Here is “Nooksack Tribe bars lawyer for ‘306’ facing disenrollment.”
Here are the materials in Belmont v. Kelly (Nooksack Tribal Court):
Belmont v. Kelly Defendants’ Reply on Reconsideration
Belmont v. Kelly Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
Belmont v. Kelly Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion for Reconsideration
Prior proceedings in this matter here.
Belmont v Kelly Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Belmont v Kelly Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injuction
Belmont v Kelly Defendants’ Reply on Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Belmont v Kelly Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injuction
Link to decision coverage in The Bellingham Herald here.
Nooksack Tribal Court has upheld the voting rights of over 300 Nooksack members facing disenrollment over a controversial ordinance passed in 2014. While the federal review of that ordinance drags along, the Tribe requested that contested members be prevented from voting in Tribal elections.
Judge Susan Alexander wrote that the marked members were allowed to vote in 2014 when their enrollment was in doubt, but now the Tribe has unilaterally changed their minds to protect open seats in this year’s general election.
Here is the complaint in Rash v. Jeff Davis Bancshares Inc. (W.D. La.):
An excerpt:
Defendant, Jeff Davis Bancshares, Inc., d/b/a under the tradename Jeff Davis Bank and Trust Company (“Jeff Davis Bank”) accepted in 2000 and 2001 the trusteeship over substantial funds placed in trust by the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana (the “Coushatta Tribe”) for the benefit of certain minor children, to be held in trust until such then-minor beneficiaries attained the age of twenty-one (21) years. Each trust is an irrevocable trust with the Coushatta Tribe as Settlor and one child, who was a minor at the time the trust was established, as the sole income and principal beneficiary (the “Beneficiary”) of said trust, which trust bears the name of said Beneficiary (each a “Children’s Trust” and collectively the “Children’s Trusts”). At the time each Children’s Trust was established and Jeff Davis Bank accepted the trusteeship, the minor child Beneficiaries were legally members of the Coushatta Tribe,
Here:
Questions presented:
The Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, makes it a federal crime for an “Indian” to commit any one of thirteen enumerated acts in “Indian country.” In this case, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that an element of the offense in prosecutions under this statute is proof that the defendant has “Indian blood,” whether or not that blood tie is to a federally recognized tribe. The question presented is:
Whether, as construed by the Ninth Circuit, Section 1153 impermissibly discriminates on the basis of race.
Here is the unpublished opinion in In re K.P.:
An excerpt:
Michelle T., a member of the Pala Band of Mission Indians, contends that the juvenile court violated the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. and Welfare and Institutions Code section 224 et seq. by terminating her parental rights to her children, K.P. and Kristopher P., under section 366.26.
Throughout most of their dependency cases, K.P. and Kristopher were eligible for membership, or were enrolled, in the Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band). At the children’s first section 366.26 hearing, the Pala Band did not consent to the children’s adoption and the juvenile court ordered a plan of guardianship. Several years later, when the children’s cases proceeded to a second section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court learned that the Pala Band of Mission Indians had disenrolled K.P. and Kristopher, and others, on the ground that they lacked the blood quantum necessary for membership.Michelle argues that in view of a pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit challenging the validity of the Pala Band’s enrollment ordinance that resulted in the disenrollment of K.P. and Kristopher and the others, the juvenile court erred when it found that K.P. and Kristopher were not Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and declined to apply ICWA’s substantive and procedural protections at the children’s second section 366.26 hearings. Michelle also argues that enrollment in a tribe is not required to be considered an Indian child, and that the Pala Band did not provide written confirmation that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band membership.
We conclude that the juvenile court correctly ruled that the Indian tribe has the sole authority to determine its own membership and that the juvenile court must defer to the membership decisions of an Indian tribe. Under federal and state law, the Indian tribe’s membership determination is conclusive. The record shows that enrollment is a prerequisite for Pala Band membership, and that the Pala Band determined that K.P. and Kristopher are not members of its tribe. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err when it determined that K.P. and Kristopher are not Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and terminated parental rights without applying ICWA’s heightened substantive and procedural protections. We affirm.
Here is the order in Alexander v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde:
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