The Exxon Case, Indian Country, and Maritime Law

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Exxon case. The case stems back to one of the worst ecological events in the last few decades, the oil spill resulting from the supertanker Exxon Valdez’s running aground. Exxon is appealing a $2.5 billion punitive damages award. Exxon thought the Court was ripe to reverse large punitive damage awards because of recent cases striking them down in constitutional grounds, but the Court is not going to review the punitive damages on those grounds. Instead, the Court will be looking at Exxon’s maritime law-related claims.

What is interesting in that choice (other than the obvious interest that Alaskan Native and Pacific NW tribes have in the direct impact of the event) is that maritime or admiralty law is a uniquely federal field of law that has very little constitutional grounding. In other words, it is practically an all-federal common law field — just like federal Indian law.

And, as we know from federal Indian law, the Court is not constrained by constitutional and statutory language when applying federal Indian law. My guess is that the Court will strike down the punitive damage award, or else they would have let this award stand.

Chief Justice Roberts & Federal Indian Law

Long before John G. Roberts, C.J. became life-tenured, he practiced. And he worked on at least three Indian law-related cases: Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, Rice v. Cayetano, and (briefly) Roberts v. United States. Also, as part of President Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel, he vetted several Acts of Congress related to Indian tribes.

Roberts won Venetie, representing the State of Alaska. He lost Rice, representing the State of Hawaii. And the Court denied his petition for cert on behalf of Hollis Roberts (no relation, one presumes) in Roberts v. U.S.

The now semi-notorious brief Roberts filed in Alaska v. Venetie is here: Venetie Petr Brief. It is notorious for the reversal of the “deadliest enemies” language in United States v. Kagama. The Kagama Court wrote that states and state citizens were the deadliest enemies of Indians and Indian tribes, but the Venetie brief (for no real good reason) altered the quote to mean that Indians and Indian tribes were the deadliest enemies of states and state citizens. Here’s my own paper on the archaic notion that states and tribes are “deadliest enemies.”

Hawaii’s brief in Rice v. Cayetano is here: Rice Resp Brief

Roberts’ cert petition in Roberts v. US is here: Roberts v. United States Cert Petn. This one is especially important since Roberts (and Roberts) brought a challenge to Section 465, the fee to trust statute. There is ongoing litigation involving Section 465 that may soon be appealed to the Supreme Court. To some extent, the legal challenge to Section 465 has morphed since the 1999 cert petition, but it is significant that Roberts, C.J. is aware of this kind of case.

Finally, we include the documents Roberts wrote as a member of the OLC. These came out during his Senate confirmation process.

Kickapoo OLC Memo

Reagan Indian Policy OLC Memo

Tribal Tax Status Act OLC Memo

Utah Paiute Act OLC Memo

Zuni OLC Memo

Shoalwater Bay OLC Memo

Las Vegas Paiute OLC Memo

I guess what these memos demonstrate is that young Roberts was a serious conservative and a funny guy (unless you were the subject of the humor).

Patrice Kunesh on ICWA: “Borders Beyond Borders”

Patrice Kunesh (South Dakota Law) has posted “Borders Beyond Borders: Protecting Essential Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act” on her BEPRESS Selected Works site.

Patrice presented her paper at the 3rd Annual Indigenous Law Conference, “Facing the Future: The Indian Child Welfare Act at 30.”

Abstract:

2008 is the thirty year anniversary of the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), one of the most dynamic pieces of legislation in federal Indian affairs that irrevocably changed the jurisdictional prerogatives of states and tribes. ICWA’s tribal wardship provision is remarkably constructive because it vests tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children who are wards of the tribal court–irrespective of the child’s domicile. This jurisdictional scheme, a rough mixture of territorial and personal criteria, defies the normative notions of state court jurisdiction over family relations. And the cross-hatching of state and tribal interests in off-reservation child welfare matters has engendered serious tension and questions about the precise contours of tribal sovereignty and the boundary line between state and tribal power.

