Tribal Immunity and IGRA’s Legislative History

Curious about the State of Michigan’s argument that Congress did not believe Indian tribes possessed immunity outside of Indian country when it enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, I checked out the legislative history for support either way. Below are just the hearings to which I have access.

There is a fair amount of discussion about tribal immunities from state regulation and taxation, and most interestingly about whether tribal immunity cloaks nonmember gaming management companies and consultants.

I don’t see any discussion of off-reservation gaming at all, which the State suggests, I suppose, would be normal if Congress was assuming something about immunity one way or the other.

In any event, enjoy the legislative history.

June 25, 1987 hearing (PDF)

Nothing here, except in a newspaper article reference to an inter-tribal dispute between the Otoes and the Seminoles that couldn’t be settled in the courts “because sovereign immunity would prevent the tribes from successfully suing one another.” Page 184.

June 17, 1986 hearing (PDF)

Omaha Tribe opposes any provision that would waive tribal immunity; not specific as to language in a draft bill or elsewhere. Page 110. See also page 357.

DOJ testifies against Indian gaming referencing immunity from state regulation in Indian country. Page 143

Interior testimony quoting 1983 Mescalero Apache decision on “historic” tribal immunity from state regulation. Page 164.

Excerpt from federal district court decision on tribal immunity from state taxation, suggesting Congress assumes states have no “residual power” to tax tribes. Page 419.

State of Minnesota testimony requesting waiver of tribal immunity to enforce gaming “licenses” against tribes. Page 501.

State of Minnesota testimony requesting waiver of immunity to allow national commission to enforce fines on tribes. This appears to assume that an Indian tribe might be immune from federal regulation, too. Page 504. See also page 505.

Arizona AG arguing that nonmembers gaming in tribal casinos should not be cloaked in tribal immunity for purposes of state regulation. Page 598.

Jun. 25, Sep. 13, 1985 Hearings (PDF)

Arizona AG arguing against Indian gaming in Indian country “immune from State regulation”. Page 40.

Tulalip member testifying about case in which State of Washington unsuccessfully sued to stop tribal bingo. Page 163.

Kickingbird testimony on gaming contracts, advising against “general waiver of sovereign immunity.” Page 188.

Indian Country, USA waiver of immunity in general form contract. Page 202.

Fort McDowell bingo code, preserving immunity. Page 900.

Rincon Band management contract, with limited waiver of immunity. Page 1183.

Barona Band management contract, with limited waiver. Page 1235.

June 26, 1985 Hearing (PDF)

Sen. Domenici testimony, concern about nonmember employees claiming immunity. Page 22.

Arizona AG arguing against Indian gaming in Indian country “immune from State regulation”. Page 115 (same as June 25 testimony)

Morongo Band management contract, no waiver. Page 266.

Tulalip member testifying about case in which State of Washington unsuccessfully sued to stop tribal bingo. Page 284. (same as June 25 testimony)

Kickingbird testimony on gaming contracts, advising against “general waiver of sovereign immunity.” Page 295. (same as June 25 testimony)

Indian Country, USA waiver of immunity in general form contract. Page 309. (same as June 25)

June 18, 1987 Hearing (PDF)

Coos, Lower Umpqua & Suislaw Indians testimony against waiver of tribal immunity, referencing “discriminatory taxation legislation.” Page 496.

Nov. 14, 1985 Hearing (PDF)

Interior testimony quoting 1983 Mescalero Apache decision on “historic” tribal immunity from state regulation. Page 38.

June 19, 1984 Hearing (PDF)

Rep. Vento expressing concern about nonmember management contractors asserting immunity from state regulation. Page 44-45.

National Indian Gaming Task Force testimony on tribal immunity from suit by gaming management consultants. Page 80.

CRS Report, April 26, 1985 (PDF)

Nothing

 

 

Michigan Opening Brief in Michigan v. Bay Mills — Updated

Here:

Michigan Brief

And:

Joint Appendix

Summer Preview of Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (Political Science edition)

The opening brief in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (No. 12-515) is due August 30 (that’s today!!!), and the case may shape up to be a blockbuster for Indian country. This is the Turtle Talk political science preview — forget the law, what are the politics? 🙂

The questions presented involve federal court jurisdiction over state suits alleging violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and, if there is federal court jurisdiction, whether IGRA abrogates tribal immunity.

