Here are the materials in Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. Zinke:
Briefs:
Other posts with lower court materials here.
Judge Garfield Hood Walks On
Here.
Mike Petoskey: “Michigan’s Tribal Court – State Court relations were built upon his shoulders. He stands for the proposition that one judge can pick up the phone and call another judge across jurisdictions to discuss matters of mutual concern and to collaborate.”
Jenn Weddle Guest Commentary on Lewis v. Clarke
This was the best possible result in this case (a narrow remand). Justice Sotomayor’s opinion keeps tribal employees on equal footing with federal and state employees and decides the import of indemnification provisions – really have nothing to do with Indian law and instead having everything to do with government employee indemnification law. The result seems to be a reasonable limiting principle for the Court.
The Court also left open the official immunity arguments (upon which amici focused) because those were not raised by Clarke in his motion to dismiss. The record didn’t have findings on that, but the NCAI/States/Tribes amici brief laid out the arguments as an ‘alternative theory’ as to why the Connecticut Supreme Court had been right in the result.
It is reasonable to anticipate that Clarke will now argue those matters on remand. And this case will go back to Connecticut District Court, with the Lewises now divorced and vastly undercutting their loss of consortium claims, such that the remand may well go away quickly in settlement before it even begins.
I don’t see that tribes or tribal employees lose any ground as a result of this opinion. Importantly, the official immunity arguments were not touched by the Court (per footnote 2), and I don’t see the majority opinion as saying anything negative for tribes’ role in our federalism.
***
Opinion and materials here.
Pascua Yaqui Tribe Seeks Lawyers
Central Arizona Water Conservation District Responds to Ak-Chin Suit; Seeks Federal Joinder
Tenth Circuit Upholds Interior’s Authority to Release Gray Wolves in New Mexico
Here is the opinion in New Mexico Dept. of Game and Fish v. Dept. of the Interior.
Initial Observations about Lewis v. Clarke
Opinion and materials here.
The initial impact could be very big. The holding is pretty broad, bringing in the doctrine of official immunity to the tribal context without the same grounding or context as state and federal official immunity doctrines. Moreover, there is no on, off reservation distinction. So on-rez torts might be an issue.
I anticipate dozens of plaintiffs’ lawyers packaging complaints against tribal employees on a wide variety of issues to test how wide the lower courts will interpret this decisions. Civil rights, contract breaches, trespass to property, and of course tort claims. I suppose the real question is whether any tort claims against tribal officials anywhere involve a tribe’s sovereign interest. I imagine insurance companies will be calling their tribal insured right quick, and vice versa.
Another open question is whether nonmember employees sued for tort in Indian country can be sued in state courts. I think not under precedents governing Indian country suits where a tribal defendant is present, but I’m not so sure about nonmember employees. Could be a lot of litigation about questions like these.
Long term, things probably will settle down. Tribes already insure themselves from the actions of their employees. Maybe the cost of business will go up some, but I don’t anticipate terrific impacts there. Just a lot of uncertainty for a few years until everyone’s used to the new regime.
As should be unsurprising to TT readers, this case involved a confluence of Justices that disapprove of governmental immunity (Ginsburg), the conservative wing of the Court that almost never rules in favor of tribal interests, and bad optics for tribal interests. Moreover, anyone who cares about government and commercial accountability for bad actions (as one should expect from Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg) should be happy. It just smells off that SCOTUS as an institution seems to strive to protect private commercial actors from suits but does a 180 with tribal commercial activities.
I admit to being disappointed the Court cared not at all that the Tribe had set up a tribal court process to resolve these claims. This was just straight up gamesmanship by the plaintiffs’ counsel, who might have waited on purpose to bring this claim in state court where there was a two year statute of limitations as opposed to the Mohegan one year statute. There, I said it. Oh well. All the effort that tribes made to set up tort claims ordinances might have been a significant waste of time and effort. It remains to be seen.
Unanimous SCOTUS Rules Against Tribe in Lewis v. Clarke
U.S. Supreme Court Reverses and Remands Lewis v. Clarke
Opinion here.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Indian tribes are generally entitled to immunity from suit. This Court has considered the scope of that immunity in a number of circumstances. This case presents an ordinary negligence action brought against a tribal employee in state court under state law. We granted certiorari to resolve whether an Indian tribe’s sovereign immunity bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment and for which the employees are indemnified by the tribe.
We hold that, in a suit brought against a tribal employee in his individual capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest and the tribe’s sovereign immunity is not implicated. That an employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the tort was committed is not, on its own, sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. We hold further that an indemnification provision does not extend a tribe’s sovereign immunity where it otherwise would not reach. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Previous posts, briefs, and other documents here.
Unpublished ICWA Case from Kansas Court of Appeals
There’s a lot of discussion about what the standards for removal are in an ICWA case at the first (emergency/24/48/72 hour/prelim/shelter care) hearing after a child is removed. This is the question of the Oglala Sioux v. Van Hunnik federal case. The federal regulations state that the standard is the one found in 25 U.S.C. 1922–whether the emergency placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 81 Fed. Reg. at 38872.
The Kansas Court of Appeals agrees (In re D.E.J.):
The ICWA is clear that there are two ways to remove Indian children from their homes. The first method allows removal if two factors are satisfied: (1) the State proves that it engaged in active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and the efforts were unsuccessful; and (2) the court makes a determination supported by clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. Here, the State did not prove active efforts. And the magistrate judge did not use the expert witness’ testimony to support her determination that the children were in need of care. Thus, removal was inappropriate under 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
The second method of removal under the ICWA is emergency removal. Removal is appropriate under this method if the State proves that it is necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. 25 U.S.C. § 1922. While the district court made a finding that the children faced imminent harm at the initial removal, the district court did not find that the children faced imminent harm months later at the adjudication hearing. And the State did not present evidence that the children faced imminent danger at the time of the adjudication hearing. So, removal could not be legally effectuated under 25 U.S.C. § 1922.
***The ICWA is very clear in requiring a finding of imminent physical harm or danger before allowing emergency removal. The ICWA is also clear that the traditional method of removal requires the State to engage in active efforts. The magistrate judge did not find that the State engaged in active efforts or that the children faced imminent physical harm, so she did not make sufficient findings under the ICWA to support continued removal.
(Emphasis in original)
Turtle Talk 
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