Here is the unpublished opinion in S.P. v. Native Village of Minto.
Here are the materials:
tribal court
Leech Lake Band 2011 Election Declared Invalid by Tribal Court
Here is the order:
Illinois State Bar Findings in Disciplinary Action against Former Little River Band Attorney
Available here (Illinois website), and pdf:
This document details the findings of fact, and makes recommendations for discipline. We posted relevant documents on this matter here and here and here.
The six counts are as follows (details are in the document linked above):
COMPLAINT
Jerome Larkin, Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, by his attorney, Meriel Coleman, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 753(b), complains of Respondent, Joseph Henry Martin, who was licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois on May 2, 1995, and alleges that Respondent has engaged in the following conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute:
Seminole Tribe Sued in Federal Court under ICRA by Business Partner for Failure to Establish a Tribal Court
Here is the complaint in South Florida Entertainment Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida (S.D. Fla.):
Here’s the first paragraph:
1. This action, in material part, seeks declaratory relief wherein SFLE and individual Plaintiffs seek to have this Court declare that the Tribe has violated the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § § 1301 and 1302 (the “ICRA”) and to order further necessary and proper relief in favor of SFLE pursuant to 28 US.C. §2202. Among other things, SFLE believes and contends that the Tribe is incapable of meeting its quasi-Constitutional obligation to provide due process of law under the ICRA due to its admitted failure to create and maintain a tribal court system or any other legitimate forum for ensuring compliance with the ICRA and the Constitutional-like protections it is intended to grant to members and non-Tribal members, alike. SFLE also seeks a declaration concerning whether the Tribe’s administration of the issuance of Tribal Liquor Licenses comports with or violates federal law, namely 18 U.S.C. §§1154, 1156 and 1161. SFLE also seeks a judicial declaration that the Tribe has contractually waived sovereign immunity with respect to disputes involving the Tribe, the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel and Casino which it operates and owns, SPR, and its commercial tenants and subtenants, like SFLE as well as the individual Plaintiffs. Moreover, each Plaintiff alleges that the Tribe solely controls SPR, as indicated in several pieces of correspondence with Plaintiffs. Proof of such control is reflected in Plaintiff’s Composite Exhibit “C” where the Defendant Tribe specifically alleges that it does business as SPR. The individual’s Plaintiffs, PENDLETON and PRIOLO, also allege damages for various tort claims against both Defendants, as stated within the various Counts herein below.
Miccosukee Supplemental Brief in Support of Cert Petition in Miccosukee v. Kraus-Anderson
Sprint Communications v. Native American Telecom & Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court
Here is that opinion:
Sprint v Native American Telecom — Denial of PI.
An excerpt:
Defendant, Native American Telecom (NAT), moves for a preliminary injunction to enjoin plaintiff, Sprint Communications Company, from withholding interstate switched access charges that NAT has already billed or will bill to Sprint in the future. Sprint resists the motion. The motion is denied.
Eastern Band Cherokee v. Wolfe et al. — Attorney Disbarment
The Eastern Band tribal court disbarred Robert Saunooke, an Eastern Band member and a Florida-licensed attorney, for noncompliance with the tribal court licensure rule that requires a North Carolina bar license.
Here is that order:
Briefing in Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp.
Here are those materials (so far):
An excerpt from the petitioner’s brief:
This is an appeal from Judgments entered August 31, 2010 and September 10, 2010, in the Circuit Court of Brown County, Donald R. Zuidmulder, Circuit Judge. (R. 38, A. App 1, R. 41, A. App 3.) The Circuit Court held a hearing on August 31, 2010. (R. 54, A. App 4-16.) The Circuit Court granted Defendant-Respondent [*3] Oneida Seven Generations Corporation’s (“OSGC’s”) Motion to Transfer to Tribal Court pursuant to Sec. 801.54, and later denied the Motion to Reconsider of Plaintiff-Appellant John Kroner, concluding as a matter of law that OSGC’s motion provided sufficient evidence and argument to warrant transfer of this case to the Oneida Tribal Judicial System (“Tribal Court”). (R. 38, A. App 1, R. 41, A. App 3, R. 54, A. App 4-16.)
Ford Motor Credit v. Poitra — Fed. Court Refuses to Dismiss Tribal Court Jurisdiction Case
Colville Appellate Court Dismisses Marriage Dissolution Action between Nonmembers, Reversing Lower Court
Here is the opinion in Green v. Green: Green v Green.
An excerpt:
At the Initial Hearing on January 21, 2011, Appellee argued that reading the Code as a whole, and in particular the Domestic Relations Chapter, the Tribes allows non-Indians, including descendants to file other civil family matter cases in the Tribal Court. She gave as examples the custody sections, guardianships, paternity actions, and child support. She asserts that to exclude this class of litigants, i.e. non-Indians and descendants, from dissolutions violates their rights to due process and equal protection, by denying them access to the Tribal Court.
We have long upheld the rights of litigants to equal protection and due process in our Courts, as guaranteed by our Tribal Civil Rights Act, CTC § 1-5-2(h). See, Gallaher v. Foster, 6 CCAR 48, 3 CCTR 50 (2002); R.L. and B.J. v. CCT CFS, 6 CCAR 1, 3 CCTR 39 (2001); and Finley v. CTSC, 8 CCAR 38, 4 CCTR 25 (2006). We cannot find a violation of either in the circumstances of this case. It is true the Tribes has restricted who may file for dissolutions in the Tribal Court, but such restriction does not offend due process or equal protection. The tribal legislatures have made a decision to limit the sovereignty it wishes to exercise over non-tribal members, no matter who their families are. It is up to the tribal Council to change this law, not the Courts.
The statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. Statutory construction begins by looking at the statute’s language, giving words their plain meaning, and proceeding to extrinsic interpretive aids only when the statute contains unclear or ambiguous language. CTC § 1-1-7(b) (providing that words given plain and generally understood meaning). The Constitutional responsibility of the tribal legislatures to decide what jurisdiction it wishes the Tribes to exercise is clear and unambiguous. See Constitution, id.
In the matters of domestic relations, the Tribes has restricted its subject matter jurisdiction over marriages, both in granting them and dissolving or annulling them, to only cases in which one party is a member of the Tribes. CTC § 5-1-32(b) (one of the persons getting married under the Code must be an enrolled Colville tribal member); and CTC § 5-1-101 (one of the parties to a dissolution or annulment action must be an enrolled Colville tribal member). There was no subject matter jurisdiction over the dissolution in this case. We so hold.
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