To be frank, the case looks like a difficult case for the Bay Mills Indian Community to win, like most cases that reach the Supreme Court. Many of the facts do not favor the tribe. Most notably, the tribe opened a casino on fee lands located about 100 miles away from their reservation on the doorstep of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians. And, as the SCT said in City of Sherrill, a process exists for tribes to utilize when it wants to assert sovereign rights on fee lands — 25 U.S.C. § 465. It’s too late for that now, but that’s the usual process. What Bay Mills is doing probably appears to be another end-around play to the Supreme Court.

The law doesn’t appear to favor the tribe, either. The Department of Interior opined that the casino was illegal, rejecting the tribe’s theory that the land, which the tribe states it purchased with Michigan Indian Land Claim Settlement Act funds, was casino-eligible. The National Indian Gaming Commission concurred, but gave the tribe an opening by denying that it had jurisdiction to shut down the casino because it is not located on Indian lands.

The State of Michigan, and initially the Little Traverse Bay Bands, sued under the theory that the casino violated IGRA. This gave the tribe yet more room, it turns out, because, as the Sixth Circuit held, if the casino isn’t located on Indian lands, then IGRA doesn’t apply, and doesn’t give federal courts jurisdiction to review the legality of the casino. The Sixth Circuit also held that the tribe is immune from the State’s suit. It is my understanding that LTBB has since dropped out of the litigation.

Given the posture of the State’s questions presented, there are numerous potential outcomes, most of them bad for the tribe, and a few of them quite possibly catastrophic for Indian country.

Outcome #1 — The Supreme Court affirms the Sixth Circuit, holding that IGRA does not authorize the State’s suit, and does not reach the immunity question.

This is the best possible outcome for the tribe and for Indian country. However, the Supreme Court reverses in 70 percent of its cases generally, and tribal interests are 1-for-10 in the Roberts Court. Still, tribal interests’ best chances for winning in the Roberts Court is in statutory interpretation cases. The major problem for the tribe here is the fact that the Supreme Court might do anything it can to avoid a result like the one the Sixth Circuit reached, which created what looks like a jurisdictional loophole for the tribe to game in a gray area where no one can touch them, a result the Court could see as absurd.

Ironically, the biggest beneficiary to this outcome is likely to be the Bay Mills’ closest competitor, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, who has a pending CA6 case on similar questions and a Lansing casino proposal on the table.

Outcome #2 — The Supreme Court reverses the CA6 on the jurisdiction question but affirms on the tribal immunity question.

This is another good outcome for the tribe and especially for Indian country. But even the majority in Kiowa Tribe called upon Congress to correct the rule of tribal immunity, which Justice Stevens called “strikingly anomalous.”

There is some hope here; namely, that the State amended its federal court complaint to add individual tribal officers. The SCT could recognize federal court jurisdiction and remand for what could be a suit on the merits of Bay Mills’ Vanderbilt casino. This would be an outcome analogous to the Court’s decision in Citizen Potawatomi way back in 1991.

But so much turnover on the SCT since Kiowa and Potawatomi. Only Justices Kennedy and Scalia remain from the Potawatomi decision, and only Kennedy, Scalia, and Ginsburg remain from the Kiowa majority (Thomas and Breyer dissented in Kiowa). It’s a whole new ball game.

Outcome #3 — The Supreme Court reverses on both questions and holds that IGRA abrogates the tribe’s immunity.

This would be a pretty bad outcome for the Bay Mills Indian Community, and a loss for Indian country, but a loss less devastating than number 4 below. Here, the Court’s decision can be limited to the unusual facts of the matter — Bay Mills going off-reservation to open up a casino on fee land. Even then, the tribe could still win on its MILCSA theory. But the Court has a bad habit of speaking way beyond the facts of its cases and who knows what the dicta is going to say here?

The Supreme Court’s immunity decisions support the notion that tribal immunity should be strongest in cases closer to the internal relations of tribal governance than to off-reservation, commercial conduct. The origins of tribal immunity, and the most robust modern immunity decisions, involve internal tribal governance. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal membership); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850) (damages claim against Cherokee Principal Chief arising from Cherokee Removal). The hardest cases involve tribal commercial activities and off-reservation activities. C&L Enterprises Co., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411 (2001) (finding waiver in construction contract for commercial building); Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751 (affirming immunity in off-reservation commercial contract breach claim). The Bay Mills immunity defense arises from an off-reservation, commercial activity, rendering the claim weaker than a purely internal governance case.

