tribal courts – Page 164

Colville Appellate Court Dismisses Marriage Dissolution Action between Nonmembers, Reversing Lower Court

February 15, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here is the opinion in Green v. Green: Green v Green.

An excerpt:

At the Initial Hearing on January 21, 2011, Appellee argued that reading the Code as a whole, and in particular the Domestic Relations Chapter, the Tribes allows non-Indians, including descendants to file other civil family matter cases in the Tribal Court. She gave as examples the custody sections, guardianships, paternity actions, and child support. She asserts that to exclude this class of litigants, i.e. non-Indians and descendants, from dissolutions violates their rights to due process and equal protection, by denying them access to the Tribal Court.

We have long upheld the rights of litigants to equal protection and due process in our Courts, as guaranteed by our Tribal Civil Rights Act, CTC § 1-5-2(h). See, Gallaher v. Foster, 6 CCAR 48, 3 CCTR 50 (2002); R.L. and B.J. v. CCT CFS, 6 CCAR 1, 3 CCTR 39 (2001); and Finley v. CTSC, 8 CCAR 38, 4 CCTR 25 (2006). We cannot find a violation of either in the circumstances of this case. It is true the Tribes has restricted who may file for dissolutions in the Tribal Court, but such restriction does not offend due process or equal protection. The tribal legislatures have made a decision to limit the sovereignty it wishes to exercise over non-tribal members, no matter who their families are. It is up to the tribal Council to change this law, not the Courts.

The statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. Statutory construction begins by looking at the statute’s language, giving words their plain meaning, and proceeding to extrinsic interpretive aids only when the statute contains unclear or ambiguous language. CTC § 1-1-7(b) (providing that words given plain and generally understood meaning). The Constitutional responsibility of the tribal legislatures to decide what jurisdiction it wishes the Tribes to exercise is clear and unambiguous. See Constitution, id.

In the matters of domestic relations, the Tribes has restricted its subject matter jurisdiction over marriages, both in granting them and dissolving or annulling them, to only cases in which one party is a member of the Tribes. CTC § 5-1-32(b) (one of the persons getting married under the Code must be an enrolled Colville tribal member); and CTC § 5-1-101 (one of the parties to a dissolution or annulment action must be an enrolled Colville tribal member). There was no subject matter jurisdiction over the dissolution in this case. We so hold.

Conference of Chief Justices Resolution Encouraging Greater Collaboration Between State and Tribal Courts

February 10, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here: Resolution on Tribal Courts.

Passed unanimously….

Federal Court Dismisses Stalker’s Habeas Petition against Chehalis; Notes that Petition Could Have Merit, However

February 10, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Here are the materials in Youckton v. Stinson (W.D. Wash.):

Youckton Habeas Petition

Chehalis Motion to Dismiss

DCT Order Dismissing Stouckton Petition

An excerpt:

Youckton makes the following argument to support his double jeopardy claim: (1) Youckton committed domestic violence under Chehalis Tribal Code (“CTC”) § 15.03.02; (2) domestic violence is defined under CTC §15.03.01, which sets out five possible ways to commit domestic violence; (3) the only way Youckton’s case fits into the domestic violence definition is under the fifth way, stalking; (4) stalking is defined by CTC § 15.04.01, which envisions “repeated” contact; (5) Youckton’s multiple texts/phone calls should be considered “repeated” contact for purposes of sentencing, which would require sentencing him for this conduct as one unit of offense; therefore (6) sentencing him for 205 separate violations rather than as one unit of crime may constitute double jeopardy.

HCN Trial Court Asserts Jurisdiction over Contract Breach Claim with Non-Indian Company

February 2, 2011Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Very interesting case, captioned Ho-Chunk Nation v. Money Centers of America, Inc.

An excerpt:

The Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff‟s breach of contract claim as it arises under the customs and traditions of the Ho-Chunk Nation. The HCN Trial Court first dealt with contract claims in Ho-Chunk Nation v. Ross Olsen, CV 99-81 (HCN Tr. Ct., Sept. 18, 2000). This case involved a dispute over a “Purchase Agreement” for cigarettes. Id. at 1. The Court determined that “neither the HCN CONSTITUTION, nor the laws, statutes, codes, or ordinances of the Ho-Chunk Nation addressed the rights and responsibilities concomitant with the formation of a contract.” Id. at 13. Former Chief Trial Court Judge Mark Butterfield consulted the Ho-Chunk Nation Traditional Court as to whether Ho-Chunk “custom and tradition recognized agreements analogous to the modern day „contract.‟”

The Traditional Court held that “in the tradition and custom of the Ho-Chunk Nation, agreements between parties for the exchange of goods or services were recognized as binding.” Id. Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over contract claims as they arise from custom and tradition. The HCN Supreme Court has upheld and adopted this precedent, using the contract in question as the operative law for the Trial Court to apply. See e.g., Marx Advertising Agency, Inc., v. Ho-Chunk Nation, SU 04-07 (HCN S. Ct., Apr. 29, 2005) (affirming the Trial Court‟s interpretation of a contract between the Ho-Chunk Nation and its advertising agency, Marx Advertising Agency, Inc.).

Comment on Applicability of the Full Faith & Credit Act to Tribal Judgments Published in California Law Review

January 31, 2011Ann Tweedy

Craig Smith has published a comment arguing that tribal judgments should be afforded Full Faith and Credit. The cite is 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (2010). A one paragraph summary from the article is below:
“In this Comment, I attempt to answer some of those lingering questions by revisiting the claim that tribes should be afforded full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Act. By looking to the Indian Law canons, the unique precedent of Puerto Rico, and the present reality of federal-tribal relations, I conclude that the Act does mandate full faith and credit for tribes. Rather than looking to whether Congress intended to include tribes at the moment it amended the Full Faith and Credit Act to include territories and countries under the jurisdiction of the United States, I arrive at my conclusion by following the approach of the First Circuit in the context of Puerto Rico and asking: Would Congress have intended to include tribes in § 1738 if it were aware of the current status of federally recognized Indian tribes today?”