Here is the CFPB fact sheet, with links to outlines of proposals under consideration will be posted.
Author: Matthew L.M. Fletcher
Arizona State Law Journal Symposium: “School-To-Prison Pipeline in Indian Country”
Ninth Circuit Reverses Judgment Favoring Crow Nation against HUD
Here is the opinion in Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. HUD.
From the court’s syllabus:
The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding the case to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for a hearing, reversed the judgment, and remanded for judgment to be entered in favor of HUD in a case brought by the Crow Tribal Housing Authority, arising from a dispute involving Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996.
The panel held that the district court erred in ruling that HUD violated Crow Housing’s right to Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996’s notice and reporting requirements under 25 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4165.
Specifically, the panel concluded that HUD did not act under § 4161, and accordingly, could not have violated a hearing requirement under that section. The panel further concluded that HUD’s actions triggered the opportunity for a hearing under § 4165 when it conducted an on-site review of Crow Housing in August 2004. Finally, the panel held that because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under § 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing under the facts of the case.
Briefs and materials are here.
Florida COA Rules against Miccosukee Tribe in Suit against Lewis Tein
Here is the opinion:
An excerpt:
Once the movants made such a presentation, the burden shifted to the Tribe as the non-movant opposing the motion to either (1) come forward with conflicting evidence that created a disputed issue of material fact which, if decided in favor of the Tribe, would support a judgment for the Tribe; or (2) file an affidavit, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(f), describing with specificity the additional discovery needed to obtain such evidence. The Tribe did neither. For example, the Tribe’s expert was unable to identify a single invoice by the Lawyers that he believed was fraudulent, illegal, or excessive.
Federal Defender Positioning United States v. Drapeau to Force Circuit Split over Use of Prior Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Federal Sentencing Enhancement
Here are the briefs in United States v. Drapeau:
An excerpt:
Santana Drapeau was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by an habitual offender. In support of those charges the United States offered evidence of Drapeau’s three prior domestic abuse convictions in Crow Creek Tribal Court. In each instance Drapeau entered a no contest plea; in two of the three he did so without a lawyer. Over Drapeau’s objection under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404, the District Court admitted testimony about the underlying facts giving rise to those convictions. The District Court admitted that evidence based on a flawed understanding of whether the court or the jury decided what was a qualifying predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 117.
The District Court denied Drapeau’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the use of no contest pleas obtained without counsel as qualifying predicate offenses. Drapeau acknowledges that this issue is controlled by United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), but presents it here in order to preserve it for review by this Court en banc and through petition for writ of certiorari.
We’ve commented on this issue extensively here and here. Right now, there is no circuit split as both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have allowed use of the tribal court convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 117, a habitual offender statute. The cases are Cavanaugh and Shavanaux. There’s a Ninth Circuit case from the 1980s — United States v. Ant (882_F.2d_1389) — that is in disagreement with these cases but in a different context (confessions).
Ah, there is a clean split that I forgot about! United States v. Bryant in the CA9.
A case worthy of watching.
I wrote a short paper about these issues more generally a while back: Sovereign Comity
North Fork Rancheria Sues California Alleging Violation of IGRA Good Faith Negotiation Obligation
Here is the complaint in North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California v. State of California (E.D. Cal.):
An excerpt:
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) requires states, upon request by an Indian tribe, to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into” “a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities” on the tribe’s “Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). IGRA also confers jurisdiction on this Court over “any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith.” Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). This action is brought pursuant to § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and seeks a declaration that Defendant the State of California (“the State” or “California”) has failed to comply with § 2710(d)(3)(A)’s requirement that the State negotiate in good faith with Plaintiff North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California (“the Tribe”) to enter into an enforceable tribal-state gaming compact, and an order directing the State to conclude an enforceable compact with the Tribe within 60 days or submit to mediation, see id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(iv).
Yakama/Umatilla Prevail against Fish and Wildlife Service in Sacred Sites Question
Here are the materials in Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Fish and Wildlife Service (E.D. Wash.):
49 Umatilla Motion for Summary J
50 Yakama Motion for Summary J
An excerpt:
Although the NHPA and its accompanying regulations do not mandate a particular substantive outcome, its procedural requirements are obligatory. This Court would be derelict in its duties if it failed to enforce the minimal procedural protections guaranteed the Tribes. True, the Service, after reopening consultation with the parties, may reasonably conclude that the expanded program of wildflower tours will have no adverse effect on the Lalíik TCP. But this hypothetical cannot influence the Court’s current analysis. Instead, the relevant focus is whether the Service complied with the relevant statute and regulations: did the Service “stop, look, listen,” and carefully consider tribal input before moving ahead with the greatly expanded undertaking? Or, instead, did the Service stop, look at past tribal consultations on similar proposals, and inappropriately assume that each Tribe would merely voice its blanket opposition rather than providing additional insight to or suggested mitigation measures for the expanded undertaking? Because this Court concludes the latter occurred here, the only remedy is to set aside the Agency’s no adverse effect finding on the updated proposal and order the Service to reengage in the consultation process before conducting any additional wildflower tours within the Lalíik TCP, if it still chooses to pursue the undertaking.
Mishewal Wappo Tribe Loses Trust Breach/Federal Recognition Claim
Here is the order in Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. Jewell (N.D. Cal.):
Briefs are here.
Quinault Moves to Dismiss Claims against Estate of Edward Comenout; Counterclaims Dismissed, Too
Here are the materials in Quinault Indian Nation v. Comenout (W.D. Wash.):
North Dakota SCT Holds State and Tribal Courts Enjoy Concurrent Jurisdiction over Child Support Matters…
… where one parent lives on and the other lives off the reservation.
Here is the opinion in Lavallie v. Lavallie.
Briefs:
Turtle Talk 
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