Supreme Court Decides Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona — Federal Law Preempts Arizona’s Proof of Citizenship Voting Form

Here is the opinion. Congrats to Patricia Millett.

Briefs and other materials are here.

Tenth Circuit Decides Seminole Indian Country Habeas Appeal (Effectively Reversing Oklahoma Criminal COA)

Here are the materials in Magnan v. Trammell:

CA10 Opinion

Magnan Opening Brief

Seminole Tribe Amicus

Oklahoma Answer Brief

Magnan Reply Brief

An excerpt:

Petitioner David Magnan pleaded guilty in Oklahoma state court to three counts of murder in the first degree and one count of shooting with intent to kill. Magnan was sentenced to  death for each of the murder convictions and to a term of life imprisonment on the remaining conviction. Magnan argued on direct review that the crimes occurred in “Indian country,” 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and that, as a result, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction  over the crimes. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) held, however, that a  1970 conveyance to the Housing Authority of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma extinguished all Indian lands restrictions that had previously attached to the surface estate of the property where the crimes occurred. The OCCA further held that, even assuming that restrictions remained on 4/5ths of the mineral estate, such interest wasunobservable and insufficient to deprive the State of Oklahoma of criminal jurisdiction over the surface property at issue. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Magnan again asserted that the crimes at issue occurred in “Indian country” and that the state trial court was without jurisdiction. The district court denied Magnan’s petition but granted him a certificate of appealability. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we need only address the status of the surface estate to agree with Magnan that the location where the crimes occurred was “Indian country” because the requirements to extinguish the restrictions placed on Indian lands by Congress were not met and that, as a result, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to grant Magnan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

State court decision, with our commentary, here.

No News from SCT on Michigan v. Bay Mills Cert Petition

Today’s order list.

Curious. It could mean several things. Most likely is that one of the Justices is thinking about drafting a dissent from the denial of certiorari. We’re not aware of any similar cases in the pipeline that would compel a hold, which is another possibility.

City of Duluth’s Opposition to NIGC Motion to Dismiss Suit over Fond du Lac Casino Revenues

Here:

Duluth Opposition

The MTD is here.

The complaint is here.

National Indian Gaming Commission Moves to Dismiss Chukchansi Gaming Ordinance Suit

Here is the motion in Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Stevens (D. D.C.):

NIGC Motion to Dismiss Chukchansi Complaint

Complaint is here.

New Scholarship on Tribal Gaming Revenue Allocation Plans

Thaddieus W. Conner and William A. Taggart have published “Indian Gaming and Tribal Revenue Allocation Plans: Socio-economic determinants of policy adoption” in the Social Science Journal. Here is the abstract:

As the Indian gaming industry has experienced unprecedented growth over the past two decades, tribes have pursued different paths regarding the utilization of gaming revenues within parameters established by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Since 1993, more than 100 tribes have received approval through the Department of the Interior to distribute revenues directly to tribal members through per capita payments governed by a Tribal Revenue Allocation Plan (RAP). This paper improves our understanding of nations with payment plans by exploring whether socio-economic tribal features are associated with the successful adoption of a RAP. We find that tribes who gained approval of a RAP in the 1990s have higher per capita incomes, while also having smaller populations and lower levels of educational attainment. Population is the strongest predictor of RAP adoptions in both the 1990s and 2000s, with the impact of other tribal features being less meaningful in explaining adoption in the second decade.

Email me if you want a pdf.

N.Y. Appellate Division Concludes Tribal Enterprise Formed under Tribal Law Not Immune From Suit

Here is the opinion in Sue/Perior Concrete and Paving Co. v. Lewiston Golf Course Corp.:

Sue Perior v Lewiston Golf

An excerpt:

Other factors, however, including what the Court of Appeals has characterized as the “[m]ore important[]” financial factors, weigh in favor of a determination that LGCC does not share in the Nation’s sovereign immunity (id.). With respect to whether LGCC’s “purposes are similar to or serve those of the tribal government” (id.), we conclude that this factor supports the denial of sovereign immunity to LGCC. In minutes from its August 2002 meeting approving the creation of SGC, the Council declared that “it is . . . the policy of the Nation to promote the welfare and prosperity of its members and to actively promote, attract, encourage and develop economically sound commerce and industry through governmental action for the purpose of preventing unemployment and economic stagnation,” and that “the Gaming industry is vitally important to the economy of the Nation and the general welfare of its members.” To that end, the Council created SNFGC for the purpose of “developing, financing, operating and conducting the Nation’s gaming operations on its Niagara Falls Territory at the Niagara Falls Gaming Facility.” In creating the LGCC, the Council declared that, “in furtherance of the economic success of the Nation’s gaming operations, [SNFGC] has commenced development of a . . . golf course located in the Town of Lewiston, New York[, which] will be developed and operated as an amenity to . . . SNFGC’s casino operations, . . . the purpose of which amenities is to enhance the overall success and profitability of the casino’s operations” (emphasis added). In that manner, the Council believed that the golf course project “may reasonably be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the Nation” (emphasis added). Thus, the Council’s own statements reflect that the purpose of LGCC – to develop a golf course as an “amenity” to the Nation’s gaming operations – is several steps removed from the purposes of tribal government, e.g., “promoting tribal welfare, alleviating unemployment, [and] providing money for tribal programs” (Gristede’s Foods, Inc., 660 F Supp 2d at 477; cf. Ransom, 86 NY2d at 560).

