NYTs “Room for Debate” — Tribal Rights vs. Racial Justice (Cherokee Freedmen Expulsion)

The New York Times’ “Room for Debate” series has published a series of articles on the Cherokee Freedmen controversy.

Debaters

Federal Government and Cherokee Nation Responses to Cherokee Freedmen Motion to Enjoin Principal Chief Election

Here are the updated materials in Vann v. Salazar (D. D.C.):

USA Response to Vann Motion

Cherokee Nation Response to Vann Motion

The Vann motion is here.

Saginaw Chippewa Disenrollment Effort Begins Anew

Here is the news article, via Pechanga. And here is an excerpt:

The “D” word has again surfaced on the Isabella Reservation: Disenrollment.

The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Office of Administrative Hearings last week conducted the first hearing in several years into the possibility of removing a current member from the rolls. No decision was reached.

The case involves an 87-year-old elder who lives in Pennsylvania. Anna Bell Atwood. She became a member of the Tribe in 1988 during the Tribe’s open enrollment period, a time when the Tribe reached out to Natives who might qualify to become members.

Since that time, Tribal membership has become extremely valuable. Members qualify for numerous benefits, including per-capita payments of several thousand dollars per month based on income from the Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort, free health care and other perks.

But a high birth rate has caused membership in the Tribe to grow rapidly. At the same time, the economic downtown has cut into the Tribe’s income.

Tribal attorney Shawn Frank admitted during the hearing that a change in the makeup of the Tribal Council had put the disenrollment issue back into the spotlight.

Bob Miller on Tribal Constitutions

Robert Miller has posted his paper, “Tribal Constitutions and Native Sovereignty,” on SSRN.

Here is the abstract:

More than 565 Indigenous tribal governments exercise extensive sovereign and political powers within the United States today. Only about 230 of the native communities that created these governments, however, have chosen to adopt written constitutions to define and control the political powers of their governments. Many observers would no doubt ask how a government can function without a written constitution to guide its formation and operation, and how the rights of citizens can be defined and protected without a written constitution. This essay addresses these questions and many more concerning American Indian and Alaska Native tribal constitutions. It is clear that constitutionalism is nothing new to Indigenous peoples in North America. This fact is demonstrated by the Iroquois Confederacy of the Haudenosaunee people who have governed themselves under an unwritten constitution for many hundreds of years, by the Cherokee Nation who apparently created the first written tribal constitution in 1827, by the many dozens of tribal governments who adopted written constitutions from 1837-1930, and by the hundreds of Indigenous governments who adopted constitutions under the federal Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. This essay examines these facts and more, and addresses whether modern day tribal constitutions adequately serve the needs of native communities and help these communities and their political entities to exercise and protect their sovereignty.

Tribal Immunity, Tribal Court Jurisdiction, and Separation of Powers

There are two active cases out there involving Florida tribes that raise interesting questions relating to tribal courts and tribal immunity in federal and state courts. The two cases, Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. (which is currently pending before the Supreme Court — an invitation brief from the OSG may be forthcoming soon), and last week’s district court decision in Contour Spa at Hard Rock v. Seminole Tribe (see today’s post here).

It is our understanding that both tribes have unusual government structures (unusual by federal and state standards, and to most but not all tribes) in which the tribal legislature serves as the appellate court of final resort for the tribal judiciary. This is less common, we think, than it once was in Indian country, but a goodly number of tribes retain this structure. Many tribes in Michigan, by contrast, have very clear constitutional boundaries between the tribal political branches and the tribal courts, and the Harvard Project strongly recommends an independent judiciary as part of its prescription for solid economic growth in Indian country.

Tribes can and should establish whatever governmental structure they believe fits best for their communities, but there may be consequences to the tribal council-as-appellate court structure for tribes that have large commercial operations. Miccosukee, for example, is trying to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court, and their tribal court judgment creditor is vehemently arguing that tribal jurisdiction is not viable because the tribal appellate court — the tribal council — is an interested party in the underlying suit. [That case likely will turn on whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the contract claim, however.] But if the Miccosukee Tribe or other tribes try to enforce tribal court judgments in state or federal courts, it could be very difficult to persuade a foreign court to enforce a judgment ultimately controlled by the tribal council.

