Here:
Lower court materials here.

Here are the briefs (that I choose to post because the others are ridiculous):
Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission Brief
The same Termination-era Congressional leader that brought us the McCarren Amendment also attempted to repeal the Indian Commerce Clause. Here is a file that includes the 1951 and 1953 bills (also the Cohen memoranda mentioned below):

Felix Cohen helpfully pointed out that this silly idea had no chance of passing:

It’s still likely that Congress would possess “plenary power” over Indian affairs even in the absence of the Commerce Clause power, see Kagama. Discuss.
Here are the new materials in State of Alaska v. Dept. of the Interior (D.D.C.):
Complaint here.

Here:






Gregory Ablavsky has published “Structural Federal Indian Law after Brackeen” in the Arizona Law Review. PDF
The abstract:
“You know, when it comes to Indian law, most of the time we’re just making it up,” Justice Scalia once observed. This admission echoed long-standing critiques of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the field, but these anxieties did not trouble the Court—until recently. Over the past two decades, the Court has begun to revisit the field’s foundations, culminating in the Court’s 2023 decision in Haaland v. Brackeen, which upheld the Indian Child Welfare Act against a constitutional challenge. Though the Court upheld the law, the majority pleaded for a “theory for rationalizing this body of law.” Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, each writing separately and at length, offered sharply different visions that would dramatically remake current doctrine.
Rather than providing a single theory, this Article tries to make sense of this current moment of “confusion” in federal Indian law, in the Brackeen majority’s language, by putting the field in dialogue with structural constitutional law. The fields have much in common: both deal with legal rules governing the distribution of governmental authority, and both confront the frequent absence of textual guidance. But in structural constitutional law—which rarely considers the authority of Native nations—the Court has developed a clearer and more fully articulated methodology for resolving this problem of textual underdetermination.
Extending this approach to federal Indian law, I argue, could produce greater clarity and rigor in the field. In particular, this method yields what I term two answers that the federal government has posited over its history to the interrelated questions of federal, Native, and state authority. I then use this framework to evaluate the visions for federal Indian law announced in Brackeen, all of which elide or submerge the jurisprudential choices that assessing these conflicting answers requires. I conclude by offering some thoughts on how Native nations and their advocates might confront this current moment of uncertainty and debate within the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence.

Here:
Institutions and Economic Development
Ezra Rosser
The Native Fight for Hunting Rights: The Crow Tribe and Herrera v. Wyoming
Jacob Lewis
The Need for Law in Federal Indian Law: A Response to Maggie Blackhawk in Light of the Supreme Court’s Troubling Term for Tribal Sovereignty
Nicholas B. Mauer

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