Here:
Here are the materials in Grand Canyon Skywalk Development LLC v. Hualapai Indian Tribe of Arizona (D. Ariz.):
DCT Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration
Amended Complaint Exhibit Set 1
Amended Complaint Exhibit Set 2
Greenberg Traurig Opposition to Motion to Disqualify
Hualapai Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify
Hualapai Reply in Support of MTD
From the opinion:
Defendants Hualapai Indian Tribe and seven named members of the Hualapai Tribal Council have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC’s (GCSD) first amended complaint to compel arbitration. Doc. 19; see Doc. 18. The motion has been fully briefed. Docs. 21, 29. Defendants also have filed a motion to disqualify Greenberg Traurig (GT) as counsel for GCSD and for related orders protecting theTribe’s confidential information. Doc. 25. GT has filed a response in opposition which GCSD joined. Docs. 43, 37. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss GCSD’s first amended complaint, and deny Defendant’s motion to disqualify GCSD’s counsel and for related orders.
Prior post on this specific suit is here.
Here is the motion in State of Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation (D. Ariz.):
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-348 reads:
A. In addition to any costs that are awarded as prescribed by statute, a court shall award fees and other expenses to any party other than this state or a city, town or county that prevails by an adjudication on the merits in any of the following:
1. A civil action brought by the state or a city, town or county against the party.
Here are the materials in United States v. Loera (D. Ariz.):
DCT Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
Loera Motion to Dismiss — Indian Status
An excerpt:
Defendant’s motion and the government’s response raise matters for the Court’s consideration which other courts have left for another day. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 934–35 (9th Cir.2005). The resolution of the issues requires the Court to journey into the world of “Indian Law” which has been described as a “complex patchwork of federal, state and tribal law, which is better explained by history than by logic.” United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted). Indian law has also been described as “schizophrenic”: “Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And the confusion continues to inform federal Indian law …” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 1644–45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Another:
This case presents a unique factual and jurisdictional conundrum apparently of first impression. Notwithstanding the 1990 amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe has declined to prosecute a defendant who may be an “Indian” and the Tribe’s decision is apparently based solely on the defendant’s lack of tribal membership, i.e., the Tribal Court has determined it does not have jurisdiction under its laws.
And finally:
Since its first enactment in 1817 (3 Stat. 383), additions added in 1854 (10 Stat. 270), sequent codification in 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and the enactment and amendment of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the language of section 1152 has never been amended, yet the government has entered into nine separate treaties with thirteen separate and distinct tribes obligating the federal government to remove all “bad men” from those tribes’ lands and prosecute them in federal courts when requested by the Tribe, exactly what occurred in this matter. In order to give validity to those treaties, as the Court is obligated to do, and which Congress has not repealed, and even though the treaties are with tribes other than the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, the use of the term “Indian” in section 1152 must, as Judge Sneed concluded, mean an Indian who is a tribal member. As such, should this Court have concluded Defendant was an “Indian” section 1152 would not grant him immunity from federal prosecution as he is not a tribal member.
Here are the materials in State of Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation (D. Ariz.):
An excerpt:
For reasons explained below, the Court concludes that §§ 201(1) and 201(2) cannot be used by Plaintiffs to establish an enforceable oral agreement that the Nation would not open a casino in the Phoenix metropolitan area. The Court has already held that the Compact between the State and the Nation includes no such agreement, and that even Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence does not make the Compact’s terms reasonably susceptible to such a reading. Doc. 216. The Court now concludes that the Compact is a fully integrated written agreement under Chapter 9 of the Restatement, and that such an agreement between the parties forecloses any separate oral agreement. As a result, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the Nation on Plaintiffs’ § 201(2) claim and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration on the § 201(1) claim.
This concludes the trial court proceedings, mostly concluded in the court’s order granting summary judgment on most claims we posted about here.
In January of 2012, Secretary Salazar announced that he was withdrawing lands near the Grand Canyon. Specifically, the withdrawal prohibits new mining claims and development on old claims that lack “valid existing rights.”
Recently, uranium companies and others have challenged the withdrawal. A portion of Yount’s Second Amended Complaint:
SIXTH CLAIM
The Secretary of the Interior’s rationale for a withdrawal as stated in his Record of Decision is substantially based on granting an unconstitutional preference for the religious belief of Native Americans proximate to the NAPWA. By deferring to Native American religious and cultural beliefs this appears to convey a message of government endorsement of their religious beliefs contrary to established law.
A portion of Quaterra Alaska, Inc.’s Amended Complaint:
Federal law does not recognize the right to preclude land uses
based solely on religious or cultural sensibilities. Sensibilities or feelings that are separate from a site protected under the NHPA or religious practice protected by RLUIPA and enjoy no legal protection. A withdrawal based on protecting sensibilities independent of legally protected sites and religious practices is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to
law. It is based on irrelevant factors not recognized in law and exceeds the Secretary’s authority.
Here is yesterday’s order in Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation (D. Ariz.):
An excerpt:
Defendant Tohono O’odham Nation (the “Nation”) plans to construct and operate a major casino on unincorporated land within the outer boundaries of the City of Glendale, Arizona, which is in the greater Phoenix metropolitan area. The State of Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community, and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community (collectively “Plaintiffs”) argue that the proposed casino violates the 2002 Gaming Compact between the State of Arizona and the Nation (“the Compact”), and ask the Court to enjoin the casino’s construction. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Court heard oral arguments on April 9, 2013. For reasons explained below, the Court will grant the Nation’s motion for summary judgment on all but one of Plaintiffs’ claims, and will require additional briefing on the remaining claim.
Briefs are here.
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