#1 Indian Child Welfare Act v. #9 Indian country voting rights
The litigation and public policy juggernaut that is ICWA defeated federal Indian preemption(the previous generation’s juggernaut) with 64 percent of the vote. Indian country voting rights prevailed over Rule 19 with 62 percent of the vote. Where my Rule 19 peeps?
This one is an old-fashioned clash of civil rights.
#4 Indian gaming v. #5 Intra-tribal disputes
Indian gaming beat out internet gaming, barely, with only 90 percent of the vote. In a battle of bad news, intra-tribal disputes knocked out human trafficking with 2/3 of the vote.
Great match-up here. Can we have one without the other? Well, looking back at the ICRA cases of the 1970s, I’d say we don’t need much to generate intra-tribal disputes, heh heh.
#2 Tribal sovereign immunity v. #7 American Indian education
Sovereign immunity beat out alternative energy with 92 percent of the vote. Did it use a sword or a shield? Education, we all need, won with 63 percent; climate change, we don’t need it, was a no-show.
Which came first, immunity or the knowledge that sovereigns are immune? Bill Wood knows, I bet.
#3 VAWA v. #6 Tribal court exhaustion
VAWA took three-quarters of the vote from criminal sentencing. Can’t sentence without convicting first, right?Tribal court exhaustion won almost as easily, with 72 percent of the vote over the new general welfare legislation. Ironically, tribal court exhaustion is all about adjudicating even without jurisdiction. Now I’m confused.
You might see a lot of Michigan here (here’s another), and that’s thanks to MIFPA.
v.
#16 Federal Indian law preemption
The Chehalis/Great Wolf Lodge matter from 2013 helped bring federal Indian law preemption back from the dead. The State of Washington was still feeling the consequences this year. The real impact may be in the BIA leasing regulations.
# 8 Rule 19
My favorite FRCP. Lots of Rule 19 action again this year, including a close call at the Supreme Court, which denied cert in the Buena Vista matter. Other cases involved Jamul Indian Village, payday lending cases, and Skokomish.
Marcia Coyle reported on what happened after the Supreme Court held that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the twins. Here is that article:
This summer the Justice Department intervened for the first time in its history in a federal district court case in South Dakota, concluding that the state has violated the rights of Native American parents.
Two of the state’s largest tribes argued that the state has removed children in hearings where parents were rarely allowed to speak and often lasted less than 60 seconds. The children were then placed indefinitely in largely white foster homes.
Stephen Pevar, a senior staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union, which brought the suit along with the Oglala Sioux and Rosebud Sioux tribes, called the hearings “kangaroo courts.”
“There was nothing — nothing — that any of the parents did or could have done,” Pevar said. “It was a predetermined outcome in every one of these cases.”
The superior court awarded Wheeler primary physical custody. Neither Wheeler nor Myre has appealed the superior court’s decision, but the tribal council appeals, arguing that the superior court lacked modification jurisdiction. The narrow question before us in this appeal is thus whether the tribal council has standing to appeal the superior court’s modification decision in light of the parents’ election not to appeal that decision. We conclude that under this circumstance, the tribal council does not have standing, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.
Father is correct that the Act requires that a party seeking to terminate the parental rights of a child that may be Native American must follow specific procedures for notifying the child’s potential tribe about a termination-of-parental-rights hearing. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012). Though the best way for a court to ensure compliance with the Act is for the State to file the notices it has sent and the return receipts it has received with the district court before a termination hearing, the State’s failure to do so here doesn’t require reversal. The State filed the required notice and receipts after the hearing in this case, and those filings prove that the district court complied with the Act.
Loa Porter (Department of Children and Families, State of Wisconsin), Patina Park Zink, Angela R. Gebhardt (University of Nebraska at Lincoln – Center on Children, Families, and the Law), Mark Ells (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), and Michelle I. Graef, Ph.D. (University of Nebraska at Lincoln – Center on Children, Families, and the Law) have posted “Best Outcomes for Indian Children” on SSRN. It was previously published in Child Welfare.
Here is the abstract:
The Wisconsin Department of Children and Families and the Midwest Child Welfare Implementation Center are collaborating with Wisconsin’s tribes and county child welfare agencies to improve outcomes for Indian children by systemically implementing the Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). This groundbreaking collaboration will increase practitioners’ understanding of the requirements of WICWA and the need for those requirements, enhance communication and coordination between all stakeholders responsible for the welfare of Indian children in Wisconsin; it is designed to effect the systemic integration of the philosophical underpinnings of WICWA.
The dissenters point out that 14 (now 15) state courts have addressed whether to use the best interests of the child analysis:
Most states that have confronted the issue we face today have held that a “best interests” consideration is inappropriate under the “good cause” analysis in Section 1911(b). Eight states have conclusively adopted this position, including Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Texas.2Link to the text of the note People ex rel. J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Child of: R.L.Z. and R.G.L, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1015, at *14-16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished); C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); In re Interest of Zylena R. v. Elise M., 825 N.W.2d 173, 184-86 (Neb. 2012) (overruling its decision to allow a “best interests” consideration in In re Interest of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992)); In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); In re Interest of A.B. v. K.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 633-34 (N.D. 2003); Yavapai-Apache Tribe, 906 S.W.2d at 169-71.
Only a minority of six states allow a “best interests” consideration in the Section 1911(b) “good cause” analysis, including Arizona, California, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.3Link to the text of the note In re Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1355-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 308 (Ind. 1988); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Mont. 1990); Carney v. Moore (In re N.L.), 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988); In re Guardianship of J.C.D., 686 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D. 2004).
Four other state courts have acknowledged the issue, but avoided resolving it because the issue was not properly before the court. Ex parte C.L.J., 946 So.2d 880, 893-94 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006); In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 854 n.24 (Alaska 2001); In re J.L.A., 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at *2-6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished); In re Guardianship of J.O., 743 A.2d 341, 348-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
Fodder for a law student note….
Kate posted the lower appellate court decision here.
Turtle Talk 
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