This article investigates the transformation point between tribal and state jurisdiction over Indian child welfare matters. From an examination of the historical development of tribal wardship decisions and ICWA’s legislative history, material unexamined in this context in other scholarship, I posit that tribes, as unique political entities in our federal system of government, possess inherent attributes of sovereignty to regulate their internal social relations. ICWA is premised on the dual nature of tribal sovereignty, and allows, if not encourages, tribes to redefine their relationship to state governments by recognizing that the power to adjudicate internal matters, including child custody matters, derives from a source independent of the land. Thus, there are no real boundaries to protecting these essential tribal relations where the exercise of tribal authority is vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination.

Talk Announcement: “Factbound and Splitless: The Impact of the Certiorari Process on Federal Indian Law” @ UM Law School

Your humble blogger will be giving a talk at the University of Michigan Law School (co-sponsored, I understand, by the U-M NALSA and the Michigan Journal of Race & Law) on November 12, 2007 at 12:20 PM in Room 150 of Hutchins Hall.

My talk will be called, “Factbound and Splitless: The Impact of the Certiorari Process on Federal Indian Law.”

Here’s the blurb I gave the students on this talk:

I have reviewed each of the 144 Indian law-related cert petitions filed in the Supreme Court from the 1986 to 1993 Terms. Tribal interests began losing 75 percent of their cases in the Court starting in 1987, a significantly worse win rate than even convicted criminal petitioners. I argue that the critical factors the Court looks for in deciding whether to grant cert — “circuit splits,” cases of national “importance,” and cases that are not “factbound” — create structural (and yet wholly discretionary) barriers to the vindication of tribal interests in Supreme Court adjudication.

If you want to read the documents I’ve read in this study, check out the Digital Archive of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun. And bring your docket numbers, because that’s how it’s organized.

Kevin Washburn: A Legal History of Bryan v. Itasca County

Kevin Washburn has posted his paper, “The Legacy of Bryan v. Itasca County: How a $147 County Notice Helped Bring Tribes $200 Billion in Gaming Revenue.

From the abstract:

The Supreme Court’s landmark 1976 decision in Bryan v. Itasca County is known within Indian law academia for the story that Professors Phil Frickey and Bill Eskridge tell about the case: it reflects a dynamic and pragmatic interpretation of a termination-era statute to limit Congressional termination’s harmful legacy during a more enlightened era of tribal self-determination. What is less well-appreciated about the case is that it provided the legal bedrock on which the Indian gaming industry was built. This article explores the genesis of the litigation and traces its path, describing how it came to produce a unanimous Supreme Court opinion of surprising breadth. It also demonstrates that the right to engage in gaming, which ultimately has produced vast tribal economic development and even riches for some tribes, had its roots as much in Indian poverty as in Indian sovereignty.

Frank Pommersheim’s “Present Moment: A Zen Reflection on Indian Law Doctrine”

Frank Pommersheim will be speaking at our conference, which begins tomorrow night.

Frank Pommersheim

Here is a snippet of his work, from UCLA’s Indigenous Peoples’ Journal of Law, Culture & Resistance.

MSU Student Paper: “Conducting Embryonic Stem Cell Research on Tribal Lands in Michigan” by Dr. Jake Allen

An MSU 3L, Jake Allen, a member of the Nez Perce Tribe and a surgeon, has recently published this paper in the Michigan State Journal of Medicine & Law. From the paper:

A unique relationship has developed between the Native peoples and the United States government, which in some ways resembles the relationship between the States and the federal government.Historically, however, the term “domestic dependent nation” has been applied to the sovereignty status of a tribe. Exclusive federal authority and tribal sovereignty trump many laws of the particular state in which the tribal lands are located. Gaming is a well known example, but to what extent are other state laws inapplicable to Indian land located within the boundaries of a particular state? Michigan has civil and criminal statutes prohibiting the use of live or dead embryos and human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to produce a human embryo. In the opinion of Michigan State Representative Andy Meisner, these statutes severely limit stem cell research, negating the potential medical benefits that may be derived from such research, and are among the most restrictive in the nation. There is enough concern in promoting stem cell research in Michigan, that a newly formed group called Michigan Citizens for Stem Cell Research & Cures, has launched a stem cell public education project. On the other end of the spectrum, some states are actively promoting and funding stem cell research. Despite the laws in Michigan inhibiting stem cell research, could research that is prohibited by state law be conducted on Indian land should the Indian governing bodies so desire? The answer depends on many factors, but none more important than Indian tribal sovereignty.