Such bad government structure “facts” almost made terrible law in the Contour Spa case, where the district court gave a great deal of credence to the Tenth Circuit’s maligned Dry Creek Lodge exception (this exception allows federal courts to review tribal government action under the Indian Civil Rights Act under certain circumstances, such as the lack of a tribal court forum). Other than the actual Dry Creek Lodge case (which was “bad facts make bad law” exemplified), no other court has adopted it. And outside of the Tenth Circuit, few (if any) courts have even invoked it to see if it was worth adopting. But last week, in large part because the tribal legislature sits as the tribal court at Seminole (according to the opinion), the district court invoked Dry Creek Lodge and applied the facts of the Contour Spa contract breach claim to it. While the court did not, in the end, apply the “exception,” likely because the non-tribal party didn’t attempt to resolve the dispute in “tribal court,” the mere fact that it was willing to take the Dry Creek Lodge exception seriously is worth contemplating.

Two commercially successful tribes with no independent tribal judiciary. While nothing disastrous has occurred yet, there are commercial costs associated with this government structure. Maybe for these tribes, those costs are worth paying. But they should be taken seriously.

Now Available: “Tribal Constitutionalism” by Kirsty Gover

Here is the flyer: Tribal Constitutionalism – Flyer

From the website:

Description

Recognized tribes are increasingly prominent players in settler state governance, but in the wide-ranging debates about tribal self-governance, little has been said about tribal self-constitution. Who are the members of tribes, and how are they chosen? Tribes in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States are now obliged to adopt written constitutions as a condition of recognition, and to specify the criteria used to select members. Tribal Constitutionalism presents findings from a comparative study of nearly eight hundred current and historic tribal constitutions, most of which are not in the public domain.

Kirsty Gover examines the strategies adopted by tribes and states to deal with the new legal distinction between indigenous people (defined by settler governments) and tribal members (defined by tribal governments). She highlights the important fact that the two categories are imperfectly aligned. Many indigenous persons are not tribal members, and some tribal members are not legally indigenous. Should legal indigenous status be limited to persons enrolled in recognized tribes? What is to be done about the large and growing proportion of indigenous peoples who are not enrolled in a tribe, and do not live near their tribal territories? This book approaches these complex questions head-on.

Using tribal membership criteria as a starting point, this book provides a critical analysis of current political and sociolegal theories of tribalism and indigeneity, and draws on legal doctrine, policy, demographic data and tribal practice to provide a comparative evaluation of tribal membership governance in the western settler states.

Federal Court Claim re: Hopi Secretarial Election Stayed under Tribal Court Exhaustion Doctrine

Here are the materials in Sekayumptewa v. Salazar (D. Ariz.):

Sekayumptewa Motion for Prelimary Injunction

Hopi Motion to Dismiss

DCT Order Dismissing Hopi Defendants & Denying PI Motion

Cherokee District Court Holds 2007 Tribal Constitutional Amendment Disenrolling Freedmen VOID

Here is the order:

Nash v Cherokee Nation Registrar

The Cherokee Nation’s entry into the hereinbefore mentioned Treaty of 1866 was an agreement which, to this date, has not been modified or abrogated by any action heretofore taken either through Constitutional change or Amendment thereto and the Nation is still bound by such provisions. The Cherokee Constitutional Amendment of March 3, 2007, by virtue of the provisions of the Treaty of 1866 and subsequent actions taken in furtherance thereof, are hereby determined to be void as a matter of law.

Three Muscogee Supreme Court Justices Issue Opinion that Declares Opinion by Other Three Justices to be Void Ab Initio

Recall that in Muscogee (Creek) Nation Council v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Election Board that three Justices purported to dismiss a claim relating to tribal constitutional amendments posted here on Saturday. Now the three other sitting Justices have declared that opinion void ab initio (opinion here: Response to Opinion and Order).

 

Muscogee Nation Council Challenge to Tribal Constitutional Amendment Thrown Out (without briefing)

A year ago, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Council, along with a tribal member co-plaintiff, sued the Muscogee Election Board to challenge the adoption of several amendments to the tribal constitution, suing in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. That Court held, over a dissent, that it was improper to bring suit under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court judge recused, leaving a vacancy that was never filled by the Muscogee executive branch. The case languished, and now the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court (3-2, with one Justice not participating) has dismissed the claims for lack of standing of the plaintiffs, apparently without notice to the parties or the benefit of briefing of either party on the questions of whether it could reassert jurisdiction or on the standing of the parties.

Here are the materials:

Muscogee Council & Robert Trepp Complaint // CV 09-211 Summons & Complaint signed

Supreme Court Order Remanding to DCT

District Court Judge Recusement

Supreme Court Order Dismissing Suit // Supreme Court Order Dismissing Suit complete opinion