Ninth Circuit Rejects Alaska’s Effort to Condemn Alaska Native Allotments

Here are the materials in State of Alaska v. United States:

CA9 Opinion

An excerpt:

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of quiet title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and vacated the dismissal of a condemnation claim in a case involving a land dispute between the State of Alaska and two Alaska Natives, Agnes and Anne Purdy, concerning ownership of rights-of-way for four public trails that cross the Purdys’ land.

The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question under the Alaska Native Allotment Act through allotments by the federal government. The State of Alaska contended that the allotments were subject to rights-of-way for four trails. Federal statute R.S. 2477, repealed in 1976, granted rights of way over public lands; it was self-executing; acceptance of a grant was determined by state law; and under Alaska law an R.S. 2477 grant could be accepted through public use.

Addressing the State of Alaska’s Quiet Title Act claim, the panel held that the State of Alaska’s quiet title claim was barred. The panel held that the United States was a necessary party to the claim because it held an interest in the Purdys’ allotments (by virtue of the restraint on alienation), and recognition of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way would impair the United States’ interest. The panel further held that the United States had not waived its immunity from suit pursuant to the Quiet Title Act’s Indian lands exception, which preserves the United States’ immunity from suit when the United States claims an interest based on that property’s status as trust or restricted Indian lands.

The panel concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed the State of Alaska’s claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as the quiet title claim.

Addressing the State of Alaska’s condemnation claim against the Purdys and the United States under 25 U.S.C. § 357, the panel held that although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s condemnation claim, the claim could not proceed as pleaded. The panel held that the United States was an indispensable party to the claim. The panel further held that the district court erred in dismissing the claim on the ground that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity because Congress waived the government’s immunity with respect to such claims. The panel also held that the United States’ express consent to the condemnation claim was not required. The panel concluded that the State improperly pleaded its condemnation claim, and remanded so that the State may be given an opportunity to amend the claim if it so chooses.

Opening Brief

Purdy Brief

Tanana Chiefs Conference Brief

US Brief

Reply

 

Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Sand Creek Massacre Trust Claims

Here is the opinion in Flute v. United States.

An excerpt:

This case arises out of an ignominious event in the history of this Nation. In 1864, the United States Army conducted an unprovoked attack on a group of unarmed Indians, who had relocated to an area next to the Sand Creek River in the Territory of Colorado at the direction and under the protection of the Territorial Governor. When what has become known as the Sand Creek Massacre was over, most of the Indians were dead, including many women and children. After an investigation, the United States publicly acknowledged its role in the tragedy and agreed to pay reparations to certain survivors of the massacre. But those reparations were never paid.

Plaintiffs are descendants of the victims of the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre and bring this action for an accounting of the amounts they allege the U.S. government holds in trust for payment of reparations to their ancestors. Because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of such for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Briefs here.

D.C. Circuit Briefs in Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell

Here:

Tribe Opening Brief

US Answer Brief

Reply

Lower court briefs here.

SCOTUS Holds FTCA’s Time Bars are Subject to Equitable Tolling

Here is the opinion in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong. An excerpt:

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless it is presented to the “appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues” and then brought to federal court “within six months” after the agency acts on the claim. 28 U. S. C. §2401(b). In each of the two cases we resolve here, the claimant missed one of those deadlines, but requested equitable tolling on the ground that she had a good reason for filing late. The Government responded that §2401(b)’s time limits are not subject to tolling because they are jurisdictional restrictions. Today, we reject the Government’s argument and conclude that courts may toll both of the FTCA’s limitations periods.

Federal Court Rejects Mackinac Tribe’s Bid for Federal Recognition

Here is the order in Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell (D. D.C.):

19 DCT Order

Briefs are here.

Tenth Circuit Briefs in Flute v. United States — Sand Creek Massacre Trust Accounting Claims

Here:

Flute Opening Brief

US Answer Brief

Flute Reply Brief

Lower court materials here.

Partially Split Ninth Circuit Panel Adopts New Two-Part Test to Determing Federal FTCA Liability for Tribal Employee Actions under Self-Determination Compacts

Here are the materials in Shirk v. United States:

Opening Brief

U.S. Answer Brief

Reply brief

Shirk v. USA (9th 2014)

From the court’s syllabus:

The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a Federal Tort Claims Act action brought against the United States after Jennifer Rose was injured in a traffic accident following a police pursuit involving two tribal police officers employed by the Gila River Indian Community.

Loren Shirk, along with his wife, Jennifer Rose, alleged negligence by the tribal officers and loss of consortium under the FTCA. Congress extended the FTCA’s waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity to claims resulting from the performance of functions authorized by the Indian Self- Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, commonly referred to as § 314.

To decide whether the tribal officers’ conduct was covered by § 314, thereby subjecting the United States to potential tort liability, the panel held as an issue of first impression, that it was first necessary to set out the analysis that courts should undertake when confronted with a § 314 claim where the alleged tortfeasors are employees of a tribe, tribal organization, or Indian contractor. The panel held at the first step of the § 314 inquiry, courts must determine whether the alleged activity is, in fact, encompassed by the relevant federal contract or agreement. At the second step, courts must decide whether the allegedly tortious action fell within the scope of the tortfeasor’s employment under state law. The panel held that if both of these prongs were met, the employee’s actions were covered by the FTCA; but a plaintiff’s failure at either step was sufficient to defeat subject matter jurisdiction. The panel remanded so that the parties could fully brief the issue and the district court could conduct a new analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction using this two-step framework.

Second Circuit Judge Sack concurred, and wrote only to register his doubts as to one of the district court’s conclusions which the panel’s opinion properly did not reach. If the panel were squarely presented with the issue, Judge Sack would conclude that the relevant agreements between the federal government and the tribe authorized the enforcement of Arizona state law by tribal police officers.

Judge Bea concurred in part, and dissented in part. Judge Bea agreed with the new two-part test articulated by the majority opinion, but he would not remand because there are no issues of fact that require remand.

Federal Court Dismisses Sand Creek Massacre Trust Accounting Claims

Here is the order in Flute v. United States (D. Colo.):

36 DCT Order

An excerpt:

In the absence of an enforceable trust, 25 U.S.C. §§ 162a(d) and 4044 do not impose a legally required duty necessary to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 63–64. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ claims do not concern “losses to or mismanagement of trust funds” and thus do not fall within the 2009 DOI Appropriations Act. See Pub.L. No. 111–88, 123 Stat. at 2922. Finding that the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for this suit, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims and must dismiss them without prejudice. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) ( “[W]here the district court dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction … the dismissal must be without prejudice.”).

Briefs here. Other materials here.

 

Briefs in Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell (Complaint for Federal Recognition)

Here:

7-1 US Motion to Dismiss

10 Tribe Opposition

12 US Reply

Complaint is here.

Federal Court Rules Tribal Officers Not Immune; Tort Claims May Proceed against Tribal Police (Black v. US)

This is the third ruling in Black v. United States (W.D. Wash.):

53 Joint Tribal Motion to Dismiss

69 Black Response

77 Joint Tribal Reply

83 DCT Order

Claims against the tribes are dismissed. The court dismissed Kitsap County here. And the US here.