Here are the materials in Wells Fargo Bank v. Sokaogon Chippewa Community (E.D. Wis.):
DCT Denying Mole Lake Motion to Dismiss
A few excerpts from the opinion:
Here are the materials in Wells Fargo Bank v. Sokaogon Chippewa Community (E.D. Wis.):
DCT Denying Mole Lake Motion to Dismiss
A few excerpts from the opinion:
As reported on Indianz….
Here is the opinion in Marshall Investments Corp. v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc. (N.Y. A.D.) (unpublished), pages 6-7 of the pdf.
An excerpt:
The subject pledge agreement did not constitute a management contract which required the approval of the National Indian Gaming Commission (25 CFR 502.15; cf. Machal, Inc. v Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, 387 F Supp 2d 659, 666-667 [2005]). However, because it changes the Tribe’s obligations, requiring them to make payments into escrow, and alters their liabilities, giving the right to sue and a veto over certain modifications of a separate management agreement to plaintiffs, the pledge agreement is a modification or assignment of rights under the management agreement. As such, it is void because it was never approved by the commission (25 CFR 533.7). Since the underlying contract is void, plaintiffs cannot recover for tortious interference with that contract (see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 424 [1996]).
Here is that order:
The motion is here.
The briefs in opposition are here:
Here is the order:
Here are the materials in Manoukian v. Harrah’s (S.D. Cal.):
Here are the materials so far in Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park (M.D. Ala.) relating to the motion to dismiss the tribal defendant:
Miami Tribe BDA Motion to Dismiss
DCT Order Denying Motions to Dismiss
An excerpt:
Plaintiffs contend that, without the benefit of discovery, they cannot ascertain whether the Tribe “waived sovereign immunity by contract or other agreement” (Doc. # 96, at 3) because they are not in the possession of any contracts (Doc. # 96, at 6). The court takes no position on whether, as Plaintiffs assert, discovery “most likely” will prove a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claim against the Tribe. (Doc. # 96, at 6.) It is noted, though, that the existence of such a contract is neither admitted nor denied by the Tribe. All of this is why, without discovery, it would be inappropriate at this time to determine the issue of sovereign immunity on a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Accordingly, the Tribe’s motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity is due to be denied at this time.
There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).
It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.
Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.
Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.
Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.
You must be logged in to post a comment.