Outcome #4 — The Supreme Court reverses on both questions and holds that it will not longer recognize tribal sovereign immunity in any instance.

This is the potential catastrophe. Each and every time the Supreme Court hears a tribal sovereign immunity case, the possibility exists the Court will simply abrogate tribal immunity. One must not forget that tribal immunity is a creature of the federal courts, and is not expressly recognized by Congress, the United States Constitution, or Indian treaties. Nothing, but nothing, stops the Supreme Court from reversing itself on tribal immunity. Fifteen years has passed since the Supreme Court asked Congress to solve the tribal immunity issue, Congress has done nothing.

Of course, as Congress no doubt recognizes, tribal immunity protects tribal assets like children’s and elder’s trust funds, land trusts, tribal government core functions like housing, health care, education, fire and police, medical, and a plethora of other desperately needed government services. Without immunity, each and every time a tribe is sued, the entire future of the tribe is up for grabs. There absolutely will be a huge run on tribal coffers from plaintiffs’ attorneys around the country looking to tap into tribal assets. Think Saul Goodman on Walter White’s meth.

Moreover, signs point to the Supreme Court carefully scrutinizing tribal sovereign immunity very carefully in the last few years. Remember, the conservative Justices like Chief Justice Roberts are in this thing for the long haul, and they can wait for the right vehicle to come along as a means to reach fairly dramatic decisions. A case like this one — where a tribe hides behind immunity to engage in an activity that even its trustee, the Interior Dept., says is illegal — could be that vehicle.

Outcome #5 — The tribe waives its immunity, mooting the second question presented, and litigates on the jurisdictional question alone.

This is another negative outcome for the tribe but a gigantic win for Indian country much akin to the Oneida waiver of immunity in the Madison County taxation case a few years back. The real question is whether the waiver would be effective, or whether the Supreme Court would decide the immunity question anyway, aka number 6 below.

Outcome #6 — The tribe waives its immunity, but the Supreme Court decides the immunity question anyway.

In my view, which is as an outsider looking in, this is an unlikely outcome, given that the Court is not in the business of deciding cases not before them. The release of a criminal from prison moots direct and habeas appeals before the Court, so why not here? Well, the exception to mootness is when a type of case is prone to repetition but evades review. If every tribe reaching the Supreme Court in an immunity case waives its immunity, then the Court will never hear another immunity case. For tribal interests, that’s probably just fine. But it may antagonize the Court.

Even so, I would strongly recommend waiving immunity unless a tribe is before the Supreme Court on something directly implicating its internal governance. Assuming the Court is looking for a vehicle, waiving immunity now doesn’t hurt. Getting immunity off the table is such an enormous benefit to Bay Mills — it makes the case about statutory interpretation instead of a judge-made common law doctrine that nobody likes. Definitely worth a try.

Update in Sharp Image Gaming v. Shingle Springs Miwok

The United States has filed an amicus curiae brief confirming that the trial court erred in disregarding the NIGC’s action.  The United States confirmed that the state courts are required to defer to the agency’s views, as expressed in an NIGC opinion letter, the Chairman’s decision disapproving the agreement, and in the United States’ amicus brief, itself:

[T]he Superior Court was obliged to exercise its jurisdiction consistent with IGRA and IGRA’s bar on the enforcement of unapproved management contracts. Instead of acknowledging this bar and the need to resolve whether the ELA was an unapproved management contract (consistent with deference principles), the Superior Court simply denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Chairman’s 2009 Disapproval was not “final agency action” binding on the state court. . . .

This is a non sequitur. A final disapproval decision by the NIGC is not necessary to render an unapproved management contract void. Such contract is and remains void unless and until the NIGC takes formal action to approve the contract. 25 C.F.R. §§ 533.1(a), 533.7. The NIGC’s disapproval of the ELA merely preserved the legal status quo. Thus, even if the 2009 Disapproval was invalid due to procedural errors – a question over which the Superior Court had no jurisdiction (see infra) – a ruling setting aside the NIGC’s decision would not resolve the preemption question.

