Here:
15-1215acFederalIndianLawProfessors
Petition here.
cert petition
Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse Cert Petition
Here.
Question presented:
The “disparagement clause” in § 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars the registration of a trademark that “may disparage … persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The questions presented are:
1. Whether § 2(a)’s disparagement clause violates the First Amendment.
2. Whether § 2(a)’s disparagement clause is impermissibly vague, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.
3. Whether the government’s decades-long delay between registering a trademark and cancelling the registration under § 2(a)’s disparagement clause violates due process.
The Fourth Circuit matter is still pending. This is an effort to jump ahead of the process to join another petition currently pending captioned Lee v. Tam. We posted about that Federal Circuit decision here.
Pauma Band Cross-Petition in Gaming Compact Dispute with California
Here is the cert petition in Pauma Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. State of California:
Question presented:
One of the statutory elements for establishing a prima facie case of bad faith negotiation against a state under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., is that “a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(I). In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this language according to the status quo ante, holding that an Indian tribe who sought and obtained a declaration rescinding a compact could not pursue a claim for latent bad faith negotiation against a state that induced the compact through material misrepresentations in order to increase its tax receipts (i.e., “revenue sharing”) by 2,460%. With this holding seeming to violate deep-rooted principles of retroactivity and interpretive norms for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act set forth within this Court’s precedent, the question presented is:Whether an Indian tribe can pursue a bad faith negotiation claim against a state under Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act after rescinding a compact induced by misrepresentation or other latent bad faith conduct, and thus bringing its circumstances into compliance with the statutory requirement that “a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into.”
California’s petition is here.
Cert Stage Briefs in Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie County v. Chaudhuri
Here:
Lower court materials here.
Cert Stage Briefs in Zepeda v. United States
Lezmond Mitchell v. U.S. Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
Petitioner, a Navajo, is a federal prisoner sentenced to death under the
Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599. Petitioner’s statements to the
FBI constituted the primary evidence at his capital trial. The FBI took these
statements while petitioner spent twenty-five days in tribal custody, with no right
to the assistance of counsel. In a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, petitioner presented evidence that a working arrangement between federal
and tribal authorities resulted in his arrest on a minor tribal charge, and kept him
in prolonged custody not authorized under Navajo Nation law, to deprive him of his
federal procedural rights. Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance at the guilt
and penalty phases of his trial, and the depositions of his three trial attorneys
revealed serious contradictions regarding the investigations undertaken and
defenses pursued.
An evidentiary hearing is required in a Section 2255 case “[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the cases conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). In this case, the district court denied the
Section 2255 motion without a hearing, and a divided court of appeals affirmed.
The questions presented are:1. Whether the court of appeals, in conflict with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’
grants of a hearing on similar records, erroneously concluded that petitioner
could not establish, under any circumstances, that his attorneys had
performed deficiently at the penalty phase of his trial.2. Whether the court of appeals clearly misapprehended Section 2255(b)’s
standards by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government,
weighing the evidence, and silently resolving factual disputes to conclude
that no evidentiary hearing was required.3. Whether the court of appeals erroneously concluded that reasonable jurists
could not debate whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted on
petitioner’s claim of federal-tribal collusion to deprive him of his rights to
prompt presentment and assistance of counsel.
Lower court decision.
Crow Allottees v. Dept. of Justice Cert Stage Briefs
Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York Cert Petition
Here:
Questions presented:
Petitioner’s case is the last in a long line of Indian land claim cases arising in the State of New York in which Indian tribes have been denied access to the courts by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); see also, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Stockbridge-Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014). Based on its Cayuga “laches” defense, the court of appeals summarily dismissed all claims of Petitioner for legal and equitable relief for the loss of their lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, also known as the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Recently, however, this Court affirmed the general rule in equity that courts may not override Congress’ judgment and apply laches to summarily dispose of all claims filed within a statute of limitations established by Congress, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any form of relief. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1975 (2014). In Petrella, this Court recognized that only equitable remedies may be foreclosed at the outset of litigation due to delay in commencing suit in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1977. The questions presented are:
1. Whether at the outset of litigation a court may apply “laches” to foreclose an Indian tribe from bringing its federal statutory and common-law claims, *ii including one for money damages, if brought within the statute of limitations established by Congress.
2. Whether a court violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses when it retroactively applies a new, judicially-formulated rule to dismiss an Indian tribe’s viable claims ab initio, thereby extinguishing established property rights.
Lower court materials here.
California v. Pauma Band Cert Petition
Here is the petition in California v. Pauma Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pauma and Yuima Reservation:
Question presented:
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), this Court held that a waiver of state sovereign immunity must be “stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Id. at 673 (alteration omitted). This case concerns a gaming compact between the State of California and the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma and Yuima Reservation. Both parties waived their sovereign immunity from suits arising under the compact, but only to the extent that “[n]either side makes any claim for monetary damages (that is, only injunctive, specific performance, including enforcement of a provision of this Compact requiring payment of money to one or another of the parties, or declaratory relief is sought) . . . .” App. 28a. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that this limited waiver, which also appears in gaming compacts between California and 57 other tribes, waived the State’s immunity with respect to an award of $36.2 million in restitution.
The question presented is: Whether, under Edelman, the language of the limited waiver—which expressly excludes claims for “monetary damages” and references only injunctive relief, specific performance, and declaratory relief— waived the State’s sovereign immunity with respect to the district court’s monetary award.
United South and Eastern Tribes Amicus Brief in Support of the Tribal Petitioners against NLRB
Here is the USET brief in Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. NLRB:
USET Amicus in Support of Tribal Petitions
This one is substantially the same as USET’s brief in the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government v. NLRB case.
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