a retired California Court of Appeal Justice with no prior connection to the Tribe, to preside over the matter. Given Judge Marston’s recusal and the appointment of a neutral judge, there is insufficient evidence of bad faith for the exception to apply. Acres does not meet any of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. He must exhaust his tribal remedies before bringing an action of this kind in federal court. The Tribe’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Cedarville Rancheria Prevails in Tribal Exhaustion Matter

February 16, 2017February 17, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians (E.D. Cal.):

An excerpt:

Plaintiff Duanna Knighton, the former Tribal Administrator for defendant Cedarville Rancheria of Northern Paiute Indians (“the Tribe”), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Tribe, Cedarville Rancheria Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”), and Tribal Court Judge Patricia R. Lenzi (“Tribal Judge Lenzi”) (collectively “defendants”) to avoid Tribal Court jurisdiction over claims that she defrauded the Tribe and breached her fiduciary duties to it. Defendants move to dismiss Knighton’s complaint because the Tribal Court has jurisdiction. I agree that it has both regulatory and adjudicative authority over its former employee under the facts alleged; accordingly, it has subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

Federal Court Orders Exhaustion in Claims involving Interpretation of Navajo Insurance Law

February 13, 2017Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Progressive Advanced Insurance Company v. Worker (D. Ariz.):

An excerpt:

The Court determines that the tribal courts of the Navajo Nation have a colorable or plausible claim to jurisdiction over this matter. See Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848. Like the insurer in Stump, Progressive issued an insurance policy that listed a tribal member as a named insured and covered vehicles that were kept on tribal lands. Unlike the insurer in Stump, however, Progressive never mailed anything to an address on tribal lands. To the extent that factor is dispositive, it may be that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction. But this is a question that must be answered first by the tribal courts of the Navajo Nation. See LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16 (explaining that the tribal court should have “‘the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge’ to its jurisdiction”). An analysis of the Todecheene decision does not change this conclusion. In that case, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that it was not clear that the tribal courts plainly lacked jurisdiction. Todecheene, 488 F.3d at 1216. This Court reaches the same conclusion here.