. . .

[T]he present case involves the NIGC’s determination on a threshold legal issue involving an interpretation and application of the NIGC regulation defining “management contract.” The NIGC expressed its regulatory interpretation in the 2009 Disapproval and the 2007 OpinionLetter (as well as in the present amicus brief). The NIGC is entitled to deference in the interpretation of its own regulations, even when such interpretation is not rendered in a formal rulemaking or other final agency action.

Here is the United States’ brief and the parties’ briefs in response:

United States’ Amicus Brief

Sharp’s Response to United States’ Amicus Brief

Tribe’s Response to United States’ Amicus Brief

The merits briefs are here.

Federal Court Dismisses Cherokee County Challenge to Quapaw Casino

Here are the materials in Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County Kansas v. Jewell (D. D.C.):

DCT Order Dismissing Cherokee County Suit

Interior Motion to Dismiss

Cherokee County Opposition

Cherokee County Motion for Summary J

Interior Opposition

News coverage here.

Federal Court Dismisses OSHA Claim against Seminole Casino

Here are the materials in Maestro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida (M.D. Fla.):

DCT Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

Seminole Motion to Dismiss

Maestro Response

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community on Schedule in Supreme Court Conference Today

See SCOTUSblog. And docket. We should know Monday.

Here are the briefs:

Michigan v Bay Mills Cert Petition w Appendices

Bay Mills Cert Opp

Michigan Cert Stage Reply

United States Invitation Brief

Michigan Supplemental Brief

New Practitioner Paper on the Tenth Amendment Implications of IGRA’s Class II and Class III Distinction

Jacob Berman of the California AG’s office has published Such Gaming Causes Trouble: Constitutional and Statutory Confusion with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in the Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law.

There is no abstract but this paragraph from the conclusion establishes the premise:

Since its passage, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act has proved wildly successful at improving Indian tribes’ economic status, but the Second and Tenth Circuits have deviated  from Congress’ original intent. The IGRA was intended to put Indian tribes and state governments on an equal footing, not to give tribal governments undue leverage over state governments. This principle of tribal-state equality has been ignored by the Second and Tenth Circuits, which instead decided to force states to choose between no Class III gambling and all Class III gambling, treating state lotteries, race tracks, and off-track betting as functionally equivalent to craps, roulette and slot machines. Not only does this approach go against Congress’ intent in passing the IGRA, but it also goes against the Tenth Amendment’s anti-coercion doctrine, which prohibits the federal government from enlisting state legislatures and to enforce federal policies. The Eleventh Amendment option, created in Seminole, presents no viable alternative for a state seeking to maintain any form of regulated Class III gaming under the class-based test.

Not supportive of tribal prerogatives, and basically reads Cabazon Band of the equation. The language in red above, in my view, is just flat wrong on a number of levels. Oh well.

Ninth Circuit, on Reconsideration, Orders Interior Review of Gila Bend Act in Tohono O’odham Gaming Lands Appeal

Here are the materials in City of Glendale v. United States:

Superceding panel opinion

Arizona & Glendale En Banc Petition

Gila River En Banc Petition

Federal Response

TON Response

The court’s syllabus:

The panel withdrew its prior opinion and published a superseding opinion affirming in part, and reversing and remanding in part, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of federal defendants in an action by the City of Glendale seeking to set aside the United States Department of Interior’s decision to accept in trust, for the benefit of the Tohono O’odham Nation, a 54-acre parcel of land known as Parcel 2 on which the Nation hoped to build a resort and casino.

The panel held the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, read as a whole, was unambiguous and that § 6(c) of the Act created a cap only on land held in trust for
the Nation, not on total land acquisition by the tribe under the Act. The panel held that § 6(d) of Act was ambiguous as to whether Parcel 2, located on a county island fully surrounded by city land, was within the City of Glendale’s corporate limits. The panel held further that the Secretary of the Interior was mistaken in concluding that the term has a plain meaning, and remanded for the agency to consider the question afresh in light of the ambiguity the panel saw. Finally, the panel held that passage of the Act was within congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause and was not trumped by the Tenth Amendment

News coverage here.

Previous panel materials here.

OSG Recommends Denial of Michigan’s Cert Petition in Vanderbilt Casino Dispute

Here is the brief:

12-515 Michigan v Bay Mills