Here are the materials in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Lee (D. Ariz.):
Navajo Exhaustion Motion to Dismiss
Navajo Rule 19 Motion to Dismiss
Salt River Motion for Summary Judgment
This case is on remand from the Ninth Circuit — and that order is here.
To say the least, an interesting development.
Here is the letter referencing the OIN ordinance waiving immunity irrevocably: 2010_11_30 Letter to Clerk re Declaration and Ordinance.
Madison County’s opening merits brief is due today.
Here is the opinion. Briefs are here and here.
And here is the Court’s syllabus:
In this tribal sovereign immunity case, the Colorado Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals’ decision to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans act as arms of the Miami Nation of Oklahoma and the Santee Sioux Nation, respectively, such that their activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribes. As an initial matter, the court holds that tribal sovereign immunity applies to judicial enforcement of state investigatory actions, including this state investigative subpoena enforcement action. Because the trial court arrived at a contrary conclusion, a remand is necessary to determine whether Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans are arms of their respective tribes such that their activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribes.
In determining whether Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans are arms of their respective tribes, the trial court shall consider the following three factors: (1) whether the tribes created the entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes own and operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects the tribes’ sovereignty. The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans are not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
Additionally, the supreme court disagrees with the court of appeals’ determination that tribal sovereign immunity does not extend to tribal officers engaged in conduct allegedly violating state law. Instead, the appropriate determination with respect to individual tribal officers is whether they acted within the scope of their lawful authority, as defined by the tribe and limited only by federal law.The supreme court further disagrees with the court of appeals’ to the extent it would recognize a waiver of sovereign immunity that is not explicit and unequivocal. The court of appeals directed the trial court to look for a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in a broad range of sources, including a contractual arbitration clause between Cash Advance or Preferred Cash Loans and Colorado customers. The court, however, finds it unlikely that an explicit and unequivocal waiver of tribal sovereign immunity would be found in such an arbitration clause.
Here are the materials in Saroli v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (S.D. Cal.):
Agua Caliente Motion to Dismiss
Saroli Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
DCT Order on Agua Caliente Motion to Dismiss
An excerpt:
Section 10.2(d) of the Amended Compact provides that Defendant consents to arbitrate personal injury claims and that Defendant agrees to waive sovereign immunity “in any action brought in federal court … to (1) enforce the parties’ obligation to arbitrate, (2) confirm, correct, modify, or vacate the arbitral award rendered in the arbitration, or (3) enforce or execute a judgment based upon the award.” (Compl., Ex. A at § 10.2(d)(ii).) The parties submit no other documents showing a waiver of sovereign immunity. Based on the plain and express language of Section 10.2(d) above, the Court finds that, at most, Defendant has agreed to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for claims relating to arbitration. The issue is now whether Plaintiff’s claims fall under this waiver.
Here is the unpublished opinion in Reed v. Gutierrez.
An excerpt:
In this case, we determine whether the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity shields Defendant Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico (the Pueblo) and its employee, Defendant Robert Gutierrez, from liability for an off-reservation tort. We hold pursuant to Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S.7 751 (1998), that they are immune from the claims of Plaintiffs Peggy and Timothy Reed and affirm the district court.
Interesting case, with Rule 19 a major player.
Here is the opening brief in El Dorado/Diamond Springs Fire Protection District v. El Dorado Fire Protection District (Cal. App. 3rd Dist.): Diamond Springs Opening Brief.
The agreement involves the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians.
Here is that court’s opinion in Armijo v. Pueblo of Laguna. An excerpt:
The Pueblo of Laguna (the Pueblo) appeals the order of the district court denying the Pueblo’s motion to dismiss the cross-claims of Appellee Robert Armijo (Armijo) filed in a quiet title suit. Our resolution of this appeal requires us to consider the issue of tribal sovereign immunity as it relates to non-tribal land purchased by the Pueblo and whether the Pueblo is an indispensable party. We hold that the Pueblo is immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, further, that the Pueblo is an indispensable party who cannot be joined. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court and remand for dismissal of Armijo’s cross-claims.
Interestingly, this case was decided Oct. 6, right before the Supreme Court granted cert in Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation.
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