For example, state laws restricting gaming are unenforceable on Indian land, at the discretion of the tribal government. Michigan has some of the most restrictive laws concerning stem cell research, when compared to most other states. The question of whether this type of research could be done on Indian lands is compelling because there are medical diseases which affect the native populations disproportionately compared to Caucasian populations, and for which stem cell research shows great promise to cure or improve the treatment. One of the most devastating diseases that has disproportionate affects on Native Americans is diabetes, a disease that has been hailed as having great potential to be cured with stem cell research. Additionally, the economic benefit from a large research center on Indian lands would greatly aid the Native population financially. Third, there is the consideration of keeping top Michigan scientists in the field from moving (along with their research dollars, prestige, and programs for budding Michigan scientists) to other states, such as California, that allow, encourage, and fund embryonic stem cell research.

This article provides a background for the legal considerations that play a part in debates concerning embryonic stem cell research and therapeutic cloning as it affects this research being performed on Indian lands. This article first examines the importance of stem cell research (Part I), Indian sovereignty (Part II), the Michigan statutes prohibiting such research (Part III), the status of international, federal, and other state laws (Part IV), the legal status of an embryo (Part V), and discusses the ethics of embryonic stem cell (Part VI). In Part VII, the issue of whether embryonic stem cell research and cloning can be done in Indian lands is discussed. This article argues that under most scenarios, embryonic stem cell research, and probably therapeutic cloning, could be performed on Indian reservations in Michigan despite the state statutes prohibiting such research.

WSJ Article on Civil Suits in Tribal Courts

At this link is an article about a lawsuit filed against the Desert Diamond Casino in Tucson, Arizona. The non-Indian plaintiffs originally sued in state court, but the Tohono O’odham Nation hadn’t waived its immunity for state court cases — but it had in tribal court. The tribal court case is ongoing.

As is typical for recent national news reports featuring Indian Country, the article is overwhelmingly unfavorable to Indian Country — and deeply unfair, if not wholly biased. This is unfortunate. In large part, the WSJ’s reporting is excellent (it’s editorial page is what I usually find myself shuddering over). [Thanks to Trent Crable for pointing the article out to me.]

Here are some excerpts and my responses:

But when Mr. Filer went to sue the casino in state court in Tucson, he quickly learned that the textbook on civil litigation doesn’t apply on tribal land, or to tribal entities. Under federal law, tribes are considered sovereign nations and are immune from most lawsuits. The Desert Diamond Casino where the driver, Douglas Levitski, got drunk, is on the San Miguel Reservation of the Tohono O’odham nation.

So even though the accident itself involved no tribal members and took place off the reservation, Mr. Filer’s state civil suit seeking $2 million in damages from the tribal-owned casino was rejected. Arizona’s appeals court upheld the decision. “This conclusion, we hasten to add, may be unsatisfactory to some and arguably divorced from the realities of the modern world,” wrote Judge John Pelander in the opinion.

Sovereign immunity shouldn’t be such a surprise to anyone — especially a lawyer working out of Tucson, Arizona who’s failure to seek tribal remedies in the first instance borders on malpractice, in my view. Both the States and the Federal Government have been dodging suits from individuals and entities (including Indian tribes) for the entire history of American law — the first Amendment to the Constitution codified state sovereign immunity, for example. Some states never waived immunity for well over 150 years. And keep in mind, as the article writer admits later, the T.O. Nation waived its immunity in tribal court. Not only is there a waiver here, but there is a fundamental flaw in the writer’s logic. Why would the State of Arizona, for example, agree to be sued in New Mexico or California courts? Or why would the US agree to be sued in Canada?

 Mr. Filer moved his claim to tribal court and is waiting for a hearing. But he and his lawyer are nervous about the outcome, even though their case appears to be strong.

 I’m no tort lawyer, but I’m suspicious. It is extremely difficult to prove as a matter of fact that the dramshop owner was liable under state law. And I am all but certain that the business people operating the Desert Diamond Casino would be more forthcoming with a settlement if the case really was “strong.” And doesn’t the WSJ’s editors usually complain about the explosion of tort claims in state courts? Ironic.