These common law tests to decide whether a tribal enterprise is under the cloak of tribal immunity are baffling, generating far too many unpredictable results like this one. It’s fairly clear to me that the wide majority of courts would conclude a tribally-owned enterprise chartered under tribal law is immune without looking toward subjective factors such as what the purpose of the corporation is — tribes just aren’t for-profit entities. They’re governments.

N. Dakota SCT Briefs in State Utility Jurisdiction Case Involving Turtle Mountain

Here are the briefs in North Dakota Electric Cooperative Inc. v. North Dakota Public Service Commission:

North Central Elec Coop Brief

N.D. Public Service Commission Brief

Otter Tail Power Co Brief

Turtle Mountain Brief

VAWA Pilot Project Notice in Federal Register, Plus Supporting Materials

Here is the link to the notice. And a pdf: Federal Register Notice on DOJVAWA Tribal Pilot Project June 14 2013

VAWA 2013 and Tribal JurisdictionOver Crimes of Domestic Violence (revised 06-14-13)

VAWA Tribal Pilot Project FAQs June 13 2013

 

New Scholarship on the “American Indian Child Welfare Crisis of the 1960s and 1970s”

Margaret D. Jacobs has published “Remembering the ‘Forgotten Child’: The American Indian Child Welfare Crisis of the 1960s and 1970s” in the American Indian Quarterly. Email me for a pdf.

Here is an excerpt:

On Christmas Day 1975, Marcia Marie Summers was born to Charlene Summers, a member and resident of the Standing Rock Sioux Nation in North Dakota. A few months later, a white couple from Indiana approached the young mother and offered to care for her infant while Summers attended school. (Just two months before, the couple had filed an adoption petition in the Standing Rock Tribal Court for another Indian child, but the court had denied their request.) Assuming she was making a temporary arrangement, Summers agreed and signed a document giving the Indiana couple power of attorney over Marcia Marie in parent-child-related actions. Immediately, the couple departed with the baby from the reservation and returned to Indiana. Summers realized that the couple intended to permanently adopt her daughter, so she asked the Standing Rock Tribal Court to intervene. When the couple ignored the tribal court’s order to return the child to her mother, Summers and tribal authorities requested the help of the Association on American Indian Affairs ( AAIA). Their attorney filed a writ of habeas corpus on Summers’s behalf in the Washington County, Indiana, Circuit Court, and the judge ordered Marcia Marie returned to her mother, noting the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction in the case.

Like Summers, in the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of other American Indian parents, grandparents, and caretakers suffered the removal of their children and their placement in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Unlike Summers, however, many Indian families struggled for years to regain their children, and some were never able to effect their return. By the late 1960s, many Indian tribes had become deeply troubled by this practice. In 1968, having endured an inordinate number of such cases, the Devils Lake (now Spirit Lake) Sioux Tribe of North Dakota requested that the AAIA conduct an investigation into the practice. The AAIA found that of 1,100 Devils Lake Sioux Indians under twenty-one years of age living on the Fort Totten reservation, 275, or 25 percent, had been separated from their families. Suspecting that this practice devastated other Indian communities as well, the AAIA engaged in a painstaking process to amass similar data from state social services agencies and private placement agencies across the nation. They discovered that in most states with large American Indian populations, 25 to 35 percent of Indian children had been separated from their families and placed in foster or adoptive homes or in institutions at a per capita rate far higher than that of non-Indian children.

How did it come to pass that the fostering and adoption of Indian children outside their families and communities had reached these crisis proportions by the late 1960s? State welfare authorities and Bureau of Indian Affairs ( BIA) officials alleged a dramatic rise in unmarried Indian mothers with unwanted children and claimed that many Indian individuals and families lacked the resources and skills to properly care for their own children. Claiming to be concerned with the best interests of the Indian child, the BIA promoted the increased fostering and adoption of Indian children in non-Indian families. Indian families and their advocates charged instead that many social workers were using ethnocentric and middle-class criteria to unnecessarily remove Indian children from their families and communities. Through creating their own child welfare organizations and legal codes, as well as working for the Indian Child Welfare Act ( ICWA), Indian activists and their allies sought to bring Indian child welfare under the control of Indian nations.