As reported on Indianz….
Here are some of the relevant materials in this issue:
ALLTEL – GONZALES FIRM BRIEF FILED IN COURT (4-13-11).7
As reported on Indianz….
Here are some of the relevant materials in this issue:
ALLTEL – GONZALES FIRM BRIEF FILED IN COURT (4-13-11).7
Here are the materials in Merit Management v. Ponca (N.D. Ill.):
Here are the materials:
Here are the materials in Wells Fargo Bank v. Sokaogon Chippewa Community (E.D. Wis.):
DCT Denying Mole Lake Motion to Dismiss
A few excerpts from the opinion:
Interesting case to watch in the California Court of Appeal. The case involves intertribal lending.
Here is the opening brief: YAN Opening Brief.
The YAN statement of the case:
May an Indian tribe avoid the jurisdiction of California courts, even after its chairperson (i) was authorized to negotiate and execute an agreement with a lender, (ii) executed an agreement with the lender containing a clear waiver of sovereign immunity, and (iii) warranted that the tribe had approved the agreement? The trial court below answered in the affirmative, dismissing a lawsuit for breach of a loan agreement, brought by plaintiff and appellant the Yavapai-Apache Nation (the “YAN”) against the defaulting borrower, defendant and respondent the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel (the “Iipay”).
The YAN asks this Court to correct this error. The law of California and of the United States has, for over a century, upheld the validity of acts of foreign officials and provided a presumption that such acts are valid; the burden of proof is on the party challenging the validity of such acts to show why they are not effective. This presumption, which applies equally to officials of Indian tribes, was not rebutted in this case. The Iipay authorized its chairperson to make an agreement with its lender (the rights to which the YAN succeeded), and all admissible evidence shows that the agreement was executed and approved by the Iipay. The Iipay breached the agreement. The Iipay should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits of an agreement until it defaults, and then avoid the consequences of its default by selectively disavowing the part of the agreement – the waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to jurisdiction in California – it finds inconvenient.
Here are the materials in Colmar v. Jackson Band of Miwuk Indians (E.D. Cal.):
Here are the materials so far in Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park (M.D. Ala.) relating to the motion to dismiss the tribal defendant:
Miami Tribe BDA Motion to Dismiss
DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss
An excerpt:
Plaintiffs contend that, without the benefit of discovery, they cannot ascertain whether the Tribe “waived sovereign immunity by contract or other agreement” (Doc. # 96, at 3) because they are not in the possession of any contracts (Doc. # 96, at 6). The court takes no position on whether, as Plaintiffs assert, discovery “most likely” will prove a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claim against the Tribe. (Doc. # 96, at 6.) It is noted, though, that the existence of such a contract is neither admitted nor denied by the Tribe. All of this is why, without discovery, it would be inappropriate at this time to determine the issue of sovereign immunity on a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Accordingly, the Tribe’s motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity is due to be denied at this time.
There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).
It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.
Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.
Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.
Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.
Here are the materials in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (S.D. Fla.):
DCT Order Remanding Case to Fla. Cir. Ct.
Seminole Tribe Motion to Dismiss
Contour Spa Response to Cypress Motion
Contour Spa Response to Tribe Motion
Of note, the court here appeared to assume that the so-called “Dry Creek lodge exception” could apply here, but found that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements (one of which was essentially exhaustion of tribal forums). This is a potentially troubling development (that is, the spread of Dry Creek Lodge to areas outside of the Tenth Circuit).
Mary-Beth Moylan has posted her paper, “Sovereign Rules of the Game: Requiring Campaign Finance Disclosure in the Face of Tribal Sovereign Immunity,” on SSRN. It is forthcoming in the B.U. Public Interest Law Journal.
Here is the abstract:
This paper examines the history and current state of affairs concerning tribal political participation. Additionally, this paper suggests legislative action to create a sensible structure in which Indian tribes can responsibly participate in the political process at both a federal and state level.
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