 More than a century’s worth of conflicting federal laws and judicial precedents have left the tribal legal system in tatters. Tribal authorities pursuing criminal cases face tough restrictions, have little say in meting out sentences and have virtually no authority in prosecuting non-Indians who commit crimes on reservations.

I don’t see the relevance of the Supreme Court ruling eliminating tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians whatsoever. This is a civil case. The notion that tribal courts are in “tatters” because they don’t have criminal jurisdiction over some people is a classic non sequitur. Finally, this is a broad generalization that doesn’t stand up to reality. I doubt the T.O. tribal courts are in tatters. And there are stories cropping in places like Mashantucket Pequot where non-Indians and their lawyers would rather sue each other  over non-tribal matters in tribal courts — because they’re faster and more efficient.

Of the nation’s 560 federally recognized tribes, only 275 have court systems. If the case can even be heard, tribes often sharply limit potential damages. And tribes often have close links to businesses that might be sued — especially casinos. Such connections would be considered a conflict of interest in a regular U.S. court.

“You try the case in front of a judge who is picked by the tribe,” says Stephen Embry, a Connecticut Attorney and past president of the Workers Injury and Law Advocacy Group. “What you normally would like to have is a judge who is not being paid by the guy you’re suing,” he says. Federal and state judges who hear cases against the government are also government employees, but the conflicts tend to be less glaring than in the small tribal communities.

There is some weight to this argument, but again it depends heavily on broad generalizations. Is there a conflict at T.O.? We don’t know from this article. Most, if not all, tribes and tribal courts have conflict of interest rules. And there’s no comparison to “regular U.S. court[s]” — just see Cheney v. District Court and Justice Scalia’s incredibly arrogant refusal to recuse himself after going duck hunting with the Veep. Or check out Toobin and Greenberg’s recent books on the Supreme Court, how close-knit the people are who decide who becomes a Supreme Court Justice, argues Supreme Court cases, and then eventually become S. Ct. Justices and federal judges.

“The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem”

I just accepted an offer from the Hastings Law Journal to publish my new paper, “The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem.” Here’s the abstract:

This year, while accepting the “Rule of Law” award from the American Bar Association, Justice Breyer proclaimed that our constitutional system “floats on a sea of public acceptance.” At that time, Breyer’s statements were meant to highlight his expectation that the Court will decide its cases following the “rule of law.”

However, Breyer’s statement, while demonstrative of his faith in the rule of law, does not always ring true. In fact, as I argue, the Supreme Court often decides its cases by ignoring, rather than following, the rule of law. This problem is particularly acute in the body of federal Indian law – which has cast a disastrous shadow on tribal interests. Tribes have lost about three-quarters of their cases before the Supreme Court since 1988. Yet, curiously, prior to 1988, tribal interests won slightly more than half of their cases. What changed?

In this Article, I attempt to answer this question. I will show that the Court identifies important, unrelated constitutional concerns that arise often in Indian law cases – issues with which they and their clerks are familiar – and then decides those matters. Only afterward, and mostly as an afterthought, does the Court then turn to the federal Indian law questions. The Court’s federal Indian law analysis takes a secondary and often inferior role.

The result of this obfuscation is an unrelenting assault on tribal interests before the Court – and the rule of law more generally. In this Article, I offer the first in-depth empirical assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent Indian law decisions and argue in favor of a sweeping change in the means of analyzing Indian law. Instead of focusing on the Indian law questions, this Article shows how major Indian law cases were decided on other grounds to significant tribal disadvantage. Analyzing federal Indian law in this manner makes transparent the Court’s frightening disrespect for the rule of law.

Section 8(a) Business Development Program Consultation Meeting in AK

Indianz.com reports that the SBA has published a notice in the Federal Register on a tribal consultation meeting. Here’s the summary:

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) announces that it is holding a tribal consultation meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska on the topic of the 8(a) Business Development (BD) program regulations. Testimony presented at this tribal consultation meeting will become part of the administrative record for SBA’s consideration when the Agency deliberates on approaches to changes in the regulations pertaining to the 8(a) BD program.

The Indigenous Law & Policy Center recently published a white paper on the importance and linkage of the Section 8(a) BD program to the federal trust responsibility. The paper can be downloaded here as well.